
THE GREAT WAR

BY

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES



THE GREAT WAR

THE GREAT WAR

THE FIRST PHASE

[FROM THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE TO THE FALL OF ANTWERP]

FRANK H. SIMONDS



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CONTENTS

THE CRISIS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	Preface	5
I	The Assassination of the Archduke	9
II	The European Crisis	13
III	Austria Declares War on Servia	20
IV	What War Meant to the Great Powers	25
V	Mobilization	31
VI	England Before the War	37
VII	Germany Invades Belgium	43
VIII	England Makes up Her Mind	47
IX	Italy Declares Her Neutrality	50
X	The End of the First Act	53

FIRST BATTLES

XI	The Attack upon Liège	57
XII	Liège Resists	63
XIII	British Troops on the Continent	67
XIV	The French Invade Alsace	71
XV	Ten Days of War	75
XVI	Belgian Battles	81
XVII	The French Counter Offensive	86
XVIII	Poland Resurgent.	92
XIX	German Armies Approach Brussels	97

FROM BRUSSELS TO THE GATES OF PARIS

XX	The Russian Offensive also Steps Out	104
XXI	The Germans Take Brussels and Start for France	112
XXII	The French Counter Offensive Fails	118

CHAPTER		PAGE
XXIII	France Changes Ministers	124
XXIV	The German Enveloping Movement	129
XXV	The Great Retreat	135
XXVI	Sedan Day and a Month of War	140
XXVII	The Fate of Austria	145
XXVIII	On to Richmond in 1864 and On to Paris in 1914	150
XXIX	Lemberg	155
XXX	General Joffre's Strategy	162

FROM THE MARNE TO THE AISNE

XXXI	The End of the Great Retreat	169
XXXII	The Battle of the Marne	175
XXXIII	German Disaster	182
XXXIV	Von Kluck's Retreat to the Aisne	188
XXXV	How the Battle of the Aisne Began	197
XXXVI	On Von Kluck's Right Flank	203
XXXVII	On the Allied Right	207
XXXVIII	The Fall of Jaroslav	213
XXXIX	A German Attack upon Antwerp	219
XL	Extinguishing Germany's Place in the Sun	225
XLI	German Surprises	231
XLII	The End of the First Phase	236
	Postscript—The Fall of Antwerp	244
	Dates in the Great War	249

PREFACE

Many but not all of the chapters of this book were first written as editorial articles. They were intended to supply in some slight measure an answer to the question raised on all sides and concerning each separate incident in the European War: "What does it mean?"

While the original articles have been revised, corrected, supplemented, their purpose remains exactly the same. They still represent an effort to explain, in the light of such information as is yet available the meaning of recent events so far described only in heavily censored news despatches and in laconic official statements from interested war offices.

They are then frankly and simply editorial comment on some but by no means all of the more considerable episodes of the first two months of the present world war written close to the event and here presented with a complete recognition of the limitations of such comment.

My acknowledgments are due Mr. William C.

Reick, President of the Sun Printing and Publishing Association, for permitting me to use such parts of this volume as were covered by the copyright owned by that corporation and to the American *Review of Reviews* for permission to use extracts from an article of mine published by it.

My thanks are due my colleagues of the editorial staff of the *Evening Sun,* Mr. Charles M. Fitzgerald and Mr. Philip Coan, for intelligent, painstaking and generous assistance, without which the original articles could not have been prepared.

F. H. S.

Upper Montclair, N. J., October 10, 1914.

THE CRISIS

CHAPTER I

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE


THE assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne, by an Austrian Serb in Serajevo, the Bosnian capital, on June 28 served to bring back to European attention suddenly and violently the great dream of the Serbs, which after slumbering for long centuries, was awakened by the triumph of Kumanovo and stimulated by the splendid victory on the Bregalnitza. It was the sober judgment of not a few European statesmen that the Balkan wars had created a Slavic state as dangerous to Austria as the aggrandized Sardinia which was the work of the Congress of Vienna, a state as certain to seek to achieve the liberation and unity of the Southern Slavs as Sardinia was to strive for the redemption of Italy. The bombs and bullets in Serajevo were a prompt confirmation of this forecast.

To-day the Serbs of southeastern Europe number some 7,000,000, occupying a compact territory between the Adriatic and the Drave. Half of them

live in the two independent States of Servia and Montenegro, which are now to all practical purposes a single state. The other half live in the Austrian province of Dalmatia, the Hungarian province of Slavonia and the Austro-Hungarian territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In addition there are in the Hungarian province of Croatia upward of 2,000,000 Croats, whose language is practically identical with that of the Servians, but who use a different alphabet, have a wholly separate history, are Roman Catholic and were long loyal subjects of the House of Hapsburg. Finally, in the Austrian provinces of Istria, Carniola and Styria there are 1,250,000 Slovenes, less closely related to the Serbs than the Croats, but Slavs. Thus, in a territory as large as the mainland of Italy and bounded by the Drave, the Adriatic and the frontiers of Montenegro and Servia there dwell 12,000,000 Slavs.

Prior to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, the Servian dream had been limited to the hope of reclaiming Old Servia from Turkey, inheriting the title to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and with the acquisition of the Sandjak of Novipasar joining hands with Montenegro and through northern Albania reaching the Adriatic at Durazzo. The sudden and forcible annexation of Bosnia, the veto of Austria to the Albanian aspirations of Servia after the first Balkan war, these wrecked the whole Servian dream. They also put the crowning touch upon the bitterness



THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

between the Serb and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had long existed.

Had Austria, in annexing Bosnia changed her traditional policy, it is possible she might have avoided what followed. But into Bosnia she carried the spirit which brought her ruin in Northern Italy in the nineteenth century. In the meantime the Hungarian Government pursued a similar policy of repression and cruelty toward the Croatians. Finally the Slovenes found themselves caught between Italian and German ambitions, since in the long promised break up of Austria, both nations planned to lay hands upon Trieste, a city Italian by population but a mere enclave in the Slovene block.

Thus it was that even before the great Serb triumph over Turkey, the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary, encouraged undoubtedly by the Pan-Slav propagandists of Russia, began to dream of a union with their independent Serb brethren. When Servia suddenly emerged from her long eclipse and won her splendid triumphs over the Turk, the imagination of the Croats and of the Bosnian Serbs was equally fired. When Austria, taking alarm, began to bully Servia, the indignation in her Serb and Croat provinces made it necessary to declare martial law. When Austrian troops were mobilized as a menace to Servia, it was necessary to send only German troops from Austria's Teutonic provinces and Hungarians, for the Slavs openly threatened to mutiny.

The Austrian championship of the cause of the

Albanians, her veto upon Servian dreams of a " window upon the sea " awakened equal wrath among her own subjects, who looked with ill-disguised resentment upon the attempt of Austria to defend the racial integrity of an alien people at the moment she was crushing out the national aspirations of her own subjects. When Austrian interference made the second Balkan war inevitable and Servia emerged again and more splendidly victorious, with new provinces and new laurels, her place among the Southern Slavs was wholly comparable with that of Sardinia when, after Solferino and Magenta, she had with French aid freed the Valley of the Po and opened the way for Italian unity.

In the pathway of the Servians' dream stood the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. It was known that he planned to try to reconcile the Southern Slavs by seeking to satisfy their longings for national unity within the Empire, by creating a three-part Empire in place of the present dual kingdom. Alone in Austria he stood forth as a strong man, who might conceivably save the shaken structure when Francis Joseph should die. His removal must seem more than the insane act of mere school boys, something beyond blind protest against stupid and cruel tyranny, for in removing the heir to the throne of a hostile country it eliminated an obstacle of real peril to the Pan-Servian dreams.

CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

ON July 23, Austria abruptly sent an ultimatum to Servia, in substance charging that Government with responsibility for the murder of the Archduke, imposing conditions which amounted to the surrender of Servian independence and giving but a few hours for answer. This was instantly accepted by Europe as a real challenge to Russia and for the third time in five years the two great groups of European Powers, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, stood face to face with the obvious possibility that war might result from the clash of rival purposes. Once more Russia, France and Great Britain were in one camp, Germany, Austria and presumably Italy in the other, and between the two lay the old question of European balance of power.

In 1908, when Austria annexed Bosnia, France, Great Britain and Russia protested. The annexation was in fact an express violation of the agreement made in the great Congress of Berlin after the Russo-Turkish war. It not merely increased the territory of a member of the Triple Alliance but it

extinguished the hope of a little Slav State racially, politically, religiously related to Russia.

At the critical moment in 1908 Germany appeared "in shining armor," declared for Austrian purposes and threw her sword into the balance. Russia and her allies were unready for war and were compelled to accept a crushing and humiliating defeat — but the consequences of the defeat were manifold. From that hour began Russian intriguing in the Balkans to promote that unity which was presently to crush Turkey.

In 1911, when Germany sent her warship to Agadir, the two groups came into collision again. In 1908 Germany had threatened Russia; in 1911 she menaced France, demanding as the price of recognition of a French protectorate in Morocco huge territorial grants for herself. But this time the Triple Entente was less compliant. British fleets assembled, Russian armies were mobilized, and finally Lloyd George made the memorable speech which amounted to a warning to Germany that England stood with France.

Then it was Germany's turn to yield, as it had been Russia's in 1908. Some territorial gain she did make in the swamps of the Ubanghi, but Morocco became French, German prestige was terribly shaken and the passionate resentment of the German people had found expression ever since in the press and in the utterances of many of her public men.

The defeat of the Triple Alliance in Morocco was

quickly followed by disasters more serious. Italy went to Tripoli and in making war upon Turkey attacked a Power regarded in Germany as an ally, whose army, German trained, was confidently expected to stand with the Triple Alliance on the great day of European conflict.

Defeated by Italy, Turkey was next compelled to face the alliance of the Balkan States, whose union was the direct product of Russian diplomacy. With the victories of Lule Burgas, Kumanovo and Jenidje-Vardar, Turkish power in Europe collapsed and the small Balkan States, increased by great territorial gain, stood on Austria's southern frontier, barring her road to the Ægean, and in the case of Servia threatening to play the rôle on the Danube that Sardinia had played on the Po and unite the southern Slavs as Sardinia united Italy.

To prevent this Austria resorted to desperate tactics. Like Germany, she had expected Turkish victory, and the Osmanli ruin found her unprepared. Toward Servia she adopted bullying methods. To break up the Balkan alliance, which was in fact a Russian creation and an adjunct of the Triple Entente, she promoted the dissension among the Balkan allies which resulted in the second war.

But again Austria backed the wrong horse. Not only was Bulgaria defeated and Servia still further increased in territory and in prestige, but Austrian support for Bulgaria had alienated Rumania, hitherto the steadfast friend of the Triple Alliance,

and precisely as the Servians began to dream of regaining Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rumania cast envious eyes on the millions of Rumanians in Hungary.

Meantime, as the situation of Austria had been compromised abroad, it was weakened at home. Half the population of the Dual Monarchy is Slav, but the ruling races are German and Magyar. Austrian bullying of Servia provoked protest, riot, disorder, at home. In Bohemia, Croatia, Galicia, Slav populations protested in vain but found cause for hope and enthusiasm in the triumph of the Serb.

Only one diplomatic triumph Austria brought home in her campaign. Servian aspirations for a " window on the sea " were thwarted and the Albanian kingdom was created. But no sooner had it been created than the rival ambitions of Italy and Austria began to clash and European observers forecast a quarrel between Austria and Italy such as Schleswig-Holstein provoked between Prussia and Austria in 1866.

Thus, on the edge of the latest crisis the Triple Alliance found itself in a badly weakened condition. Austria on her southern boundary was confronted with Serb and Rumanian armies, whose fighting capacity was proven, whose national aspirations would be promoted by Austrian disruption. Greece, too, excluded from Epirus by Italy, had been driven to the Entente and possessed a fleet and an army to be reckoned with.

At home Austria faced growing disorder. Her

Slav populations, their racial pride and confidence roused by Servian and Bulgarian victories, no longer endured with patience the persecutions of Germans and Hungarians. Disloyalty was on the increase on all sides, and Austria seemed about to succeed Turkey as "the Sick Man of Europe."

In this situation German newspapers and public men began to demand that the clash between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente should be postponed no longer. Time patently was with the enemy. Austria was growing weaker, Austro-Italian rivalry in Albania as well as secular rivalry in Trieste and the Trentino plainly promised future quarrels which might destroy the fighting value of the Triple Alliance and leave Germany alone between France and Russia.

It was the German temper which made the Servian crisis serious. At the time of the Bosnian clash no nation in Europe desired war, and only Germany was ready. At the moment of the Moroccan dispute Germany backed down because she found France, England and Russia ready and the possible gain incommensurate with the possible loss a great war might bring.

In July, 1914, a very considerable faction of German official life believed that only by war could Germany maintain her predominance in Europe and that a few years more of peace would leave her far behind Russia in strength, in resources and in allies. In 1914 she could count on Austria and presumably

Italy. A few years hence and Austria might have fallen apart, but Russia, England and France were not likely to grow weaker.

The challenge Austria issued to Russia, then, was Germany's challenge. It was also her own declaration of a determination to fight for her existence. Russia had enlisted Servia and Rumania on her southern boundary. Russia had promoted Slav aspirations and disloyalty in Austria. Now Russia must leave Servia to her fate, abandon her schemes to destroy Austria within and without, she must publicly confess she could not aid her weaker Slav allies, or she must fight. Austria preferred to be destroyed by war rather than by the attrition of intrigue.

If France and Great Britain stood with Russia her decision could not be mistaken. If France and Russia were agreed to resist, the result could hardly be different. But British statesmen were unlikely to run the risk of a German victory which would leave Germany with her hands free to fight for naval supremacy.

The worst phase of the July crisis was that neither Alliance nor Entente could now escape war without tremendous loss of prestige. The challenge of Austria had been made in such fashion that it left Russia no choice between war and dishonor. The German official utterance gave the thing the value of an issue between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

It was the combination of all of these circumstances which made the Servian crisis the most serious Europe had seen since Bismarck edited the fateful Ems dispatch and the Franco-Prussian war resulted.

CHAPTER III

AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR UPON SERVIA

ALTHOUGH Servia agreed to comply with all but the most humiliating of Austria's demands and to refer these to The Hague, Austria pronounced the Servian answer unsatisfactory and on July 28 declared war upon Servia. The declaration of war automatically removed from the field of diplomacy the possibility of composing the original cause of the European crisis. It also transformed a situation already grave beyond any this generation had known into one of peril almost beyond calculation.

It was still humanly possible that the conflict might be "localized," as the current phrase had it. In other words, it was still possible for Russia to stand aside and permit the little Slav States of Servia and Montenegro, which owed their existence to her, to be worn down by the millions of Austro-Hungarian soldiers, who were already advancing on Servian soil.

But that Russia would do this remained as inconceivable as it was on the day when Austria made her first move. Nothing of the meagre news that came from St. Petersburg since that hour had war-

ranted the slightest hope that Russia would remain a passive witness to the destruction of two little States bound to her by race, by religion and by sentiments too deep to analyze.

And if Russia did not suffer the destruction of Servia, then Germany was fatally drawn into the vortex by her obligations, which were made by Bismarck, and through the Triple Alliance have preserved the peace of Europe for more than a generation. With Germany, France, too, was involved. As sacred and as binding upon France as upon Germany were the terms of her foreign alliances.

England and Italy might stand aloof. Indeed, there was every indication that they would, for the present. Desperate efforts in Rome and London were still being made to "localize," to limit, to reduce the immense area of possible conflict. But with what slightest prospect of success now, when the Austrian declaration had in fact set the match to the magazine?

Since Napoleon faced Europe in arms, since Leipzig, the "Battle of the Nations" was fought, no such far-reaching contest as now threatened had been faced. From the English Channel to the Neva, from the Mediterranean to the German Ocean the millions of armed men Europe had trained for a generation seemed bound to clash. All the secular hatred of Slav and Teuton, of Prussian and Frenchman appeared inevitably to be about to be unchained in a conflict the end of which no man could

see and the consequences of which might change the map of three continents.

On the eve of hostilities between Austria and Servia, there was plain reason to recall the famous prophecy of Krueger, so soon realized, that the British conquest of the two Boer republics would be at a cost "which would stagger humanity."

There was, too, in the Austro-Servian clash a plain parallel, for the mighty resources of the Hapsburg Empire were also directed against two little States, Servia and Montenegro, who were bound to stand or fall together, whose resistance was certain to be desperate and whose condition warranted the conjecture that they would prove a difficult problem for Austrian military forces.

For since the Prussian army demobilized after its conquest of France, no European nation had possessed an army whose uninterrupted triumphs could compare with those of Servia in the two great wars of the Balkans. The 300,000 troops Servia and Montenegro possessed had served in two terrible campaigns. They had been victorious in two great battles, one unequalled in number of combatants in any European conflict since Gravelotte, and from the Turk and the Bulgar they had captured enormous amounts of military material, of rifles, of cannon, of ammunition.

It was the misfortune of the Serbs that the press of the world fixed upon Turk and Bulgarian as the chief combatants of the first Balkan war. Yet while

Bulgarians were still striving to break down Turkish resistance in Thrace, 100,000 Serbs at Kumanovo routed and destroyed the main Turkish army in Macedonia, drove it through Uskub, a fortress town almost as defensible as Adrianople, and harried the retreating rabble, making an early rally impossible.

Again, what was left of the Macedonian army having collected at Monastir, the Servian troops overwhelmed it, took its entrenchments by assault, captured half the Turks and sent the rest flying into the mountains of Albania. Meantime one Servian army had penetrated the snow blocked passes of Albania and reached Durazzo and another was before Adrianople aiding the Bulgar. When at last Adrianople fell it was Servian troops who captured the Turkish general and carried his last fort by storm.

In the second war 160,000 Bulgarians attacked the main Servian army on the Bregalnitza without warning and without declaration of war. Yet despite the momentary disorder of the Serbs a few hours later they advanced to that attack, which after several days of desperate fighting broke the Bulgarian army into two disordered fractions and sent them back over the mountains, thus regaining for Servia the whole of Macedonia.

Such was the Servian battle record. Their victory over the Turk at Kumanovo was more complete than that of the Bulgar at Lule Burgas. Their triumph over the Bulgar at the Bregalnitza was as

complete as any of the famous "decisive battles of the world." Throughout the Turkish and Bulgarian wars their armies suffered no reverse.

These 300,000 Serbs, battle trained and nerved by the proud record of recent victory, were now to challenge at least 1,000,000 Austrian and Hungarian troops. But neither the Austrian nor the Hungarian had known battle. Both Austrian and Hungarian armies included many thousands of Slavs, whose allegiance was at the very least doubtful.

Left alone, Servia was as certain to be overwhelmed as was Sardinia, when Novara seemed to end all hope of Italian unity. But the capacity for prolonged resistance in her own mountains Servia certainly possessed, and each day of resistance must infallibly stir more deeply the sympathy of the "great Slav brother" beyond the Carpathians and the Vistula, whose battalions were already gathering on the Galician frontier.

CHAPTER IV

WHAT WAR MEANT TO THE GREAT POWERS

THE Austrian declaration of war precipitated the final crisis. All eyes turned instantly to Berlin and St. Petersburg, where efforts were still being made to compose the disagreement, which was now recognized as almost inevitably leading toward a general war.

What then were the considerations, the possibilities and the probabilities which influenced and decided the statesmen and rulers of the great nations now on the verge of war? What were the foreign and domestic concerns of the six great Powers divided into the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy and the Triple Entente of France, Great Britain and Russia, which were being weighed by those who had now to decide between peace and a world war?

For Austria the die was already cast. She had accepted all the perils of war; she had hazarded Armageddon, because in the opinion of all Austrian statesmen war alone could save the Dual Monarchy. Her prestige was ruined by the Balkan wars. On the southern frontier there was raised a Servia, in all respects resembling the Sardinia which in the last

century became the corner-stone of United Italy. And as France stood forth as the champion of Sardinia and defeated Austrian armies at Magenta and Solferino, so Russia was ready to help the southern Slav *risorgimento.*

Victorious Austria could annex Servia, unite all the southern Slavs under the Hapsburg crown, perhaps win their loyalty by transforming the Dual Monarchy into a tripartite State; she could, too, resume her march to the Ægean uninterrupted by Servian success.

Defeated, she was bound to be despoiled, Galicia, Bukovina, Transylvania, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia might fall to Russia, Rumania and Servia. But without war she was, in the view of her rulers, doomed to crumble, destined to be torn by the dissensions between her many races until she fell apart automatically. Austria had decided for war as the price of national existence.

For Russia the problem was different. Her existence was not at stake. But if she should fight and win her frontier would infallibly be carried to the Carpathians on the southwest and the Germans believed she would seize the ancient Polish lands of Posen and East and West Prussia, with the port of Dantzig and the valley of the Vistula. Again, once Austria were destroyed and Germany crushed, the last obstacle to Russian occupation of Constantinople vanished and the dream of centuries of Russian rulers and statesmen was realizable.

In the nearer view Russian victory would inevitably arouse the deepest emotions of the whole Slav race. Religion quite as much as race, too, cried out against the Austrian despoliation of the Serb States. Should the Romanoffs bring back a splendid victory now, it might consolidate Russian internal life, postpone the revolution so long promised, unite all shades of Russian life.

Defeated, Russia could not be dismembered. By her very bulk she would remain immune to the dangers that must threaten Austria and France. Her progress as a great power might be delayed for a little, but nearly 200,000,000 of Slavs could not be long restrained. Not to defend Servia was to sacrifice prestige at home and abroad, to lose the support of the religious and racial emotions of the Russian people, to become contemptible in the eyes of her own subjects. This was the Russian alternative.

For Germany the choice between war and peace was only less clear. Victorious Germany would at the very least have postponed the Slav peril for a generation. Once and for all she would have "dealt with France" and for years she could expect a free hand in her struggle with Great Britain for naval supremacy and for that "place in the sun" so passionately desired by German patriots. French colonies would be the prize of war. Great Britain would be left alone to confront Germany as supreme and unchallenged on the Continent as Napoleon

after Austerlitz and Jena. So the Germans at least viewed the possibilities.

But defeated, Germany might face dismemberment, Alsace-Lorraine, Posen, the two Prussias and Danish Schleswig would undoubtedly be taken, German supremacy on the Continent would be destroyed, German unity might be endangered, the powerful Socialistic forces might be enabled to drive out of power the ruling caste and lay hands upon the government.

Yet not to fight for Austria was to see the Triple Alliance shattered, Austria dismembered, Italy drawn aside by her Mediterranean and African interest and the German Empire left exposed to the eternal rivalry of the Slav and the undying resentment of the nation which had never accepted the Treaty of Frankfort.

France next to Austria was most vitally affected by the Servian crisis. Victorious in the imminent war she would regain her "lost provinces." The eternal shadow of German menace would be removed. Spared the terrible expense of maintaining the unequal struggle for military superiority with her neighbor beyond the Vosges she could turn her resources to the development of her great North African empire, which would insure her remaining as a world power.

But defeated, France would have to surrender the rôle of a world power. With a stationary population, shorn of many of her African colonies if not

of some of her European provinces, she would sink to the rank of Spain or become a mere satellite of Germany, incapable of resisting her, compelled to share in her future campaigns as was Prussia in Napoleon's after Jena had put her at his feet. So the French statesmen and patriots had reckoned the consequences of war for France, so they had described it as a war for the existence of France.

For Great Britain the line of self-interest, the deciding element, since, unlike Russia, France and Germany, no question of race or religion entered, was less plain. For the Servians, England cared not a fig. She sacrificed the Bulgarians at the Congress of Berlin. Could the war be "localized," no sympathy with the Servian would have moved her statesmen.

Again, victory for her Russian and French allies would mean the tremendous aggrandizement of the former, which confines India, presses upon China, is stretching south into Persia and is still as ever determined to have Constantinople, to prevent which England fought the Crimean war and was prepared to fight again after the Treaty of San Stefano.

On the other hand, a victory for the Triple Alliance would mean the immediate expansion of the German navy, the destruction of the balance of power on the Continent for which England fought her great wars with Louis XIV and Napoleon. It might be, as the German soldiers, sailors and statesmen had long threatened, the prelude to "the day"

when the German navy would sweep the English from the sea and the British Colonial Empire be the prize of victory. France destroyed, Russia crippled, England would be exposed to the greatest peril in her history, and the possibility of such peril had driven England into the Triple Entente.

For Italy the prospect was most confused. A victory for Austria would mean Austrian expansion in the Balkans, along the Adriatic and toward the Ægean. Austria, too, was the secular enemy. Thousands of Italians were still subject to Austrian tyranny in the "unredeemed lands." Austria is the Italian rival in the Adriatic, and if victorious would be able to lay hands on Salonica, the key to the Near East.

Again, should Italy join the Germans and Austrians her coast would be at the mercy of the French Mediterranean fleet; her newly won Tripolitan colony would be the inviting prize for French garrisons of native troops in Algeria and Tunis. To balance this Italian reward for fidelity to her allies would doubtless be Tunis and perhaps Egypt, if England, too, were defeated.

Such, briefly, were the major considerations which a general war had for the rulers and the leaders of peoples and nations in Europe. So complicated and confusing were the policies and the purposes of the Great Powers who now stood on the edge of a war more terrible than Europe had known since Napoleon abdicated at Fontainebleau.

CHAPTER VI

MOBILIZATION

RUSSIA met the Austrian declaration of war upon Servia with a prompt order for partial mobilization directed at Austria on the same day, July 28. It was clear at once that hope of peace was fast fading, for Russian mobilization was bound to be a signal for similar action on the part of the other great Powers. Germany, relying upon the speed of her mobilization to counterbalance the superior numbers of Russia, when the Slav army was at last mobilized, could not permit Russia to gain in peace an advantage that would be dangerous if war came.

In fact, the Russian order for mobilization promptly evoked an ultimatum from Germany demanding that the Czar's order be recalled. The rejection of this ultimatum led to the German declaration of war on August 1. The following description of the mobilization plans of the several great Powers is based upon information available before the war. As will be noted it does not cover the situation produced by the German invasion of Belgium, but as this was a secret plan, this absence of information was natural. What is here outlined

was what the world expected at the moment mobilization was ordered.

German mobilization was sure to be far more rapid than the Russian. Hence all French military writers were agreed that the German plan would be to direct practically all its field army upon France with the expectation of overwhelming French resistance before the Russians could come up. Thus French writers believed that German mobilization would be in Alsace-Lorraine, on the line between Metz and Strassburg, and that the mass of the German army would be ready to move across the frontier at Nancy by the tenth day.

French military writers estimated that by the tenth day Germany would have on a narrow front of one hundred miles and just east of the frontier twenty-three army corps, or substantially 900,000 men. This number would be materially lessened if Russian mobilization proceeded more rapidly, because this left but two German army corps to face the Russian forces.

To face this host the French writers asserted France would have, based upon her three great fortresses, Toul, Verdun and Epinal, which, save for a single gap, constituted a line of permanent works from the Luxemburg frontier to the Vosges, eighteen army corps, two of the twenty-one which make up the field army of France having been detached to observe the Italian frontier, and one, having its station in North Africa, likely to be delayed in ar-

riving, that is, 700,000 men reinforced by the garrisons of the fortresses.

To counterbalance the disparity in strength between French and German forces from the tenth to the twentieth days of mobilization, that is, before the slower Russian mobilization had been achieved, the French relied upon the remarkable line of forts and entrenched camps, upon the possibility of the arrival of the English " expeditionary army " of upward of 150,000 and upon the advantage that always rests with the defender.

It was clear then that all European military writers expected that following declarations of war Germany would rapidly concentrate upon the French frontier and by virtue of superior numbers seek to crush the smaller French field force and penetrate the Toul-Verdun-Epinal barrier before Russian pressure in the east recalled several army corps, provided always the offensive through Belgium were not attempted, a contingency only to be met when German operations began.

As for Austria, with her smaller army, it had been expected that she would put sixteen army corps on the Polish frontier of Russia, based on Cracow, Lemberg, and the first class fortress of Przemyls. But this estimate had been made before Servia had become a military factor, and this change materially reduced Austrian forces in Galicia. As Austrian mobilization was also slow, it was expected that Austrian and Russian armies would be at the

foot of their task simultaneously. Giving Austria ten army corps for use against Russia, she would have upward of 400,000 to face the 1,200,000 Russians, while Germany would have about 100,000 in the field on the line of Dantzig-Thorn-Posen. This would leave Austria but six corps or 250,000 men to deal with a Servian field army of at least 300,000.

Exceptions being made for Italy and England, whose plans and purposes remained doubtful, such were the lines of European mobilization in advance of a general war as foreshadowed by the military writers of the day.

Russian general staff plans provided that mobilization should take place at three rail heads in Russian Poland, at Vilna, facing Koenigsburg in East Prussia; Bielostok, east of Warsaw and south of Vilna, and Brest-Litowski, north of Lemberg, the capital of Austrian Galicia. This mobilization was covered by the chain of first and second class fortresses nearer the Prussian frontier of which Warsaw is the strongest and the centre. The others from north to south are Kovno on the Niemen, Ossowetz on the Narew, Novo Georgiewsk on the Vistula, and near Warsaw, Ivangorod also on the Vistula and near the Austrian boundary. Brest-Litowski is also a first class fortress.

Further to the front in a wide circle were placed the regiments of Cossack cavalry, which constituted the first screen. After the mobilization was accomplished five army corps, constituting the advance



FRONTIER FORTRESSES

FRENCH

1. Dunkirk
2. Lille
3. Maubeuge
4. Toul
5. Verdun
6. Epinal
7. Belfort
8. Besancon
9. Dijon
10. Lyons
11. Briancon
12. Grenoble
13. Toulon
14. Nice

RUSSIAN

15. Kovno
16. Ossowetz
17. N. Georgiewsk
18. Warsaw
19. Ivangorod
20. Brest-Litowsky
21. Lusk
22. Dubno
23. Rowno

GERMAN

24. Kœnigsberg
25. Danzig
26. Thorn
27. Posen
28. Metz
29. Strassburg
30. Mainz
31. Cologne
32. Kiel
33. Munich

AUSTRIAN

34. Cracow
35. Przemysl
36. Pola

ENGLISH

37. Plymouth
38. Portsmouth
39. Cromarty

guard, would be at Warsaw; four corps, forming the right wing, at Vilna; four corps, making the centre, comprising the army of St. Petersburg, at Bielostok; five corps, forming the left wing, at Brest-Litowski, comprising the army of Moscow. Finally two corps of reserves were to assemble east of Brest-Litowski. This disposed of twenty army corps, besides the troops covering the frontier, or about 800,000 men.

In addition there was a secondary field of mobilization in the Russian provinces of Podolia and Volhynia facing Austrian Galicia, and based on the fortresses of Lusk, Dubno and Rowno. Four army corps and one in reserve were assigned to this duty, constituting an army of over 200,000, which was to take position near Rowno. Two more army corps were based on Odessa and their duty was to watch the Rumanian frontier. If Rumania declared her neutrality or joined Russia these would then be freed for the campaign.

Twenty-seven army corps, constituting the field army of Russia in Europe and with cavalry divisions amounting to about 1,200,000 were thus to be disposed. There were in addition five Siberian corps and three stationed in Turkestan, but they could not be expected in Europe until the European army had completed its concentration. French military observers had reckoned that, despite the fact that Russian mobilization was notoriously slow, this army would be ready for offensive movements between the eighteenth and twenty-fifth day after the mobiliza-

tion order had been issued. Between the twentieth and twenty-fifth day these authorities asserted the Russian army could cross the German frontier if Germany decided to maintain a defensive position in the east.

CHAPTER VI

ENGLAND BEFORE THE WAR

IN the days before war was actually declared, the position England would take remained obscure. Not until the very end did she publicly make up her mind. Yet long before the invasion of Belgium supplied a definite issue, it was clear that the war party in London was growing. Officially, however, and with unmistakable earnestness Sir Edward Grey labored at St. Petersburg and Berlin for peace. Throughout the critical period his whole endeavor was to find a way by which the Servian dispute could be withdrawn from the battle ground of the two groups of Powers and relegated to diplomatic discussion by the Powers not directly affected.

In this effort France and Italy joined loyally. Neither desired war. Russia, too, frankly pessimistic from the start, consented to accept any formula which should not involve the destruction of Servian independence. But as Russian championship of Servia was for Austria, in fact, a step toward the assertion of Russian tutelage over the Slavs of the Balkans and, indeed, of Austria herself, no middle ground was discoverable, while Germany steadily stood behind her ally. It must be the work of his-

tory to decide the merits of the rival charges made after war began as to the responsibility for it; what is necessary to record now is that in this period it was England, still giving no official indication of her future course, who sought to find a way to bridge the ever-growing gap between Russian and Austrian purposes.

Meanwhile the probable course of England commanded the attention of the whole world. What were her commitments to her partners of the Triple Entente? Was she bound to join in a general war? For this answer the whole world waited, and neither in Paris nor in Berlin was there any actual proof of British intention.

A few weeks before when George V visited Paris and the Anglo-French friendship was emphasized by unprecedented demonstrations on either side, the press of the world had been filled with rumors that the earlier understanding had been transformed into a far closer and more vital agreement. But this was denied, then reaffirmed, and the fact was that the question remained wholly unsettled.

What the British press thought was perhaps best indicated by the comments of the London *Times* and the Manchester *Guardian,* reflecting different and conflicting political and national views. For "The Thunderer" war was a duty if France and Russia were involved. England's future on the sea, her colonial world were imperiled. For the *Guardian* there was no occasion for war, but even this

Liberal organ could find but one meaning for the words of Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith and only one interpretation for the activity of British Army and Navy departments.

Laying aside, then, the question of obligations, what were the considerations both as to peace and war which British statesmen had now to weigh — perhaps had weighed? For peace, it must be said at once that there was a tremendous argument in the fact that England had no interest in Servia. The occasion of the general war that threatened had no bearing on any British policy or possession. The extinction of Servia would have left England unaffected.

Again, the cost of a great war would fall upon England at a time of real financial disorder at home, while her political condition was hardly precedented since the great reform contest of the last century. For ten years the struggle over domestic policies and industrial and economic reforms had disorganized British social, economic and political life and the Home Rule question had brought the United Kingdom to the very edge of civil strife at home.

Add to this the fact that the party in power was the party by tradition and temper opposed to war, to continental alliance. It contained very large elements hostile to Russia and friendly to Germany. These were represented respectively by the " Cocoa Press " and the " Potsdam Press " as the Tory journals derisively described them.

Balancing these considerations were certain others which were at least as influential. Ten years before Germany had begun to challenge British naval and commercial supremacy. German battleships had begun to increase at a rate which provoked first a protest and then a panic. Tory journals frankly demanded the destruction of the German fleet. Meantime the German commercial fleet also began to compete with the British on the Seven Seas and the German manufacturer to invade successfully the world's markets.

In this situation England had been driven back upon her traditional policy of preserving the balance of power in Europe by joining with the weaker nations against the dominant power. Begun by Edward VII, the Triple Entente, the understanding with France and Russia had become the opponent of the Triple Alliance, now successful, now checked, but always strong enough to restrain German supremacy.

In July the English had to consider that if France and Russia were defeated by Germany and her allies, not only would Germany have her hands freed for the eventual struggle with Great Britain for naval supremacy, but Russia and France, angered by British desertion of them, might be potential allies. If Germany were successful, there could be no power left to prevent her occupation of Belgium and Holland, and thus her close approach to British shores.

British colonies had long been described by German writers as the ultimate goal of German world policy. The school of which General von Bernhardi was the most celebrated spokesman had again and again openly demonstrated the German belief that having disposed of Austria and France and thus gained military supremacy first in Germany, then in Europe, the Germans must look forward to "the next war," with England and for "world power."

All this the British government had to consider. War was a thing odious to them particularly. It awakened no real enthusiasm anywhere in the nation. But the prospect of the peril to British existence, to the empire, which a German victory would infallibly bring, and the chance now,with every condition as favorable as any Englishman could ever hope to have, of destroying German sea power, and so weakening her continental position that she would have to abandon her "future on the sea" for many years, these necessarily weighed heavily with the most pacifically inclined of British statesmen and Government, a title wholly deserved by the Liberal Ministry and its spokesmen, Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey.

Certainly the arguments for British fidelity to her allies, arguments of self-interest which are always determining with those who are responsible for their country's actions, were impressive. And in addition it was made plain by British military and naval ac-

tivity and by the expectations in Paris and Russia, that in all three nations the strong conviction existed that Great Britain would march with her partners of the Entente, reluctantly but loyally. Only in Berlin was British policy misunderstood to the very end, so completely misunderstood that when, at last, England entered the ranks of the enemies of Germany, German statesmen seemed as amazed as the Berlin crowds whose anger flamed forth in sudden fury.

CHAPTER VII

GERMANY INVADES BELGIUM

GERMANY declared war upon Russia on August 1, following Russia's refusal to demobilize. The next morning her troops were reported in Luxemburg, where they promptly took possession of the principality. Meanwhile in London the suspicion of German purpose to move against France by way of Belgium was growing. France, in response to an inquiry from Sir Edward Grey, had already agreed to respect the neutrality of Belgium. Germany had merely agreed to respect the integrity of the kingdom and reimburse it for any damage that might flow from German operations in Belgium.

When Sir Edward Grey again asked for a less "narrow" pledge, the British ambassador in Berlin was told that it was too late, that German troops were already across the frontier and that Germany had been compelled to take such steps by "imperious necessity." The British Government replied with an ultimatum, which called forth the celebrated inquiry of the German Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg: "Was England to make war for a mere 'scrap of paper'?" This "paper" was the English pledge to protect the neutrality of Belgium.

Meantime the world was hearing for the first time of that great German offensive through Belgium, which was to hold its attention for many weeks. The first news, that of German soldiers in Luxemburg and about Liège all pointed to the adoption by Germany of that flank attack which had long been the subject of military discussion. That Germany would disregard the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg and seek to strike France on the open northern frontier had been the familiar prediction of the well informed.

The exact situation was this: When after the last war France lost her frontier provinces of Alsace and Lorraine her boundaries were thrust back behind the Vosges and the Ardennes with an open gap between, in the centre of which was Nancy. To meet this condition France on the very morning of her terrible disaster began to construct great barrier fortresses, of which Toul, Verdun, Epinal and Belfort were the most considerable. These fortresses completed, the next step was to connect them with detached forts.

Thus it came about that at least ten years ago France had so elaborated her scheme of defence that from the Luxemburg frontier to the Swiss, save for one gap, there was a continuous wall of permanent fortification, in the face of which flowed the Meurthe, the Moselle and the Meuse rivers, like moats of ancient castles.

In this situation the German General Staff was

compelled to consider an alternative to her earlier plans of attack. It selected the unprotected French frontier between Luxemburg and Belgium. Toward the German frontier of these two States it constructed a number of double track strategic lines ending actually at the frontier. This preparation was made in the gap between the northernmost of French fortified posts, Longwy, mentioned in the despatches of October 4, and the Belgian fortress of Liège, and facing Sedan of evil memory.

From the railheads of these strategic lines the German staff planned to throw their Cologne army into France north of the great barrier forts and east and west of Maubeuge and Lille, the French strongholds in the north. Coming from this direction the invading army would arrive on the flank and rear of the barrier forts and near Chalons, where the French centre of mobilization was, and would encounter no fortresses until they approached Rheims, La Fère and Laon, which are within a hundred miles of Paris itself.

The whole purpose of this German offensive was to make a quick and terrible thrust into the heart of France before France was ready and before Russia could bring up her armies on the Polish frontier. To "dispose of France finally," as General von Bernhardi had said.

Belgian resistance the Germans had estimated as worth little. Liège was a strong fortress, but it commanded but one of seven highways open to the

Germans. The possibility that the British army might be landed in Belgium and come up on the flank and rear was reckoned with, but held unlikely to influence the result of the campaign owing to inevitable delays.

Before England could move, while France was still mobilizing and concentrating her efforts on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier, the German offensive was calculated to penetrate into the heart of France on an unguarded frontier, to compel the retreat of the armies facing Lorraine and to cripple France so utterly that Germany could turn and deal with Russia subsequently.

Such, briefly, was the German offensive, as it had been forecast by military writers. The first steps of the Germans wholly confirmed the predictions of these writers. The seizure of Luxemburg, the invasion of Belgium were almost unmistakable indications that Germany was coming south not by the way of her own frontiers but through the neutral States to the west.

Success for such a tremendous strategical venture must patently exercise a considerable if not a decisive influence upon the land operations of the war. But it brought in new risks, almost infallibly insured British participation. For the Germans, however, it became hourly plainer that no risk could counterbalance the solid advantage discoverable in possession of the Belgian gate to France.

CHAPTER VIII

ENGLAND MAKES UP HER MIND

THE British ultimatum to Germany was sent on August 4. Already British fleets and land forces were being put on a war footing and it was unmistakable that the Belgian invasion had served to supply a cause and a willingness to fight hitherto by no means generally discoverable.

The British ultimatum failed in its purpose and England declared that a state of war had existed between Great Britain and Germany since the night of August 4, but twenty-four hours before, Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons had delivered a speech which finally demonstrated that England had made up her mind.

Exasperatingly inconclusive as were the words spoken by Sir Edward Grey on August 3 for those who looked for a declaration of war, there was no mistaking their import or his conviction. They were heard by a House already resolved upon war and they were translated to a waiting nation which had already made up its mind.

The decision of England for war had for hours been recognized as inevitable. So long as there was the smallest hope of preserving peace, England's

efforts were, as they were bound to be, almost frantic. Her sympathies with France were real, her hostility to a war which could bring no material benefits, was natural.

But from the moment the conflict between France and Germany became inevitable England's participation was certain. France defeated, Belgium occupied, Holland at the mercy of Germany, Antwerp, "the pistol pointed at the heart of England" as Napoleon named it, the base of German fleets, this was a prospect intolerable to Englishmen.

When, after the bitterness of Fashoda had a little died away, Edward VII went to Paris and laid the foundation of the Triple Entente, the initial step was taken in the series which was to involve England in the first great continental war since Napoleon's fall, for the Crimean war was remote and inconsiderable.

England made war upon Germany, not because of real hostility to the Germans; indeed, her feeling was historically far kinder toward Germany than France; not because there was any direct cause for war, but because as she fought Napoleon and Louis XIV, she was to fight William II of Germany as the foe of the balance of power in Europe. In Germany victorious she saw the future challenger of English supremacy at sea.

For ten years German writers and soldiers have written of "the next war" with Great Britain. The Kaiser has said "Our future lies on the sea."

His people had believed him. England had believed him, and believing, reluctantly, with every evidence of repugnance, she again drew her sword to fight for her familiar object, the balance of power.

" The mainspring of English policy toward us is national egoism, that of France is national idealism," Prince von Buelow had said in his recent study of " Imperial Germany." Here was an illuminating analysis of all British policy and history, wholly applicable to the present hour.

Of the value of England to her allies, once she had enlisted, it is idle to speak. She brought the mastery of the sea. Her armies were of doubtful value, but German harbors were at once closed to food supplies by sea, the German flag disappeared automatically from the high seas. France on her part could now deal decisively with the weak Austrian fleet on the Mediterranean.

In the opening moves France and Russia had plainly scored two tremendous triumphs in obtaining the aid of England and the promise of Italian neutrality. Unmistakably this left Germany and Austria to fight against odds, with the great army of Germany as the only real reliance. If it sustained its splendid tradition it might prove adequate, as it did under Frederick the Great for seven years with far heavier odds against it.

CHAPTER IX

ITALY DECLARES HER NEUTRALITY

ON August 6, Italy notified the British Government that she would remain neutral in the war that had then begun. To all the demands of her partners of the Triple Alliance that she participate, she steadily replied that the war was not defensive but one of aggression, that it had been provoked by Austria without previous consultation with Italy and that under the terms of her agreement with Austria and Germany she was not bound to participate.

The Triple Alliance had in fact broken down at the critical moment, precisely as von Bernhardi had foretold, because there was no human method of reconciling Austrian and Italian ambitions. Austria and Germany might offer Italy Tunis, Algeria, Belgian Congo, even Savoy and Nice, but the Italian vision was fixed upon the Adriatic and what the Straits of Dover were to the British, those of Otranto were to the heirs of Venice. Malta, Bizerta, Cattaro had escaped her, but Valona remained — and Valona was the key to the Adriatic.

Only two generations had passed since French soldiers, fighting with the Italians, won Solferino

and Magenta and freed Northern Italy save for Venice. Less than fifty years had gone by since the last Austrian soldiers withdrew from the " redeemed Italy " and the dream of the great Italian patriots was realized.

Even in this century, in the Trentino, about Trieste and along the Dalmatian coast nearly a million Italians beckoned to their countrymen and begged that the work of making Italy be completed by the conquest of the Irredenta.

Austria, victorious in the present war, her Empire would descend the Adriatic, little Montenegro, birthplace of the Queen of Italy, would lose its bit of sea coast. Albania would be gathered under the Hapsburg crown, Valona, the key of the Adriatic, would become an Austrian naval base; Salonica, the gateway to Asia Minor, would follow the same destiny. So at least the Italians viewed the prospect of the victory of their partner in the Triple Alliance.

Self-interest, sentiment, memories of the last century's great struggle fought against Austria for Italy, roused a lingering sympathy for France which, though sometimes impatient and unkind, was still the France that brought liberty to the Italians, if at the price of the home of the House of Savoy and the birthplace of Garibaldi.

On the other hand, war with France meant the probable loss of Tripoli, open to invasion from French Tunis; the paralysis of Italian commerce,

possibly the destruction of its merchant marine, probably famine if its shores were blockaded; certainly misery, financial suffering, since the strain of the Turkish war was still felt. Finally no proportionate gain that could balance patent loss.

Germany had never put much reliance in Italy's fidelity. Bismarck had declared that if one Italian corporal and one private faced west, that is toward France, he would be satisfied. General von Bernhardi in his famous book declared that Germany should have attacked Italy when Italy attacked Turkey, holding the Ottoman a more valuable ally.

Italy joined the Triple Alliance when the occupation of Tunis by France roused a passing storm. She remained in it because, as Count Nigra once said, Italy and Austria must be allies or foes. The alliance was never popular, and the ties had gravely loosened in recent years as friendship with France and ancient sympathy with England had exerted an anti-German influence.

In the present war Italy would necessarily be Austria's soldier, fighting for Austrian aggrandizement. Rome despatches promptly demonstrated the decision of the whole Italian people against this — a decision forcing the compliance of the Government. It remained to be seen whether obvious self-interest would subsequently transform Italy from a neutral to a foe of her old allies, seeking to " redeem " old Italian land in Austria.

CHAPTER X

THE END OF THE FIRST ACT

WITH the declarations of war between France, Germany, Great Britain and Belgium on August 4, the first act in the great world war drama terminated. Just seven days had elapsed since Austria declared war upon Servia, but since Napoleon returned from Elba what seven days of history had held such wonderful and momentous events?

Macaulay, writing of the glorious days of the elder Pitt, tells of the fortunate times when every post brought news of a city captured, a province won, a fleet destroyed, an army victorious. Reading the news despatches of August 5, who could fail to feel the bewildering amazement which the great crisis had produced? A whole world seemed suddenly shaken and from the uttermost parts came the echoes of the awful explosion.

In Europe, from the Niemen to the Thames, the news of battle flew: Russian warships and German were struggling in the Baltic: British and German armadas were facing each other in the North Sea with every prospect of a Salamis or a Trafalgar: from the Mediterranean came the details of a conflict on the high seas.

On land, Libau, Bona and Liège were in flames, on the Meuse and the Moselle hundreds of thousands of men were fighting or drawing close. The Low Countries were once more invaded, the echoes of William II's cannon were heard not far from the field of Waterloo, the Prussian Uhlans were again on the field of Mars-la-Tour.

By land, by sea, even by air, where the dirigibles and the aeroplanes were doing deadly battle, nations were struggling. All the things that men had dreamed of, discussed in their dry-as-dust pamphlets, soberly prophesied without ever believing, had suddenly been translated into reality. Had a daring author ventured to describe the ravages of an aircraft of war hurling down destruction upon a defenceless town, behold it was realized at Lunéville on August 4. All the familiar things of fiction lived again. " Uncle Toby " and his sieges, Henry Esmond in the Low Countries, the Prisoner of Zenda in his Ruritania, which was Servia, the marvels of H. G. Wells's latest version of world warfare, were translated into fact and history.

In central Africa millions of blacks were already the gauge of battle and empires like the Congo Free State were proclaimed the victor's prize. In Asia fleets were gathering and Japan preparing to enter the struggle. Above all, from every corner and quarter of the earth men of all nations and races and conditions were caught in the mad vortex and drawn irresistibly into conflict.

Such were the seven days, which were the first act in the great war drama, possibly, regard being had to the means for transmitting news unknown in all the world struggles of the past, the most interesting seven days any generation of mankind had lived through. As a human spectacle it was hardly to be equalled in history, as it was daily, hourly, brought before the amazed world still doubting its stricken senses.

" It is well war is so terrible," said General Lee, surely the gentlest of great soldiers, to his staff one day, " else we might grow too fond of it." Some such feeling must have come to every one at the end of this great prelude. But now the nations had taken their stand. France and England forgetting Blenheim and Waterloo, France and Russia forgiving Moscow and the Crimea, England and Russia burying those jealousies in Asia which had made European peace precarious for a generation, had struck hands. Belgium, Servia, perhaps Holland, drawn into the train, were following. Against William II, as against Napoleon and Louis XIV, Europe was rising in one more Grand Alliance.

It remained now to look at the narrow opening between the Vosges and the southern frontier of Holland, a stretch little wider than that between Albany and New York, through which into Belgium and into France the great armies of the German Kaiser were coming. Here in days that could not be many, however long they seemed, an-

other great battle — one more of the endless series of "decisive battles of the world"— might be fought. It remained also to look out upon the troubled German Ocean where the battle fleets of the rivals for sea empire, rivals as keen as Carthage and Rome, must presently decide the supremacy of the ocean.

And as the curtain fell upon this first act it was impossible not to feel that on the human side a single figure dominated, and that figure was the German Kaiser. "We Germans fear God and nothing else," Bismarck had said, and deserted by Italy, at war with France, Russia, Great Britain, Belgium, with no ally but shaken Austria, William II stood forth from the storm like Napoleon, launching his mighty armies against the world. History would settle the rights and wrongs, fate and the "heaviest artillery" might once more determine the issue, but the Kaiser was the central figure in the closing prelude.

FIRST BATTLES

CHAPTER XI

THE ATTACK UPON LIÈGE

ON August 4 the Germans attempted to take Liège by storm and on the same day there were skirmishes on French territory south of Luxemburg and also west of Strassburg. To understand this fighting which marked the beginning of the great Franco-German conflict it is necessary to grasp clearly just one simple geographical fact.

From the Rhine, which is the base of German operations, three routes lead west and south into France. The first starts at Cologne, crosses the Belgian frontier just beyond Aix-la-Chapelle, reaches the Meuse at Liège and ascends the Meuse to enter France at Maubeuge by a natural gap in the divide between the headwaters of the Oise and the Sambre. This is the route followed by the main railroad between Paris and Berlin. It was employed by the Allies in the second campaign in the French Revolution. The invaders were defeated by the French army celebrated in song and story as the Army of the "Sambre et Meuse" at the decisive battle of Fleurus.

The second natural avenue to France starts at Coblenz and ascends the valley of the Moselle until it arrives at Luxemburg. North of Metz it then crosses into France by Longwy and the gap of Stenay. This route was followed by the Duke of Brunswick in the first invasion of France at the time of the Revolution and by Blücher in 1814. The first attempt penetrated through Longwy, passed Verdun, which surrendered, and was checked at the famous "Cannonade of Valmy."

The third approach follows the Rhine valley from Mayence to Strassburg and then turns west through the famous Saverne gap to cross the frontier of France near Lunéville and Nancy and directly in the centre of the unfortified space left by the French between Epinal and Toul. This was the route used by many invaders prior to the seventeenth century, when France seized Alsace, and it was to close this gap that Richelieu and Louis XIV struggled to acquire the Rhine frontier.

It will be seen, then, that, conforming to the geographical conditions, the Germans were directing at France three great armies, the Army of the Meuse, based on Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle; the Army of the Moselle, based on Coblenz, and the Army of the Rhine, based on Mayence and on Strassburg. The first would naturally become visible when it touched Belgian territory; the second, when Luxemburg was invaded; the third would remain masked behind the fortifications of Metz and Strass-



GERMAN ROADS TO PARIS

burg. The first two would arrive in France behind the Belfort-Verdun barrier of forts and presumably compel the French Army on this line to fall back — opening the way for the Army of the Rhine and permitting the concentration of all three German armies well within French territory and north of Paris, the German objective.

Now it remains to consider what happened. On Sunday, August 2, a German advance guard walked into Luxemburg and occupied the principality. Since German mobilization had only just been ordered, this was plainly merely a flying expedition made up of garrisons of frontier fortresses. Having occupied Luxemburg, they began to skirmish in front of Longwy, and this fighting continued growing stiffer as the mass of the Army of the Moselle came up.

In the same fashion there also began on Sunday skirmishing on the border facing Strassburg. Cirey was seized, raiding parties crossed the boundary and a dirigible dropped bombs in Lunéville, the first considerable town on the line of the approach of the Army of the Rhine. Unmistakably and even before war was declared the first firing showed exactly where the storm was coming in these two quarters.

It remains to consider the Army of the Meuse, which had assigned to it the most difficult preliminary rôle. Between Cologne, its base, and the frontier is a distance of twenty-five miles. Plainly the advance guard, probably the army corps regularly sta-

tioned at Cologne, reached this point on Sunday, August 2, for on Monday came the first reports of the violation of Belgian territory, preceded by a demand to be permitted to cross Belgium, made by the Kaiser upon the Belgian Government.

The permission being denied and Belgian resistance assured, the invading force deployed rapidly until it spread out on a front of some thirty miles, its right flank resting upon the Dutch frontier at Visé, south of Maastricht, its left upon Spa and Stavelot, and its mass on the line of the railway from Liège to Cologne, which, going south, descends the Vesdre River to its junction with the Ourthe near Liège.

Three possibilities had to be considered by the German commander of the Army of the Meuse. The Belgians might make no resistance. They might content themselves with a formal and insignificant resistance. Or they might in attempting to make a real resistance fail utterly because their mobilization was incomplete. In any case his necessity was to push on at top speed and endeavor to lay hands upon Liège, a strongly fortified town, before it was prepared, and at the same time endeavor to isolate it by an enveloping movement, which necessitated crossing the Meuse at Visé.

Plainly the brusque offensive was attempted and failed. Could the Germans lay hold of Liège all Belgium to the sea would lie open to them. As they were anxious not to fight in Belgium, but to

get across Belgium to France as quickly as possible, it would have been necessary to leave only a little garrison in the forts of Liège, thus protecting their flank, and press on up the Meuse Valley to the open French frontier.

So valuable in the scheme of German operations was Liège that the sacrifice of some thousands of men to capture it was held worth while. This explained the apparent recklessness of the opening attacks and the slaughter which Belgian despatches declared accompanied their repulse. Precisely the same thing was attempted by the Japanese at Port Arthur and also failed.

Only one thing was immediately quite clear in the confusion. An unexpectedly heroic Belgian resistance temporarily delayed the advance of the Army of the Meuse. While the main German force was coming up behind, Liège still held out. If the Belgian resistance continued, it was certain that the real fighting would begin not in French territory but in Belgian, not about Maubeuge and Givet, but on the line of the Meuse between Namur and Liège.

If Liège held out permanently the Germans could still mask it as the Bulgarians did Adrianople when they advanced to Lule Burgas. But the peril of such a movement was visible, because such an advance would leave their flank and rear open to attack by Belgian troops coming up along the Sambre and Meuse from all quarters, reënforced by the French and certain to have English help soon.

If the Army of the Meuse had been arrested, it must also necessarily delay the advance of the Army of the Moselle from Luxemburg, which would otherwise leave its right flank and rear open to French attack. Since the forts of the French frontier were unbroken the Army of the Rhine must also wait.

The early reports were too inconclusive to warrant any real forecast. But so far as they showed anything they indicated that unexpected Belgian resistance had brought the whole German "*attaque brusquée*" to a momentary halt. Remembering that with the Russian troops gathering toward the east the German necessity was quick and decisive success in the west, it was then plain to see how damaging the Belgian stand might prove if it continued long. The moral effect of such an impressive check at the outset of the German campaign was also to be reckoned with.

CHAPTER XII

LIÈGE RESISTS

THE German attack upon Liège began on August 4. It was made by three German divisions, multiplied by ready imagination to army corps, and it failed disastrously. Here for the first time the world heard of the German assaults in massed formation which from the Meuse to the Marne were to be a terrible detail in successive engagements. On August 7 German troops penetrated between the forts and took the city, but some of the forts held out, continued to resist until the great howitzers, the first surprise of the German General Staff, reduced them to dust with their opening salvos.

But as the costly frontal attacks continued the world began to grasp the fact that the operations about Liège were of major importance and that the Germans were counting little the price of blood its capture demanded. It is then necessary to recall the part in the general scheme of German offensive and Franco-Belgian defensive that the line of the Meuse River played and for the position of which the Germans were making such a sustained and costly fight.

Bear in mind that the German Army of the Meuse, coming south across Belgium, would have on its right the Meuse River, a deep, navigable stream constituting a natural defence to Belgium, from the French to the Dutch frontier. This natural barrier was reënforced by three fortresses, Namur on the south, Huy in the centre and Liège at the north.

So long as the barrier remained in Belgian hands the right flank of the Germans was exposed to attack from the Belgian Army reënforced by French and English supports, since the main trunk lines from Antwerp, from Brussels and from Northern France strike the Meuse perpendicularly and thus permit armies to be brought up quickly.

Held by the Germans, on the contrary, the Meuse Valley constituted a right flank defence and screen. Behind it the German advance into France could proceed secretly and safely. Those who recall the Civil War campaigns will remember the facility with which General Lee, by using the Shenandoah Valley, was able to put his army into Pennsylvania without exposing it to any flank attack, to maintain his connections up the valley and to screen his operations behind the mountains. What the Blue Ridge Mountains were for him the Meuse barrier might be for the German offensive, if Liège, Huy and Namur were once captured.

Of the three fortresses Liège was by far the most important. So long as the Belgians held it they

could bring up troops from Brussels and Antwerp, sixty and seventy miles away. When Liège fell, if it did, there was no other obstacle to a quick raid across the open country to the Belgian capital. Belgian railroads could be destroyed, Belgian mobilization prevented and the Belgian defence thrown back to Antwerp, the only remaining fortified place in northern Belgium.

Such a raid would interrupt any scheme to put the British "expeditionary army" on the German flank, the destruction of the railways would greatly increase the time necessary for its arrival, and leave the Germans several weeks in which to pursue their invasion of France without fear of serious molestation from their right flank. They would also be able to utilize the trunk line from Cologne to Paris from the Rhine to the French frontier.

All despatches that came in at this time indicated that the German determination to possess Liège remained unshaken and any pause was to permit the bringing up of siege artillery and supports. The desperate fighting of the first forty-eight hours must also have exhausted the ammunition of the forces engaged as well as severely taxed the endurance of the attacking divisions.

The more carefully the strategic relation of Liège to the German advance is studied the more clearly it must be recognized that an ultimate failure to take it would have jeopardized the whole plan of advance through Belgium. Liège captured Huy and

Namur could be masked and ignored. The former is only an isolated fort, the latter really a frontier guard to northwestern France.

Once Liège were captured the road to France between the German frontier at Thionville in Alsace-Lorraine and the French first class fortress of Maubeuge on the Sambre was open. Coming this way the Germans could advance on the flank and rear of the French barrier forts and between them and Paris. So long as Liège was not captured the advance was dangerous in the extreme. It would also be weakened by the reduction incident to detaching a large flank guard.

Doubtless the German General Staff foresaw the possibility of a preliminary repulse and took their chance. The loss of 50,000 men would not be a disproportionate price to pay for the eventual capture of the town. Even the delay could hardly prove fatal, for to the east and south their advance was pressing onward, steadily flowing on toward France. The capture of Liège in two days or even in a week would suffice.

The moral effect upon the French, the Belgians and the Germans themselves of the resistance at Liège was actually the thing most important in this opening contest. It also served to demonstrate to the French how the Germans were coming, if they had any doubt, and should have enabled them to prepare to meet them.

CHAPTER XIII

BRITISH TROOPS LAND ON THE CONTINENT

BY all means the most interesting news of the early days following the attack upon Liège was the announcement made in Paris on October 8 that British troops had landed on the Continent and would proceed to Namur. Not only did this promise a rapidity of English mobilization, wholly unexpected, and in fact wholly unwarranted, but taken in connection with French reports it convinced the British, French and Belgian publics alike that advantage was to be taken of the gallant Belgian resistance to pin down the German advance in Belgium and east of Brussels.

The English expeditionary army consisted of some 165,000 troops of all arms, the best army of its size in Europe, because it was composed, not of two or three year conscripts, but of regulars, who had served for a number of years and like our American regulars are professional soldiers, in many cases veterans and commanded by officers who had seen active service all over the world. This force should be carefully distinguished from British volunteers and territorials, whose fighting value was rated very low.

While no ports were mentioned as the places of

disembarkation, there is now no doubt that Havre, facing England just across the narrow Channel, was selected. This port had the essential advantage of possessing admirable docking facilities and of being the rail head for railroads leading directly into Belgian territory and arriving at the Meuse, at Liège, Namur and Brussels.

Taken in connection with the reports of French advance into Belgium, the arrival of the British force was accepted as meaning that the Allies were planning to concentrate along the Meuse and the Sambre on the front and flank of the German Army of the Meuse, which was advancing toward France across Belgium. The obvious purpose was to compel the Germans to wheel about and facing to the west confront Belgian, French and British troops.

Such a necessity would plainly bring the grand advance into France to a temporary if not a permanent pause. Already in the fighting about Liège at least three German army corps were reported to have been very roughly handled, suffering losses which greatly reduced their fighting value for some time. There were but twenty-five German army corps in the field army, the only one to be reckoned with as yet. At least three were on the Russian frontier. As the French Army contained twenty-one corps of about equal strength it seemed now that from the start the Allies might be able to establish a dangerous numerical superiority when to the French force there were joined the Belgian field

force, which had the strength of at least two army corps, and the British force, with the strength of four on paper.

What now occupied the attention of the world was the question as to whether the resistance of Liège might not have resulted in a material disarrangement of the whole German plan, which, as was well known, contemplated throwing a huge force into France and crushing the French army before Russia could mobilize and become aggressive on the east. This the Bulgarians had accomplished by their unexpected victory about Kirk Killisse in the Balkan war.

The announcement that the British troops were proceeding to Namur, a wholly false and deliberately misleading assertion, was accepted as a promise that the Belgian Army would promptly be reënforced and the press despatches of all nations began to be filled with prophecies of approaching encounters bebetween Allies and Germans on the fields forever memorable because of their connection with the Waterloo campaign, mistaken conclusions which persisted for many days.

Meantime a whole flood of historical parallels was awakened by the arrival of another British army on the Continent. It was almost exactly a century since Wellington had won his last great battle. Two centuries spanned the distance between Marlborough and Sir John French. But now British soldiers were to fight with the French as comrades and, as

it then seemed, upon the fields where England in other centuries had won her most splendid triumphs.

And in the twentieth as in preceding centuries, supremacy at sea had enabled England to strike where she chose, having swept the German fleet from the high seas.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FRENCH INVADE ALSACE

ON August 10 French soldiers entered Alsace by way of the Belfort Gap and captured Altkirch; they subsequently reached Muelhausen which was taken and retaken several times but ultimately remained in German possession. For a world divided in its sympathies, there was still an almost irresistible stirring of emotion at the news that French soldiers were again on Alsatian soil and the dream of the *"revanche"* had at least for a moment come true.

It is a characteristic evidence of the immense power of the French to impose their spirit and their emotions upon the civilized world that the question of the "lost provinces" has a worldwide meaning. Prussia took Silesia from Austria and it vanished contentedly into the kingdom of Frederick. France took Savoy and Nice from Italy, and not even Italians dream of a reclamation. But for forty-three years, ever since the Treaty of Frankfort made definitive the loss of the Rhine frontier, France has openly, unceasingly, with a devotion which made almost a religion of the patriotic impulse mourned her "lost provinces."

In the days since Sedan French explorers, soldiers and civilians alike, have carried the tricolor to the heart of Africa and to the capitals of the Shereefian Empire and Timbuktu on the southern edge of the great Sahara has its Boulevard d'Alsace-Lorraine and Casablanca its Rue de Strasbourg. All over the Kabyle highlands of Algeria, where a handful of French colonists are taking up the task of creating a new France, the names of the cities and towns of Alsace and Lorraine, Bitche, Metz, Colmar appear as frequently as those of fortunate battlefields in the happier history of France.

Something there has been of grandeur, something almost commanding the sympathy of the least Francophile of observers in the forty-three years of fidelity to an idea and an ideal. German writers, Von Buelow, Bernhardi himself, with all his antagonism, have not hesitated to pay tribute to the sacrifices, the burdens that a great nation has voluntarily laid upon itself that it might still hope to regain the surrendered Rhineland.

The least observing travellers in France, wandering in districts as far from Lorraine as the Pyrenees or the Riviera, have not failed to report that even there the unconquered and unconquerable longing for the redemption of " the lost provinces," was discernible, in fact hardly to be escaped, at every turn. A whole nation, amidst all the eddies and tides of ephemeral political excitement and passion, something in the spirit of Gambetta, who bade French-

men never to forget and never to talk, has kept burning the candle of hope before the altar of national resolution.

The rights and wrongs of the question itself, these are beside the point. Whether Alsace is German by right, was French by spoliation, is German again by act of supreme justice, who could or would attempt now to discuss the technicalities? The single fact was that the French have in some fashion and by arts all their own imposed upon the whole world save its German fraction something of their own feeling, which responded to the early fragmentary reports that the tricolor was again in the land of Ney and Kellermann, Rapp and Kléber, in the land which had given France so many soldiers and such splendid loyalty in other days.

As for Alsace-Lorraine, what observer from a neutral land will venture to say how loyal these "lost provinces" are to their old possessors? This much at least appears. It was only a few months before that the incident of Saverne, when a whole town turned out to mock a Prussian officer and goad him to fury, filled the press. The latest foreign newspapers recounted the flight of Hansi, the Alsatian caricaturist, from Alsace after condemnation for the grievous offence of lampooning Prussian soldiers.

In the German Parliament there still sat representatives of Alsace-Lorraine who belonged to the "non-conforming" faction. All over Alsace and Lorraine there were societies and associations for

keeping alive the old memory. In the Foreign Legion in Africa there were hundreds of Alsatians who left home forever rather than wear the Kaiser's coat. Von Bernhardi, a score of other German commentators, had conceded with surprising frankness the success of the French in retaining the affection of her lost children.

All these circumstances, a hundred more, combined to give to the slight military operations, for it was impossible to regard the skirmishes at Altkirch and before Muelhausen as important in themselves, a real meaning to the world, to the world which, rightly or wrongly, through weakness of mind, or through sentiment which found no warrant in the fact, was roused at the thought of the little red legged soldiers sweeping down the valley of the Ill, where once Turenne triumphed, "to redeem" the lost provinces.

There is no nobler instance of the arising of a whole people than that of the Germans themselves when in 1813, peasant and poet, soldier and scholar, a whole race sprang to arms to drive Napoleon from the Fatherland. Was it too soon to detect in French and Belgian operations in August something of the same spirit so fatal alike to the strategists and to the military genius of Napoleons?

CHAPTER XV

TEN DAYS OF WAR

TEN days after the declaration of war between France and Germany, that is, at the precise time, when, according to military writers, both nations should have completed their mobilization and put practically all their field forces at the frontier ready for offensive operations, what was the actual situation? How far had the preliminary operations disclosed or influenced the campaign that was now to open? As the German offensive was the great operation a review of the situation at this moment must necessarily amount to an examination of the progress of this great thrust through Belgium.

To begin with the Liège operations, the most considerable so far, on Monday, August 3, German soldiers, evidently an expeditionary corps, kept ready for a sudden, swift invasion of Belgium, crossed their own frontier near Aix-la-Chapelle and moved on Liège. They were in front of Liège on Tuesday. The obvious purpose of this invasion, as the German official statement had already explained, was to seize the town by a *coup de main*.

The attempt failed, and German official reports did not claim that German troops entered the city

until Friday night, August 7. Confused stories of bloody battles and terrific losses came from Brussels, but were accepted under great reserve and proved later to have been grossly exaggerated. What was vital was the comment of the German War Office that there was a delay due to the resistance of Liège.

To understand the meaning of this it is necessary to grasp the object of the German advance, which was not to conduct operations in Belgium but to open a way into the north of France beyond the barrier forts. The Germans were before Liège on Tuesday morning, August 4; on Wednesday they should have been at Huy and on Thursday at Namur if Liège had surrendered promptly. Such a quick thrust, had it succeeded, would have given the Germans possession of Namur, before the French could conceivably have reached that town.

Had the German plan succeeded then by August 8 the advance guard of the Army of the Meuse would have been on either side of the Meuse above Namur, its right flank protected against Belgian or French attack by the forts of Liège, Huy and Namur. The advance guard of its left wing would have been in contact with the German Army of the Moselle, whose advance guard occupied Luxemburg on the same day the Army of the Meuse began to march toward Liège, while the left wing of the Army of the Moselle would have been solidly protected by the German forts of the Thionville-Metz barrier

west of the Meuse, its cavalry could operate via Brussels to the French frontier at Lille.

Such was the conception of the Belgian operation which all commentators before and since the war began have held. They foresaw that Germany might attempt to throw her main force upon the flank and rear of the French barrier forts of the Verdun-Belfort line. To German forces advancing from Southeast Belgium into France the sole natural barrier is the Meuse River from Verdun to Namur. Had the Germans succeeded in taking Namur they would have held both banks of the river and the French defensive would have been thrown back somewhere on the Verdun-Rheims-Laon line of defences far within French territory.

Now consider what happened. Liège did not surrender, and instead of arriving at Namur on August 7 the Germans only succeeded in getting into Liège that night. Meantime Belgian troops had time to occupy Namur solidly and the line of the Meuse became a formidable obstacle to German advance from the fortress of Verdun to that of Namur. French concentration on the south bank of the Meuse was made possible; in fact, French offensive operations north of the Meuse toward Luxemburg were reported.

What had happened at Liège after the Germans entered the town long remained a complete mystery. The best information available on August 10 pointed to the prolongation of the battle by some of the forts

at least. Operations to the north toward Tongres also confirmed the Belgian assertion that the German Army of the Meuse had been compelled to turn north to face Belgian troops coming from Brussels and Antwerp. Had the Germans taken Liège, they could rely upon its forts to defend their flank and resume their march south.

The Army of the Meuse, then, was delayed. What, then, had happened to the Army of the Moselle? Its position in Luxemburg was reported at regular intervals. It seems on August 9 to have stretched out toward France, taking the little town of Longuyon on the road to Verdun and well across the French frontier. But the delay of the Army of the Meuse increased the difficulty of its task very gravely. Not only had it now to cross the Meuse in the face of a French army, but its flank toward the lower Meuse, where the Liège army should have been, was exposed.

In this situation the German General Staff had to decide whether to abandon the sharp thrust into France or strongly to reënforce the Army of the Moselle. There was evidence immediately available to prove that it chose the latter course. French soldiers operating in Lorraine east of Nancy having penetrated many miles reported that they saw no trace of German forces. Again, the temporary success of the French dash into Alsace disclosed a similar fact. Finally, the bringing up of Austrian soldiers in Alsace was a further indication that

the Germans had transferred their forces elsewhere.

To the third German Army, that of the Rhine, there thus far seemed to have been assigned a wholly minor rôle. Apparently impressed by this the French from Belfort and Epinal early began an offensive campaign, at first little more than a raid, into upper Alsace, and captured Altkirch and Muelhausen, but not Colmar. While the force from Belfort was moving north between the Rhine and the Vosges another from Epinal attempted, apparently with success, to force the passes of the Vosges leading from France into Alsatian territory about and above Muelhausen. But by August 10 despatches began to indicate that the French raid had been checked and repulsed.

To sum up briefly, then, the Belgian resistance at Liège during the first ten days of the war gave the French time in which to seize the Meuse barrier, to occupy Namur solidly, permitted the British to land troops on the Continent. Instead of beginning their battle in Northern France, the Germans seemed bound to have to struggle to obtain a foothold in Belgium beyond Liège, which did, in fact, hold out for several more days, not all the forts succumbing until the next week.

All this presumptive advantage was sacrificed by the French to enable them to undertake their celebrated and disastrous counter-offensive just breaking out in Alsace-Lorraine. Although the first

British troops arrived on the Continent on August 8, the main body did not arrive in time to defend Brussels against the Germans, the French only got one regiment into Namur the day it capitulated and this general failure of the Allies to take advantage of Belgian resistance brought swift and enduring punishment.

Still, it is well to recall that at the close of the first ten days the world believed that the Allied troops were rapidly approaching Belgium and that the delay at Liège had been fatal to German plans. The British announcement that their first troops had been sent to Namur, the French declaration on August 14 that French troops had entered Belgium near Charleroi and were proceeding to Gembloux kept this belief alive until the Germans were actually at the gates of Brussels and the brave little Belgian Army, hopelessly outnumbered and defeated, was withdrawing to Antwerp.

So far as it is possible to see now, this was the great opportunity of the Allies and the fact that they missed it explains the subsequent German advance to the very walls of Paris. Ten days after war broke out the belief that the opportunity was being put to the best possible use obsessed an audience which did not discover its error until the Germans had overrun Belgium nor recover from its surprise until they had reached the Marne.

CHAPTER XVI

BELGIAN BATTLES

BETWEEN August 7, when the Germans entered Liège, and August 16, when their main army began its advance, their advance guard fought a number of actions with the Belgian Army, which were announced from Brussels as considerable victories. Reading the despatches from Brussels in the second week in August it was impossible not to suspect that the Belgian War Office in some mysterious fashion had laid hands upon Lieutenant Wagner, the illustrious hero of Balkan war correspondence. Accounts of "battles" on Belgian soil, murderous, decisive, and almost immediately repeated, suggested the imagination of the correspondent who decorated all the Turkish territory from Lule Burgas to the Chatalja with battles more terrible than Leipzig and river crossings more fatal than that of the Beresina.


Now the odd thing about the Belgian "battles" was that after victory yesterday Belgian troops were invariably found fighting to-day some miles in the rear of yesterday's field of victory. Thus, in turn they triumphed on Monday, August 10, at Ton-

gres-St. Trond, Tuesday at Hasselt-Landen, but on Wednesday and Thursday were back at Haelen, Tirlemont, Diest and Eghezée.

The unmistakable fact was that the Germans were slowly, methodically but steadily advancing through Eastern Belgium between the French and the Dutch frontier. So far as despatches yet disclosed the advance was almost exclusively cavalry, and it was sweeping before it a screen of Belgian infantry and cavalry which was gradually retiring fighting upon Brussels, Namur and Louvain.

Obviously the German cavalry screen preceded an advance of the Army of the Meuse in great force and the reports from Holland of the construction of a railroad line round the forts at Liège and of the passing of strong divisions of German troops near the frontier pointed to an eventual offensive through Eastern Belgium toward Brussels and thence to France. Precisely this way Marlborough came twice from Liège in the wars of Louis XIV. The first time he broke through French lines stretched from the Dyle to the Meuse at Tirlemont, where there already had been fighting. The second time he broke through at Ramillies, destroying Villeroi's army on a field which in part was fought over at Eghezée on Wednesday, August 12.

A great deal of nonsense was written in the first two weeks of the war about " battles " and prospective battles in Belgium. In point of fact the English War Office finally declared that there was but



BELGIAN BATTLEFIELD FROM AUGUST 4TH TO AUGUST 23RD

one small detachment of German infantry north of the Meuse and west of Liège in Belgium. This could only mean that the main advance of the Army of the Meuse from Liège had no more than begun and that, since the Belgians retiring before the German cavalry were destroying all roads, bridges and railways as they fell back, the advance would be slow when it did come. Hence a great battle in Belgium, north of the Meuse, was hardly to be expected for another week.

This was precisely what the situation at Liège necessitated. If the Liège position be likened to the neck of a bottle, a figure justified by the fact that the main roads and railways from Germany to Belgium pass through that city, then the preliminary operation of the Germans was in fact an attempt to pull the cork, which resulted not in extracting it, but pushing it into the bottle. The result was that while the contents of the bottle did trickle out, the process was at first slow.

What the Germans had to do when Liège did not fall was precisely like the task of the Bulgarians after Lule Burgas, when they held both ends of the Orient Railway between Sofia and the Chatalja, but Adrianople commanded a connecting link. To supply and reënforce their troops operating south of Adrianople they were compelled to unload their trains at Mustapha Pasha and transport everything in carts around Adrianople to Dimotika, where they could again use the railway.

The roads in Belgium are far better than in Turkey, the German machinery was vastly finer, but even with automobile trucks and all the resources of a modern war department the task was a grave one, seriously complicated by the necessity to bring up siege guns and ammunition for the reduction of Liège along the same lines.

Some delay, then, naturally followed the unexpected resistance of Liège. But it did not prevent the Germans from pushing strong cavalry masses around Liège and to the west. These masses steadily drove the Belgian infantry and cavalry screen before them, and as the German General Staff still persisted in its determination to use Western Belgium as a way of entering Northern France, following the Marlborough precedent, which was wholly successful, it presently became clear that the next week would see a great German mass, the Army of the Meuse, following their victorious cavalry toward Brussels.

Meantime the Army of the Moselle, operating from Luxemburg, had with equally uniform success cleared Belgium between Luxemburg and the French frontier of hostile troops, at several points crossed the French frontier, and on a front from Givet to Verdun, and facing the unfortified gap of Stenay was advancing slowly, methodically, but so far uninterruptedly. On this front a great battle began to be forecast, but even this was wholly problematical.

The outstanding fact about Belgian "battles" up to this time was that the great wave of German advance from Metz to the Dutch frontier was moving forward, gaining rather than losing headway, and that on the whole line the Belgian forces were falling back, skirmishing as they went. For the rest, apart from the first efforts to storm Liège, the fighting, both in numbers employed and losses, was relatively trivial and precisely what was to be expected as a great forward movement developed. The newly reported capture of the Huy fort by the Germans was in itself an indication of their progress.


Indeed, the general success of the German advance already infallibly suggested that the Allies had deliberately elected to fight a delaying war until Russian armies should come up or that a French offensive was shortly to break out in another field.

CHAPTER XVII

THE FRENCH COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

AS a consequence, primarily, of the gallant and unexpected resistance of the Belgians and because further the interest of the world was naturally concentrated upon the development of the great German offensive thrust toward France, the earlier fighting on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier attracted only passing attention. Yet the despatches of the second week of the war demonstrated that in this quarter a great French counter-offensive directed by the commanding French general was sweeping toward the Rhine from the Swiss frontier to Metz. Plainly this counter-offensive had now been reckoned with as one of the salient details of the pending campaign.

The simplest fashion in which to describe the French counter-offensive is to point out the exact analogy between it and the great German operations through Belgium. The Germans, on a front of about a hundred miles, were sweeping down upon the left flank of the Allied Armies in position from the Channel to Switzerland in a desperate effort to penetrate Northern France. The French, on a front a little wider, were advancing toward Southern Germany. Namur, in Belgium, was almost in the centre of the



THE FRENCH COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AT THE START OF THE BATTLE OF SAARBURG-LUNÉVILLE

German advance. Strassburg bore the same relation to the French. Antwerp in Belgium, Metz in German Lorraine, were both on the flank of invading forces.

Consider now the possible effect of the French advance. Its left had already passed the line of the Metz-Strassburg railway and was approaching Saverne; further advance would presently bring it into Lower Alsace, below Strassburg and on the Rhine. Meantime, its right was coming up from Belfort, by Muelhausen, driving the German defence north toward Strassburg and east across the Rhine near Basel. Its centre was descending the valleys east of the several Vosges passes from the mountain of Donon to that of Barenkopf — one level with Strassburg, the other north of the French fortified post of Belfort.

The effect of this advance if it could be successfully pressed home would be to drive the Germans out of Upper Alsace, surround Strassburg, and bring the French eastern frontier to the Rhine again. When forces had been detached to cover Strassburg and Neu Breisach, the main French Army would be free to advance down the Rhine toward Mayence, where the Kaiser then was, or to cross the Rhine and drive north to Frankfort or east to Baden and Southern Germany.

In other words, just as the Germans had undertaken to sweep into Northern France, avoiding the great barrier forts from Epinal to Verdun, so the French were aiming at a counter-offensive which

would take them into Germany and between the fortresses of Strassburg and Mayence. As an alternative, they were if successful free to turn west, isolate Metz and attack the flank and rear of the German armies invading France by moving to the Moselle Valley north of Metz and Thionville.

Certain advantages, evidently, the French offensive had over the German. First, it began in French territory and crossed directly into German. The Germans on the contrary had to cross Belgium, to establish their communications in a hostile country and to fight a Belgian army before they could reach French territory, and they had not yet reached it. The population of Alsace-Lorraine, the field of the first phase of French operations, was friendly to France and could be relied upon to give all possible help to the invaders. The main line of communication of the Germans must necessarily be across hostile Belgium for a hundred miles, and would require a strong rear guard. France could reach the Rhine and the Alsace-Lorraine frontier of the Bavarian Palatinate and Baden before she need consider her communications.

The chief justification of the taking of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 has always been asserted by Germans to be found in the fact that the presence of the French on the Rhine left Germany open to attack. While Strassburg and Metz could doubtless have sustained long sieges before they could be captured, a French offensive which isolated them and gave

France possession of the rest of the Alsace-Lorraine territory would in fact have permitted France to invade Germany quite as easily as in former times before she lost the Rhineland.

In addition there was, of course, the narrower but real value of an early reconquest of the "lost provinces." It was to such a reconquest France had looked forward for forty-three years. For every French soldier the knowledge that French armies were again on the Rhine and the Saar would be a tremendous driving force. The invasion, too, would deprive Germany instantly of two fertile provinces, from which she had hoped to draw supplies and soldiers. France could also expect to enlist thousands of Alsatians and to promote indiscipline and desertion among Alsatians then actually wearing German uniforms.

But in the wider field the French invasion of Alsace was recognized as the answer to Germany's thrust at France. Germany had attempted to strike France on the left flank. France had retaliated by coming through the German left flank. German success meant opening a road toward Paris and into Northern France. France was striving to open a way into South Germany and similarly toward Berlin. If the German offensive failed French armies would be nearer than the German forces in Belgium and Northern France both to the Rhine and to the German capital.

It must be remembered, too, that France, with her

allies, had the advantage of numbers. Of twenty-five German army corps not less than three were on the Russian frontier, and probably one more. France had twenty-one corps, and the reënforcement of her allies meant English and Belgian troops to the value of at least five corps. She could thus, with the British and Belgian corps, place in Belgium enough troops to oppose man for man to the Germans, and still establish a two to one advantage in numbers in Alsace-Lorraine, such as could only be counterbalanced by Austrian reënforcements.

It was fair, then, to insist at this time that the French counter-offensive was at least as serious a military move as the German advance in Belgium. It, too, met with quite as complete preliminary success and cleared the way from Lunéville, Epinal and Belfort to the east toward the Rhine and nearly to the Strassburg defences.

It was the obvious conception of the French General Staff that coincident with a successful arrival of the German advance from Belgium at the frontier of France the French counter-offensive would be pushed out into Germany beyond Alsace-Lorraine and exercise a pressure which would compel the German General Staff to weaken the great army operating toward Paris via Brussels. It is probable also that French strategy also contemplated a gradual withdrawal before the German offensive which would

draw German columns into France toward the Rheims-La Fere-Laon barrier forts and further from their base, while the French columns advanced on the Rhine. Grave as the mistake now seems, imperative as was the duty and the necessity of the French to stand on the defensive on the east while hastening to reënforce the Belgians, it is doubtful if France could have resigned the offensive in Alsace-Lorraine without a try and it is conceivable that had the venture culminated in victory instead of defeat, it would have realized much if not all that had been hoped for it.

CHAPTER XVIII

POLAND RESURGENT

NOT even the prospect of a great conflict on the plains of Belgium, where on August 15th the cannon of four nations were prematurely reported to be awakening echoes quite as portentous as those of Waterloo, wholly served to distract attention from the momentous rescript of the Russian Czar, issued on August 15. This proclamation was, in fact, a promise to the Poles that they were to realize most, if not all, of the dreams and aspirations, which they had treasured for nearly a century with a fidelity surpassing even that which had animated the French as they looked across an arbitrary frontier on the mournful prospect of lost provinces.

From the Congress of Vienna to the Treaty of Bucharest last year, the wars of the nations have been provoked by the longings of men of the same race to achieve national unity. As the French Revolution carried the gospel of Liberty, Fraternity and Equality from Madrid to Moscow, each succeeding European conflict has expressed the will of men who spoke the same tongue, shared the same culture and the same racial unity to be joined. *Seriatim,* Servia, Greece, Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, Ger-

many, Bulgaria, have established their places upon the map after wars which have made the history of the Nineteenth Century.

Alone of the races the Poles, divided between three great Powers, the subjects of Prussia, Russia and Austria, have failed to achieve even a partial *risorgimento,* although of all races they have most ardently and loyally preserved the memory of former solidarity and cherished the dream of future reintegration. To them now the Czar, with all the solemnity and publicity of an irrefragible oath, promised the right to speak their language, pursue the natural evolution of their own race, if, in this great European crisis, they gave to him and his nation the loyalty which might assure him victory.

And this sacred promise did not apply merely to the 12,000,000 people who live in that restricted district, no larger than New York State, which bears the name of Russian Poland and contains the former capital of Warsaw. Reading the rescript there was no mistaking the fact that it is equally instinct with hope for the 5,000,000 Poles subjects of a Hapsburg and the 3,000,000 Poles who owned reluctant submission to a Hohenzollern. In a word, the rescript of the Czar pointed inevitably toward new and momentous changes in the map of Europe if victory should come to the cause he had championed in this great conflict.

It was not by accident that the Czar in his appeal referred to the Battle of Gruenwald. On that field

five hundred years ago the Poles triumphed over the Teutonic Order, won the first great victory over the German force which was sweeping Slavdom eastward and laid the foundations of that Poland which, under Sobieski, was to save Europe from the Turk and in its expiring days to give Napoleon as the champion of the French Revolution so many soldiers and at least one marshal of France. Gruenwald was in no slight degree the victory of the Slav over the German; it put a limit to that extension of German power and culture which had driven the Slav from the Elbe to the Vistula: to what could the champion of the Pan-Slav cause refer with more appropriateness?

What Napoleon promised and could not quite bring himself to do Nicholas now undertook. His promise was intended to have its effect upon the Poles of Posen who wore the Prussian uniform. To be heard by the Czechs, the Serbs, the Slovaks, the Slovenes, the Croats, who wore the Hapsburg uniform. Even the Rumanians, who claim Roman, not Slavic origin, could find in it a suggestion that, when all Slavs were coming into their own, they might hope to step over into Transylvania and Bukovina and " redeem " some millions of " Romans " who are the unwilling subjects of Austrian or Hungarian tyranny. Obviously it was intended to disrupt Austrian armies and stimulate treason in Prussian forces.

Poland restored, even with its frontiers of language alone, would give Europe a new state of nearly 25,000,000 inhabitants. It would take from

Germany at least three provinces and from Austria half its population. If to the freeing of the Poles there were added the logical work of liberating all Slavs, Austria would disappear from the map of Europe. There would appear at least three Slav States in its place: Poland, Bohemia and Serbo-Croatia. To Slavdom there would be added not less than 26,000,000 of Slavs, bound by ties of race, religion and common hatred of the German.

Such in its wider aspect was the meaning of the rescript of the Czar. In it was to be found much warrant for the German assertion that at bottom the present war was a struggle between Slav and Teuton.

A glance at an ethnological map of Europe serves to indicate the meaning of this promise. Not only is Galicia, west of Lemberg, with Cracow, an ancient capital of Poland, included in that area which such a map assigns to the Poles, but so also is Posen in Prussia, almost at the gate of Berlin; while northward to the Baltic at Danzig, extends another peninsula of Poles, separating the Germans of East Prussia from the mainland of Germanic territory. That district which Frederick the Great took in the first partition, in 1772, remains Pole by race, and Danzig, Koenigsberg, all Germany east of the Vistula might logically be included in a new Poland, together with half of that Silesia which the great Prussian King seized a century and a half ago.

And if Poland were to be reëstablished why not Bohemia with its millions of Slavs, not less than

8,000,000 including the Slovaks on the marches of Hungary, west of the Carpathians? Ever since the "Defenestration of Prague," ever since the Battle of the White Hill that sent the Winter King into exile, Bohemia has been subject to the German and millions of Czechs have maintained a desperate battle for racial independence. Now Europe was fighting because the Czar chose to extend to the little Slav brother on the Danube the protection of his great Empire. Now the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croats of Dalmatia and Croatia, the Slovenes of Carniola, Carinthia and the Coast Lands, all the Southern Slavs from the Alps to the Balkans were included in the great Pan-Slavic renaissance, which had followed the victories of the Slavs of Bulgaria and Servia in the Balkans.

Not as an appeal to a fraction of his own people, not as a pledge to bind the halting loyalty of some millions of subjects on a threatened frontier, was the Czar's rescript to be accepted. It had a far wider meaning not mistaken either in Berlin or Vienna or indeed in London.

CHAPTER XIX

GERMAN ARMIES APPROACH BRUSSELS

READING the official despatches from Paris and London on August 18 it was impossible longer to doubt that Brussels was in peril and that the battle for it was being fought east of the city and along the famous Lines of the Dyle from Louvain to Namur. Nor was it more difficult to guess that in both Allied capitals it was expected that the city would be captured, since the Belgian Government had already retired to Antwerp, that the French troops would presently fall back from Gembloux toward Charleroi and Maubeuge and that the Belgian forces would retire to the fortress of Antwerp, which had been constructed for just such an emergency.

What were the causes of this imminent reverse? What would be the effect of German occupation of the Belgian capital upon the general campaign against France, of which the Belgian operation was already recognized as the mere preliminary? To answer these questions it is necessary to review once more and briefly the progress of events after Monday, August 3, when the Germans suddenly entered Belgium and moved against Liège. German assault upon that city had begun on August 4. On that

same day Liège was garrisoned by the permanent force Belgium keeps in her four fortified cities, strengthened by the first regiments which had responded to the mobilization orders of the previous week.

Once the fact of resistance was established the Belgian and French General Staff were united in a common task. For ten years French generals had feared the Luxemburg-Liège onrush and had planned to meet it. What they had not known was that Belgium would resist. Their mobilization and screening were accordingly arranged for operation inside the French boundary. The Belgian resistance was a new and immeasurably valuable thing — but it was plain that French mobilization would have to follow the original plans and French forces, apart from a few regiments of cavalry and artillery, would be unavailable for at least ten days.

Accordingly it became the mission of the Belgian Army to delay, impede, embarrass German advance until the French forces could come up. In this work the plans of Belgian resistance to a German invasion prepared by the Belgian General Staff long in advance served admirably. Their general scheme was to delay the invader as long as possible on the line of the Meuse, held by the fortresses of Namur, Huy and Liège, then to fall back to the Lines of the Demer, of the Dyle and finally to Antwerp, prepared to receive the whole Belgian Army and one of the strongest places in all Europe.

During the first two or three days of the fighting about Liège Belgian field forces assisted in the resistance. But as German masses came up and began to cross the Meuse, above and below, the Belgian troops, apart from the garrison, were drawn out. This enabled the Germans to enter the city between the forts. Meantime, the Belgian field army, now if fully mobilized, numbering at least 80,000 took up the work of holding back German advance.

The series of "battles in Belgium" which followed has already been described. With Liège squarely in its path, the German General Staff had for some days a difficult problem of getting troops west of the Meuse in large numbers and supplying them. Until it had succeeded in constructing roads and bridges north and south of the city only its cavalry was able to pass, and they had a trying experience dealing with Belgian infantry and artillery, well placed at important points between Liège and Brussels. Indeed, unsupported by infantry, the German cavalry could hardly be expected to perform this task very completely.


On the other hand, just as soon as German infantry could come up, both along the Aix-la-Chapelle-Liège-Brussels line and south of the Meuse by Huy, it was certain to force the far weaker Belgian Army back. By August 18 the pressure of the German masses had become unmistakable and the Belgian force was back on the last line in front of Brussels from Louvain to Wavre and Ottignies and the

skirmishing was at places directly in front of this line.

Meantime the French mobilization was completed and, on August 15, Paris made the official announcement that French soldiers had entered Belgium near Charleroi and were proceeding toward Gembloux, that is, were marching to fill the gap between the Belgian forces on the Dyle and the fortress of Namur, through which the Germans were pressing and had already made a raid on the famous battlefield of Ramillies. Their arrival at Gembloux had been subsequently reported.

The Belgians and French were apparently in position then, and in a position from which a successful defence might be made, if it should be determined to make the first real stand here. But what of the English? Not until August 18 was it announced that most of the expeditionary army, perhaps 120,000 strong, was on the Continent, although the arrival of 22,000 had been reported ten days earlier. The problem then faced was: Could they reach the battle line in time to participate? English military observers doubted it. If they were right, the second question was instantly raised: Would the French General Staff risk a decisive battle before the English came up? Again many observers doubted it and continued to doubt it despite newspaper forecasts of a great conflict.

The reasons for such a risk were plain and weighty. The position was admirable. The whole German



THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO BRUSSELS ON AUGUST 19TH

masses were jammed in between the Dyle-Demer and the Meuse rivers. Opportunities for deploying and developing were lacking. Brussels taken, on the other hand, the German advance could spread out, the next military obstacles would be within French territory, about Maubeuge. All Belgium, save the fortresses, would fall to the Germans. The moral effect would be great, the actual military advantage very considerable.

On the other hand, a bad defeat for the Allies meant a disorganization of their army. To fall back would insure the arrival of the British Army on the field selected for battle and the prospective German victory would at the very least be postponed, giving further time for the Russian masses to come up upon the East Prussian frontiers. An extension of German lines would also mean the detaching of more German troops to guard communications and thus a smaller army to deal with in the decisive battle.

Such then was the situation as it appeared to the world on August 18. In fact, the English Army had only just succeeded in getting its last division on French soil and was unable to concentrate at Mons, nearly fifty miles to the south of Brussels until August 22. The French had sent their main masses far off to the Vosges and the upper Meuse. Such troops as they had assigned to guard the Belgian frontier in company with the English were not yet up, the troops which had actually reached Gembloux had arrived just too late to join hands with the Belgians on the

Lines of the Dyle, too late to save the brave Belgians from the final defeat they were to suffer at Louvain the next day, too late to give moral or material aid to Namur, already crumbling under the terrific fire of the German howitzers, which were to gain fatal distinction in the next three days.

Brussels was already doomed, then. The German Army now almost before its gates numbered far more than half a million. The blow was already launched that was to fall upon the Allies at Mons-Charleroi five days later and carry disaster and destruction to the very gates of Paris. Meantime the press of the world was calmly speculating on the possibility of a second Battle of Waterloo and, in fact, Prussian cavalry were actually on the Wavre road, along which Blücher had pressed to Wellington's aid almost a century before.

One other consideration was at this moment weighing on the minds of British and French military experts: Was the Belgian Army to go south or north after defeat? To retire to Antwerp, as Belgian military advisers had planned for years or to go south and join the Allies? British experts strongly insisted upon the latter. A few hours later the Germans were to decide this question by cutting in between the Belgians and the French and sweeping the former roughly back through unfortunate Louvain to the great fortress city of the Scheldt. To the fact that the Belgian Army made good its escape was to be ascribed, soon, much of the ultimate disappoint-

ment that overtook the Germans about Paris, for whatever their previous service to the Allied cause, a service largely wasted, since the great opportunity was lost, Belgium was now to hold back those army corps required to give the final blow to the Allies in the approaching campaign from Mons to the Marne.

FROM THE SAMBRE TO THE MARNE

CHAPTER XX

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ALSO STEPS OUT

IT was natural that the Belgian conflict and the development of the German offensive should command the attention of the observers of the Great War, as it was already named by the world, to the exclusion of all else in the first month. Primarily this was because the supreme military machine of the world was then subjected to its first trial in nearly half a century. From Sedan to the Battle of the Marne the German Army was held invincible, the greatest military weapon in the world, and armed with it the German Kaiser had dominated the counsels of Europe during his whole reign. Since Waterloo destroyed the Napoleonic Army no troops, save those of the German Empire, had enjoyed an equal fame.

In the trial of August, too, the German Army showed itself not unworthy of its reputation. To measure the magnitude of the German offensive thrust must be the work of general staffs of the future, but at the present moment, close to the event,

the spectacle of a nation launching more than a million of magnificently trained, fully equipped men, whose courage equalled their efficiency, in one gigantic drive, sending them in three weeks forward over more than two hundred miles, from victory to victory in battles far surpassing the Napoleonic struggles in numbers engaged, and rivalling the Russo-Japanese War in the sacrifice of life, seems in all our written history comparable only with the dispatch of the myriads of Xerxes against Greece and the Armada of Spain against England.

But while the German Army was still about Brussels and before French and British troops had yet been compelled to begin their great retreat, events were taking place elsewhere, which were bound to exercise a powerful influence upon the western field and were soon to awaken doubts as to the permanent value, or, at the very least, as to the extent of German success in Belgium.

To get an accurate estimate of the situation in the whole European field at the beginning of the fourth week of the war, it is necessary to pass in review certain facts.

German attack upon France had been dictated by the following considerations: In a war with France, Russia, Great Britain, and Servia, having only Austria as an ally, it was certain that when all her foes had their military strength in the field, Germany would be decisively outnumbered. But at the outset of the conflict only France could mobilize with ap-

proximately the same promptitude as Germany. The size of Russia, the inadequacy of her system of communications, the comparative inefficiency of her general staff, as Berlin saw it, the long delay that would be necessary before Great Britain could put anything but a small expeditionary force in the field, all these circumstances combined to give Germany a period of some weeks during which she could strike at France.

If, while England was raising an army and Russia slowly coming up, restrained by a thin screen of Germans and most of the field army of Austria, Germany could deal France a swift, tremendous, decisive blow, not defeating but destroying her military force, repeating in 1914 the successes of 1870 on a colossal scale, then Germany might hope to be finally rid of one foe before the others were up. At Paris she could dictate French submission and turn her victorious army against Russia.

The Kaiser's position was precisely that of Napoleon at the outset of his last campaign. In Belgium, British and Prussian armies were on foot; from Austria, Russia, the rest of Europe, new armies were sure to come; Napoleon's plan was to crush the armies in Belgium before the others came up, and deal with them in turn. For this purpose he fought the Waterloo campaign.

Precisely the same necessities had compelled the Germans to go through Belgium as inspired their attack upon France. Granted that for six weeks they

were free to use their massive military machine against France almost exclusively, it was equally necessary that they should have a way to get to France promptly, to be at the throat of the enemy without delay. Hence it was impossible to attack France from the Franco-German frontier. Here, from the very morning of her terrible defeat in 1870, France had been building tremendous forts, Verdun, Toul, Epinal, Belfort, barred this approach and behind them was a second line hardly less formidable.

Six weeks to Paris had been the time-table of the German General Staff. Now what had been the progress of the movement on the French capital? At Liège on August 4, the German Army was 228 miles from Paris. At Brussels on August 20, it was 213. In sixteen days the march to Paris had gone forward precisely fifteen miles. From Liège to Brussels is sixty-two miles; they had been covered in sixteen days, despite the fact that only the Belgian army had barred the way. Ten days of this time, to be sure, had been consumed in the regular mobilization. To succeed in this great offensive, Germany had concentrated at least twenty of her twenty-five army corps in the southwestern field. She had in addition borrowed two from Austria. Had Italy remained loyal to the Triple Alliance, she would have taken care of at least three French along the Alps and in Africa, and Germany would have had twenty-two corps against eighteen French

and not more than three British on the west, with all the advantage of superior concentration.

But Italy had proclaimed her neutrality and promptly released three French corps. The whole French army was then in the pathway of Germany, the British corps were coming up, the Belgian field army was still in existence, behind the works of Antwerp. Already then the advantage of numbers in the western field was passing, had in fact passed. Such was the situation when three of the six weeks allowed for disposing of France had slipped by.

On August 20, then, the German Army was not yet in France. It had won a brief campaign which must certainly have been outside the scheme of the German General Staff, but it was only now on the point of engaging the Allied armies and Paris was still 200 miles away. In addition, French troops were taking the offensive in Alsace and Lorraine, a defensive at the moment making a big noise in the gazettes, but destined to fall wholly short of what was expected of it at this moment.

Given this situation, the progress of Russian mobilization had become of supreme interest to the Germans. Straining every nerve to crush France before the Czar's forces could concentrate, compelled for two weeks to fight an expensive and delaying contest in Belgium, the German anxiety over the situation on the eastern frontier was already manifest. In his interesting book upon *La France Victorieuse dans le Guerre de Demain,* Colonel Arthur Boucher of

the French Army had made the definite statement, three years earlier, that between the twenty-first and twenty-third days after mobilization had been ordered Russian troops would be at the German frontier. German military writers had ridiculed this, declaring that six weeks was the minimum of time in which the Czar's forces could begin to become effective.

Yet as the German armies were advancing through Brussels to their first victory on fields familiar to the students of the Waterloo campaign, their generals received news of evil omen. Precisely as Napoleon, at the moment he was launching his attack upon Wellington, learned of the appearance of Prussians in the fields toward Plancenoit, the German commanders at Charleroi heard that Russia had stepped over into East Prussia, had passed Gumbinnen, won several victories, isolated Koenigsberg, and was driving forward toward the Vistula furiously. Evidently Russian mobilization had been quicker than was expected and at the end of the third week it was necessary to deplete the armies in France. Two corps had to be sent east while the first great battle was still unfought.

The Russian offensive was naturally divided into two parts, one directed against Austria, the other against Germany. The former was composed of at least twelve army corps based on Brest-Litowski, Lublin and Rowno; the latter, of perhaps fifteen with the centre at Warsaw. To meet the twelve

Russian corps the Austrians had sixteen, less those charged with opposing the Servian Army, holding the southern Slavs in check in Austrian territory and protecting the coasts and the Italian frontier. At least four corps were required for this work and two were in Germany on the French frontier. Russia could then reckon on a numerical advantage of at least two army corps against Austria, enough to remove all possibility of further Austrian reënforcements being despatched to the west.

There remained the army charged with penetrating Prussia towards Berlin. For this fifteen army corps would ultimately be available. To face these the Germans had left not more than five, possibly only four, corps in the first line or field army. To meet this tremendous disparity she had to rely upon her second line, which could not be mobilized until the first was in the field and was naturally inferior in equipment and in immediate military value. Patently, the advantage of Russia in this field was enormous, if her regular army could be brought up. A portion of it at least had now come up, was in Prussia and the Russian offensive had begun.

Again, it is necessary to review the whole field to get the true value of the German campaign in Belgium. Three weeks after the German declaration of war upon Russia, Russian troops were in Prussia, French troops were in Alsace-Lorraine, the British expeditionary army was on the Continent, the Belgian army was in the field and had made a wonderful

showing; finally, the great German offensive movement had not yet reached French territory, its cavalry had been very severely handled in a preliminary campaign and the roads to Paris were blocked by French armies fully mobilized and, at least with its allies, equal in numbers to the German.


Briefly, then, Germany at Brussels on August 20 had terminated victoriously, perhaps gloriously, a campaign wholly outside of the calculations of her General Staff and in a direction parallel to, not towards Paris. She had lost some days in Belgium. These days had brought Russia into the field. Henceforth it became necessary to watch the Russian offensive toward Berlin quite as closely as the German toward Paris.

CHAPTER XXI

THE GERMANS TAKE BRUSSELS AND START FOR FRANCE

THE Belgians were defeated at Louvain on August 19 and the Germans entered Brussels the next day. Through this city for two days the vast army poured and from stray reports from the Belgian capital in the next few days the world was to learn that Germany had in fact concentrated more than half of her first line army, perhaps 900,000 men, in this tremendous thrust at France across the Belgian plain. As regiment after regiment, the men clad in those grey uniforms, which were previously unknown to their opponents, swept along the Brussels boulevards, they broke into the "goose step," and this little detail fixed itself upon the mind and the imagination of the world, which in the next few days was to discuss the possibility that the triumphal march through Brussels might soon be repeated in Paris. It was with the German occupation of Brussels, that the real power, force, menace of the great German offensive were first brought home to neutral and foe alike.

To understand the next and second phase of German operations in Belgium and toward France there



THE START OF THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE FOR FRANCE, AUGUST 20-21

are certain geographical and military circumstances which must be remembered. When the German advance stepped over into Belgium on August 3 its obvious purpose was to seize Liège and then Namur and open the road to France by the Meuse and Sambre Valleys. Had it succeeded the main German advance need not have gone to Brussels. The side trip to Brussels was imposed by two interdependent circumstances. The resistance of Liège gave the Belgian garrison at Namur time to prepare and prevented any seizure of this fortress by a sudden rush. This town closed the valley of the Meuse and the Sambre above Namur, the direct line to Paris. The prolongation of the resistance at Liège also enabled the field army of Belgium to come up on the right flank of the Germans.

Under these circumstances the Germans were compelled to go west, not south, to roll up the Belgian Army and sweep it back into Antwerp and to open a road to France west of the Meuse, since Namur was on a war footing. As the Belgian field army continued to put up a gallant and effective resistance and Liège delayed the mass of German infantry there was a period when it seemed possible that the French and British forces might arrive in time to confront the Germans on the famous Lines of the Dyle east of Brussels and compel them to open a way to France far inside Belgian territory.

But, fortunately for the Germans, the Allies failed to get up, apparently by a narrow margin of time,

for French troops in considerable force were just south of the Belgian lines at Gembloux, when the Germans, by a wide sweep to the north, broke in upon the Belgians at Louvain, threatened their line of retreat upon Antwerp and thus compelled them to retire rapidly on that city. Thus, by Thursday August 20, the Germans had accomplished the task which constituted the first phase of their operations to get at France and stood in force at Brussels while their cavalry was sweeping west and north toward Ostend and Ghent.

From Brussels to France three important lines of rail and roadway lead south to the French border some fifty miles away. That to the west enters France at Lille, where it joins the Ghent-Antwerp-Paris line. The middle line crosses the French boundary north of Valenciennes. The eastern line joins the Liège-Paris railroad at Charleroi and enters France at Maubeuge. Maubeuge and Lille are perhaps fifty miles apart and Valenciennes is almost equidistant from both. Maubeuge and Lille were fortified towns, each surrounded by a circle of detached forts. With Valenciennes, Condé, Le Quesnay and Mons, the last named now in Belgium, they constituted the famous "Belgian Belt," constructed by Vauban and familiar to all students of French and English history. But only Maubeuge and Lille were now fortified. There were, however, in addition several detached forts between the two cities occupying vantage points and to be reckoned with still.

Finally, across two-thirds of the gap between Lille and Maubeuge runs the Scheldt River, a sort of moat, in front of the Maubeuge-Lille line.

For the German army at Brussels and intending to invade France the gaps between Maubeuge and Lille and between Maubeuge and Namur were practically the only possible roads. To go to the west beyond Lille would mean to extend an open flank to the Anglo-French forces from Namur to Lille, while the narrower stretch of land between Lille and the sea is flanked again by the first class fortress of Dunkirk. Such a detour would also be far off the main railway lines. To go east of Namur beyond the Meuse was equally difficult and unattractive to an army whose time was limited, because the Meuse route was closed by a series of fortified towns in France, notably Mèziéres and Givet.

One more detail, Charleroi is on the Sambre about half way between Namur and Maubeuge. The river runs from southwest to northeast and a French force lying behind it would have its flanks covered by these fortresses. Similarly Mons lies between Lille and Maubeuge, both squarely on the German road to Paris. It was plain from the outset then that once the German army had occupied Brussels, wheeled left for France and begun its advance, spreading out east and west as it moved, the first considerable encounter would take place about these two towns of Charleroi and Mons.

The Germans were at Brussels on August 20.

At that time the world was convinced of three things; first, that Namur was certain to make a determined resistance, to surpass the achievement of Liège, an achievement which had fired the imagination of Allied capitals, still confident that the great forts, now long silent, were still holding out.

Second, that a French army, fully concentrated and at least equal in number to the German, was on the Sambre, already entrenched: Third: That the British expeditionary army was all up and having made contact with the French line was also in position to bar the German advance.

The key to what happened immediately after August 20 is found in the fact that on all three points, public conjecture was mistaken. Namur did not make a serious resistance, falling abruptly on August 22, its Belgian garrison, without French help until the terrible bombardment had opened and then strengthened by a single French regiment which had to retire almost immediately, lost courage, despaired and surrendered. No considerable French army, measured by the enormous German concentration, was on the Sambre. The English had not as yet concentrated their entire force, were barely taking position on their appointed ground when the storm burst upon them. Finally, owing to some blunder on the part of a French general officer, which will hardly be explicable until the close of the war, the troops assigned to the duty of protecting the left flank of the British had not come up, did not come

up in the three critical days that followed the opening battle at Mons on August 23. This failure on the part of the French compelled the retreat of the British, before the engagement at Mons had reached a decisive stage, exposed the whole left wing of the Allied armies and made inevitable the series of disasters that followed so promptly.

Meantime the opening of the Franco-German campaign recalled names famous once and now forgotten in long years of peace. Jemappes, Fleurus, Wattignies had been fought on the fields over which the cavalry of three nations were already on August 20 skirmishing. At Charleroi, soon to witness a French defeat, Napoleon had beaten the Prussians in the Waterloo campaign. By the route the Germans were now taking, the Allies in 1792-3 had marched against Maubeuge and had failed to take it and get to Paris by the narrowest of margins. Before the Battle of Mons British and German cavalry actually clashed on the field where a century before Prussians and English had destroyed the last Napoleonic army.

On August 22, Namur fell, on the following day the French were defeated at Charleroi, the British compelled to retire from Mons to avoid an enveloping movement. Lille promptly opened its gates to the Germans. At a single thrust the Germans had broken through the first line of French defense. The campaign in Belgium had given place to the invasion of France.

CHAPTER XXII

THE FRENCH COUNTER-OFFENSIVE FAILS

THE simplest and therefore the best way to grasp the meaning of the fighting along the broad battle front from the German Ocean to Switzerland, which filled the fourth week of the Great War, is to accept the central unity which lay back of the whole confused and bewildering mass of detail. This unity is discoverable in the French counter-offensive movement.

From three different bases Germany had launched armies at Paris. These armies, taking their names from the rivers whose valleys they followed, the Meuse, the Moselle and the Rhine, were moving in a converging direction toward the French frontier. In advance of their reaching the frontier where the French had permanent and considerable fortifications the French General Staff about August 14 sent three armies against them: one from the Lille-Maubeuge line in northern France along the Sambre and Meuse toward Mons, Charleroi and Namur; another from Verdun across the French Meuse into the Ardennes region about Neufchâteau; a third from Nancy into German Lorraine between Metz and Strassburg.

The obvious purpose of these counter-offensive

movements was to strike the three German armies before they reached France, thus, if possible, bringing them to a halt and putting them on the defensive before they had time to develop their lines, make their contact between armies and attain their maximum of efficiency. Each of these counter-offensives totally failed. The circumstances attending their failure, so far as they were then known, supplied the news and explained the grave anxiety discernible in London and Paris at the moment when the Germans took Brussels.

The first failure was that of the Eastern French Army facing the German Army of the Rhine. This offensive had two different phases. One contemplated a movement through southern Alsace by Belfort and the passes of the Vosges, the other an advance by Lunéville between Metz and Strassburg and toward the lower Rhine at Mayence. The plain purpose was to roll back any German forces in the region and by defeating them compel the Germans to weaken their great army in Western Belgium.

In both Alsace and German Lorraine the offensive was temporarily successful. Saarburg, on the railroad between Metz and Strassburg, was occupied. French bulletins reported successes, including the capture of Muelhausen in Alsace. Then, suddenly, with no explanation, the French advance was reported to have terminated and the retiring troops were placed beyond Lunéville near Nancy. The only conceivable explanation for this was that the

advancing force had been utterly defeated, if not routed. This the German bulletins promptly affirmed, claiming the capture of 150 cannon, while French rumor pointed to the failure of an army corps to do its work and the disgrace of a general.

Much more obscure was the story of the repulse or rout of the French columns sent against the Army of the Moselle, evidently established in the Ardennes west of Luxemburg and north of Longwy, Verdun and Stenay. Evidently the attempt was made to strike the German corps advancing through the difficult Ardennes region. French bulletins soon admitted the retreat of their columns beyond the Semois toward Verdun. German despatches announced a crushing victory at Neufchâteau, even more complete than in Lorraine, with the capture of generals and many thousands of soldiers and the rout of the French.

Finally, in Belgium, along the Sambre and the Meuse and north of Maubeuge, an Anglo-French move against the German Army of the Meuse, coming south from Brussels had receded after desperate fighting at the moment of the sudden and utterly bewildering fall of Namur.

It was absolutely clear then that in different fields the French counter-offensive, so much advertised by French strategists before and since the war began, had failed utterly. What remained the real problem was whether defeat had so completely demoralized

the French armies that they would be unable to hold the lines to which they had now been driven. If it had the German advance could still reach Paris on schedule time.

As the situation now stood the French on all their fronts were back on their first permanent line of defences. The Eastern Army occupied the gap between Epinal and Toul, which had long been prepared to meet the whole German advance into France. The position was tremendously strong, both naturally and by reason of the great forts about it which had been erected in recent years. Unless the army had been hopelessly routed, it could still stand on the defensive, where French engineers and staff had long ago prepared the ground.

As to the army of the centre, facing the German Army of the Moselle, the situation was less clear. Between Verdun and Charleville-Mézières, on the south bank of the Meuse, there was an admirable position to defend, with the deep Meuse in front, the Verdun forts on the right, the forts of Mézières, Givet and the broken country between the Sambre and the Meuse on the left, where contact with the Allied army to the west could be made. But there was no serious obstacle in the shape either of forts or mountains, and if the French advance to Neufchâteau had ended in a rout, it was exceedingly doubtful if French resistance could hold a victorious German Army here.

As to the Western Army, made up of English and French, and now retreating before overwhelming forces, not even German despatches as yet claimed that the retirement was other than orderly.

In sum, a French offensive against the Germans in three directions had come to grief. Following it the French and British had fallen back upon the lines prepared over long years by French engineers as the first line of defence in France. If the Allied armies had not been demoralized they had still the advantage of forts, field works, rivers and hills in their favor, with complete railway lines to insure reënforcement and communication.

On the other hand, if, as the Germans declared, incorrectly, as was subsequently disclosed, their Army of the Moselle had routed the French force in front of it, the prospect was that a German advance between Verdun and Mézières would very shortly compel the Allies to fall back, if not upon Paris directly, upon the Rheims-Laon-La Fère barrier far in French territory.

To the Germans' credit now were the conquest of Belgium and the defeat of the French counter-offensive. If the defeat were a rout they still had plenty of time to get to the Paris forts before the Russian advance became dangerous enough to compel weakening their western armies further. It remained to be seen just how complete their success in Lorraine and at Neufchâteau was. All else was of secondary importance, even the fall of Namur, the

most amazing circumstance of the war save only for the resistance of Liège, and a circumstance which promptly aroused doubt as to the strength of all other fortified towns, including Paris itself, a doubt to grow with each successive siege until the fall of Antwerp finally established the superiority of German heavy artillery over the strongest of modern fortifications.

CHAPTER XXIII

FRANCE CHANGES MINISTERS

OF greater permanent meaning in the European conflict than the results of German victories in Lorraine and Picardy or Russian triumphs along the Prussian marches was the decision of the French Republic on August 26 to call to the colors three of its most distinguished statesmen, Delcassé, Millerand, and Briand, men whom peace politicians held too "strong," but a national crisis clearly demanded. Exactly in the same fashion in England, a Radical government, had sent Kitchener to the War Office.

What had happened in France was now fairly clear. Our own history in 1861 and in 1898 should supply sufficient parallels. England at the outbreak of the Boer war and in the days of the Crimea, suffered from similar inherent disadvantages. For the fact is that the first day of war is invariably the weakest for democracies, as it frequently is the strongest for monarchies. A State like Germany is, in a sense, always mobilized, always on a war footing. England, France, the United States, are hopelessly handicapped by their system of government expressly designed to prevent in peace a centralization of power, absolutely necessary in time of war.

When the Austro-Servian crisis finally precipitated the long promised general war France had one of the weakest of her innumerable Cabinets. It was frankly a makeshift to bridge a time in which alignments could be made and new political combinations formed in a legislature fresh from a general election. In the posts of importance and danger men of second and third class ability were found. Even in France they would not have lasted, but war came all unexpected and found France, as it found us in 1898, unprepared in executive departments at least.

After war broke out came miscalculation and defeat. French mobilization was less promptly effective than German. French concentration failed to cover German purposes. In consequence after brief successes in Alsace and Lorraine disaster and retreat had followed. French generals, too, had apparently been unsuccessful, and to fail in such a conflict is the unpardonable thing. "Your head is the price of failure!" was the last message the Committee of Public Safety in 1793 sent through the lines to the commander of Maubeuge, assailed by an earlier invasion. But, apparently, such a spirit was not to be found in a makeshift political Ministry sitting in Paris.

Now there had happened what always happens in democracies, weakest at first; the emergency called the best of all parties to the front. Our Civil War with its long failures, its political generals, its flounderings and its blunders led inevitably to the

time when strong men and strong measures were found or taken. After preliminary defeat democracy mobilizes. After defeat autocracy, whose only claim upon power is efficiency, falls as did Napoleon III after Sedan.

To France there was not allowed the three years of experiment this nation had fifty years ago. But France had the tremendous advantage of a whole male population trained to military duty. In 1871, without this advantage, with all the regular establishment swept away, France created armies, prolonged a hopeless contest, saved her honor and survived defeats.

After her first reverses, the situation was not yet even desperate. Her field armies remained. They had met defeat, but no disaster comparable with those of the Third Empire. But already the spirit typified by Gambetta in 1871, by Carnot in 1792, manifested itself in the calling to the colors of the men whom France believed her ablest statesmen. The nation, not the Chamber of Deputies, full half of whose members were now at the front, had made a Ministry.

Wars, after all, are not ultimately determined without regard to the spirit of peoples. The German machine was not finer, more splendidly equipped, more justly confident of future victory because of recent triumphs than the veterans of Napoleon I, whom the Prussian conscripts fought successfully in 1813 and 1814. Such disadvantage as France now

labored under was not comparable to those of 1792, when she faced a whole world in arms without trained soldiers or generals.

But what it is vital for all of us Americans to understand is that the French situation in the last days of August was the direct, the inevitable consequence of her choice of her form of government. It was exactly what we have had to face in all the wars of our history. If democracy cannot maintain itself under these circumstances in France and England alike, it will be forced to give way to a system which, however unpleasant, heavy handed, inspired by the temper and tone of the barrack, can in the final hour defend the frontier and the nation. Precisely the same lesson was to be found in Russian as in German success in the present war.

German success, if uninterrupted in the next few days, already foreshadowed the arrival of the German offensive before the forts of Paris. The appointment of General Galliéni, one of the most distinguished of French officers, as Governor plainly hinted at the expectation of such a contingency. But it was also a wholesome indication of the determination to put soldiers rather than political generals on guard.

But to reach Paris was not to take it. In 1870-71 that was a matter of months after the last regular French army had been captured and France had no allies. In the meantime it is well to look at the political as well as the merely military aspects of the

situation at this moment. In England and in France party politics had been eliminated, national defence had become the single purpose of governments in which party lines had been obliterated.

No American could watch the next few weeks of European history without concern. Questions of right and wrong, of rival cultures and racial ambitions were wholly subsidiary to the greater question as to whether democracy, with all its virtues, could, because of its inherent defects, defend itself against autocracy, against the most efficient autocracy this world has known in centuries. If it failed it was not difficult to foresee the reaction that would follow.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE GREAT GERMAN ENVELOPING MOVEMENT

FOR nearly ten days after the German occupation of Brussels, the world remained in absolute darkness as to the progress of events on the Franco-Belgian frontier. Battles had been fought of real importance. Allied armies had been defeated. French and British forces were in retreat. This much the Berlin bulletins from time to time asserted with ever growing confidence and exultation. But it was not until August 28 that the official statement from Paris gave the first bare hint of the defeat that had been suffered and the disaster that had threatened and still threatened.

To describe this it is necessary to summarize briefly the things that had taken place in the recent days. When the Germans fell upon the Anglo-French forces along the Sambre and the Scheldt Rivers, the situation on the great battle line from the English Channel to Switzerland, so familiar in the newspaper headlines of that hour, was as follows: Between Namur and Lille and about Mons and Charleroi stood the Anglo-British army, with its right flank south of Namur extending along the Meuse from Dinant to Givet. A second army, hav-

ing been defeated in the Belgian Ardennes had retreated and filled the gap between the first and the frontier barrier forts extending between Toul and Verdun. The third was fighting before Nancy, having been terrifically beaten and driven in confusion from German Lorraine, but now, at last established on ground which it was to hold for the next two months against tremendous assaults.

The defeat of the Anglo-British Army at Charleroi and Mons has been mentioned. While the Germans were attacking at these points, which were the left and centre of this army, they directed a further assault upon its right along the Meuse River from Dinant to Givet. This was made by the western half of the German Army of the Moselle, henceforth to follow the fortunes of the Army of the Meuse. This attack was successful, the French right was driven and the German army, commanded by the Grand Duke Albrecht, pursuing it was on the flank and rear of the French and English retreating from Mons and Charleroi and threatened to interpose between them and Paris.

It became necessary for the Allies to retreat and they did rapidly, the French coming south, east of Maubeuge, the English west. It was a race between the German Army of the Moselle, commanded by Grand Duke Albrecht, and the French to get control of the road to Paris. As the English retired they left the cover of the Maubeuge-Lille line of forts and their left wing, which was also the left

wing of the whole army, was exposed. On this flank, then, the Germans, evidently waiting for this event, flung five army corps — from 225,000 to 315,000 men — in one tremendous rush.

Thus, at one stage, and the critical stage of the operation, the Allies were in this position: on the right flank and to the rear was the Army of the Moselle moving against their line of retreat. In the front was the main German army, commanded by Generals von Hausen and von Buelow; on the left flank and striking toward their rear were five corps, commanded by General von Kluck. In other words, the Allies were in great peril of being surrounded by two forces striking on their flanks and rear, while faced with a superior force at the north.

Here, then, was the imminent shadow of a Sedan, far more gigantic than that of 1870, which might in a single operation dispose of at least 300,000 first line troops and permit a victorious German army moving south to interpose between Paris and the French armies on the Vosges and in Alsace and drive them north and eastward against the Bavarian-Austrian troops about Metz and Strassburg.

Such, briefly, was the tremendous enveloping movement of the German General Staff, a magnificent expansion of the elder von Moltke's plan, which in 1870 had shut one French army up in Metz and led to the capture of the other at Sedan. The purpose was now disclosed, alike in the French official statements and in the German bulletins, which for the first

time boldly affirmed that the plan had already been realized, that the British had been overwhelmed, the French driven away from Paris. In the whole period of the Great War from the first shots at Liège to the Battle of the Aisne this was the most exciting moment in every capital and in Paris there was heard on all sides the grim comment, "It is 1870 again."

Yet on August 28, at the moment when German hopes were highest, an official bulletin at Paris held out the hope that the Allies had, at least momentarily escaped the enveloping net. This bulletin declared: — "The situation on our front from the Department of the Somme to the Vosges remains the same as yesterday." But for the world there had been no "yesterday." So far as Paris or London knew, outside of the war offices, the left flank of the Allies still stood at Cambrai, Arras, Le Cateau, the first town in Pas de Calais, the others in the Aisne. Here was a confession of lost territory, instantly subordinated to the plain indication that far greater perils had been escaped.

For, if the Allied armies were in the Department of the Somme, they were near the second line of French permanent defences, which military writers have frequently described under the name of the Laon-La Fére-Rheims barrier. The left flank of this position stretched along the marshy valley of the Upper Somme, by Péronne, once a fortress, north of Amiens to the Channel at Abbeville. Behind this position the roads to Paris were still open, Dieppe

remained a base for the British, now that the road to Boulogne was menaced by the progress of German advance.

The Allies then stood some seventy-five miles back on their first battle ground; over this distance they had been driven in five days of fighting, the details of which were still unknown. But they had not been destroyed as Berlin had asserted, as one British war correspondent at Amiens had despairingly announced. Their position was a strong one, on the centre and right it was covered by the chain of fortresses from La Fére to Rheims. The second position was far better for a defensive fight than the first. In it the Allies were much nearer their base, while the Germans were correspondingly further away. Reënforcements were coming from England, from distant Alsace, where the ill-advised counter-offensive had been abandoned and the troops engaged in it recalled.

By August 28, then, while the Germans had been successful in a number of serious conflicts and had rolled the French centre back and threatened to surround the English on the Allied left, they had still failed to envelop or destroy their enemy. So far and so far only the great German enveloping movement had failed. On the other hand the possibility, soon to be translated into fact, was that the retreat of the Allies had been so precipitate, particularly upon the battered left, that they would be unable to stand at the Somme and the Laon-La Fère bar-

rier, that they would have to go back to the forts of Paris. For the Allies this was the gloomiest moment in the early weeks of the war. Paris and London aside from brief and vague statements preserved complete silence officially. This silence was in grim contrast with Berlin, which daily reported new progress and as a climax to glowing bulletins, one German newspaper on August 29 reported that the storm beaten little British army driven south from Cambrai had been met on its line of retreat near St. Quentin by masses of German cavalry, dispersed and destroyed.

The attention of the world was then concentrated upon the desperate effort of the Germans to repeat in 1914 the successes of 1870, but on a far more gigantic scale and all through the week following the Allied defeat at Mons and Charleroi, the ultimate success of their great enveloping movement seemed imminent.

CHAPTER XXV

THE GREAT RETREAT

WITH the arrival of the Allied Armies on the line of the Somme and on August 29, a corner of the veil that had covered all military operations since the engagements on the Sambre and Meuse was lifted and the first official report of Sir John French permitted the world to discover if not all of what had happened, yet exactly what was meant by the tremendous operations still continuing in Northwestern France. For the first time they learned something of the character of the great retreat, the critical operation of the first month of war.

At the moment when the German commanders saw the French irrevocably committed to their counter-offensive, they suddenly set in motion their vast army on Namur and Brussels.

When they wheeled left in Brussels and started toward Paris the Germans were actually nearer to the French capital than either of the great French armies on the east. If they could crush the Allied force before them, or outflank it and roll it east away from Paris, they could envelop the whole military force of France. With three of their six weeks still remaining, the Germans were in a posi-

tion to repeat Sedan on a truly colossal scale. To this effort the following ten days were devoted.

At the precise moment when the fatal German "drive" began, it was Thursday, August 20, the great mass of the German Army was less than 150 miles from Paris. At least two-thirds of the French Army were from 250 to 300 miles away, along the Vosges and the Meuse, fighting desperately and making little real headway. Before Nancy the much-advertised "counter-offensive" had come to grief and after a brief foray into German Lorraine had been sent home shattered. South before Belfort another invading French army clung to Muelhausen, which it had taken, lost, and retaken.

On August 23 the first blow had been struck. At the same time the centre of the Allied Army in Northern France, standing near Charleroi and the right on the Meuse near Givet were assailed, overwhelmed, forced back after desperate fighting, while Namur, to the amazement of the world had fallen on the previous day. The British on the left about Mons repulsed several savage attacks, but were involved in the general retreat, their own unguarded left already exposed to a flank attack. This first blow was an attempt to destroy by sheer weight rather than to outflank and only by rapid retreat was disaster avoided.

The second stroke came upon August 26. It fell upon the British alone. Standing about Cambrai, Le Cateau, Landrecies, and preparing to withdraw,

the British Army, two corps against five, was suddenly assailed by a huge German Army which struck at its front and at the same time reached for its left flank.

This was the critical moment, not merely for the British, threatened with annihilation, as Sir John French subsequently reported, but for the whole northern army. For if the British were destroyed the whole left flank of the Allies was gone, the centre and the left would be rolled up as the British had been, the northern army would be destroyed, and the mass of the Germans would be between Paris and the eastern armies, could surround them, destroy them by sheer weight of numbers and turn to the Russian task.

But the British Army was not destroyed. Fighting, as it fought at Waterloo, with the same obstinacy, tenacity, imperturbability, it finally shook off its opponents, staggered back, won clear and went home, dealing terrific blows as it went and inflicting losses which were enormous. When next it stood, French troops had at last come up on its left, after a delay, which remains inexplicable, had exposed the British Army to deadly peril from August 22 to August 28 and particularly on the most critical of all days, August 26. In all these nights and days the British army had known no rest, had been compelled to leave its dead and wounded behind it, but it " had lived " and this was a supreme triumph.

On October 28, for the last time the British were

compelled to fight for their existence, this time with German cavalry drawn up near St. Quentin on their line of retreat. But this last barrier they brushed aside with comparative ease. At the moment when a Berlin newspaper proclaimed their destruction, they were seventy miles from Paris, safe for the moment, with the road to the French capital open.

Such then was the meaning of the last few days of furious fighting. By September 1 the Germans had driven the Allies from the second line of French defence, beyond the line of the Somme, south of Amiens-St. Quentin and the Laon-La Fére-Rheims barrier, and were now within sixty miles of Paris and still coming on apparently irresistibly.

While the world had been looking for some news of a great battle favorable to the Allies just inside the French frontier, French and British forces had been retreating day and night at full speed to escape annihilation, to save their left flank, to keep ahead of the German enveloping movement, to elude the net pinned down at one end on the Swiss frontier and the Metz-Thionville forts and carried at the other by the swiftly moving German right, commanded by General von Kluck.

It was now plain that the crisis in Northern France could not be long delayed. If the German enveloping movement should fail for two or three days more the Allied left was bound to escape. Indeed, although Paris and London remained in suspense for a few more days, Berlin had already

recognized the failure and was preparing for the alternative move. It was at this moment that Paris made final preparations for a second siege, that the French government retired to Bordeaux, that the story of the Allied disaster filled the press of the world.

Hostile and neutral journals alike paid full tribute to the wonderful courage, determination, persistence of the Germans. Their General Staff had outgeneralled the French, their men had certainly carried all before them despite staggering losses. The first and perhaps the real crisis of the European war was now at hand, and the great puzzle was whether despite huge losses, tremendous efforts and the terrific wastage of war, the German soldiers still had strength left to deal another blow as Blücher's Prussians did at Waterloo. Happily for the French they now had English steadiness with them.

CHAPTER XXVI

SEDAN DAY AND A MONTH OF WAR

ON September 1, 1870, German armies along the Meuse surrounded Napoleon III, and the last field army of France. On hillsides which were now being freshly fought over they had forged the "ring of steel," which one day later was tightened to crush the beaten French. Surrender on September 2, 1870, settled the fate of the Third Empire, laid the solid foundation of the new German Empire, gave Alsace-Lorraine and supremacy on the Continent to Germany.

Forty-four years later two millions of Germans in arms in France, in Belgium, in Russia and in Germany were endeavoring to celebrate the anniversary by achievements which should make the day memorable anew. In the nineteenth century it was the birthday of German unity and military greatness. In the twentieth, for every German, the words of General von Bernhardi, "our next war means world power or downfall," had a particular meaning.

And on this German holiday, on which also the first month of war terminated, it was impossible to deny that Germany had marched far upon the road

to what her statesmen had long called "her place in the sun." Her victorious armies had already proved utterly that the German "machine" created by the father of Frederick the Great, used by him, remodelled by the soldiers of the German uprising in 1813, moulded on grander and more splendid lines by von Moltke and von Roon, was still as marvellous as ever.

In one short month the army had swept through Belgium, crushed the feeble Belgian forces, broken down the northern gate to France and had driven before it French armies still unbroken but yielding steadily to terrific blows dealt by numbers always superior — despite the terrible losses of each advance. To the precision and efficiency of the machine there was added the enthusiasm, the devotion, of the soldiers, who were fairly rivalling the Japanese in their recklessness and contempt for death.

Once more the German Army had been mobilized more quickly, equipped more completely, handled with more skill and judgment, than the French. Once more it had been left to the French soldiers, aided this time by a small but sturdy army of English, to seek to repair, to redeem, the errors of politicians in the Cabinet and palterers in the field. So far they had failed, not decisively, but wholly.

Yet the wonderful achievement of German arms could not blind the observer to the manifest difference between Sedan Day 1870 and 1914. On the earlier day the surrender of Napoleon left the road

to Paris open, while Bazaine, behind the walls of Metz, was doomed to surrender when starvation came. No thought of further resistance save a brief siege of Paris could have troubled the German invaders. No ally in Europe moved to succor prostrate France. Yet Paris resisted for long months. Gambetta raised hundreds of thousands of men, who fought brave battles, even won one, strained German endurance severely before the inevitable surrender came.

On Sedan Day 1914 no army of France had been routed or captured. On the Vosges the Eastern Army was fighting on even terms with an army it had confronted for weeks, now advancing, now retiring. On the Meuse a second army, from Verdun to Mézières, still held the ground which, like the position to the south, was the first line of French defence within sight of the frontier.

Only on the north had French retreat been serious, and here some hundreds of thousands of French with hardly more than a hundred thousand English had been fighting and retiring, now thrusting back, now slipping away from the main German Army, which had penetrated some eighty miles into France. The fact that a political Ministry sent masses of troops to the remote Vosges and left Paris open explained German progress, but already French corps were coming back and reënforcements were arriving from England and from the south and west of France.

Eastward on the Vistula Russian advance had begun unexpectedly promptly and East Prussia seemed temporarily lost, the road to Berlin was defended by second and third line troops, the first were on the Somme and the Meuse. Panic-stricken Germans fleeing from the Cossacks were as familiar at the moment in East Prussia as French refugees leaving their homes before the Uhlan advance in Picardy, Artois and Flanders.

Looking seaward, the German prospect was even more unattractive. "Our future is on the sea," the Emperor had said years before, and now, while his great battle fleet lay helpless in its war harbor, English cruisers the world over were sweeping up his commerce and merchant marine, Japan was filching his Chinese colony, England had taken German Samoa and the patches of German land in Africa were already doomed.

At the close of a month of war the German Emperor stood where Napoleon had stood before Austerlitz — with a splendid army, a loyal nation, a shining record of military triumph. But for the Kaiser Austerlitz had not yet come. France was not yet crushed. Sedan Day saw French defeat, but not disaster. She was losing the "first round." But not in Paris, London nor St. Petersburg was there any hint of avoiding a second. Even Servia, the occasion of the tragedy, was stepping over into Bosnia, repeating at the Jedar the victory of the Bregalinitza, while French and English cannons were

driving the Austrians from the foot of the Black Mountain.

A month of horrors August had been, made more terrible by the fact that it had insured more months of suffering, struggle, human misery. A month in which each day's events gathered hastily from newspapers still fresh from the press contained deeds and events which will be remembered as long as written history endures.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE FATE OF AUSTRIA

WHILE the German war machine was undergoing its supreme test now almost under the walls of Paris, while there was being renewed the age long struggle between the Germans and the French, it was also beginning to be apparent that far off beyond the Carpathians and the Vistula a conflict not less tremendous was proceeding which might have far more enduring consequences in European States.

For if Germany defeated France and England there would still remain a France and England. Napoleon could not destroy Prussia. Austria never succeeded in killing the national aspirations of the Italians, but an Austrian defeat in Galicia might mean the end of Austria, for Austria was not the nation of one race or of several races bound together by centuries of common hopes and fears, sufferings and ideals; rather it was the combination of peoples of many tongues ruled by two races, in numbers the minority, in intelligence and power dominant.

The downfall of Austria-Hungary had been foretold for a generation. The death of Francis

Joseph had been fixed as the term of the Hapsburg Empire. The rise of the Balkan States, of Servia, so small in area, so large in recent events of world history, had been accepted as final signs of the coming dissolution.

If the battle now in progress in Galicia in the last week in August, a battle where hundreds of thousands of men were units should turn against the Austrian — and the fall of Lemberg was already accepted as an indication of waning fortune — then as the victorious Slav armies went forward, what of the Ruthenian and the Pole of Galicia, the Czech of Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovak beyond the Carpathians? What, too, of the Serbs and Croats along the Danube and the Drave? Would they not welcome the Russian as a fellow Slav, would not Austria, inundated from the East by victorious Russian armies, be faced by the uprising of 26,000,000 of Slavs who had long and impatiently endured the stupid tyranny of German and Hungarian rulers? Such, at least, was the question the world outside was now asking.

The plain purpose of Russian military operations was now revealed. Precisely as Germany sent her whole field army to France and kept only a screen to face Russia, the Czar had turned only a relatively weak army against Germany and sent his great force over the boundaries into Austria. To destroy Austrian armies, to crush the forward thrust from Galicia of the main field army of Austria,

aiming at Warsaw precisely as the Kaiser had struck down the French counter-offensive, this was the Russian purpose.

Successful, it could hardly be possible to exaggerate the consequences of the Russian strategy. The immediate effect must be to send the shattered Austrian troops westward through the Carpathians, out of the field of future operations not impossibly harassed by the Galicians themselves, Slav to a man. Meanwhile the great bulk of Russians could flow west and north toward Berlin. Such strength as remained to Austria must be devoted to a grim defence eastward along the Carpathians and southward on the Danube, where the Serbs were coming up, and to the repression of Slav rebellion at home, not impossibly.

But if Russia failed, if Austria at the last won, or even made the battle drawn, then the Russian advance would be checked from the Baltic to Bukovina. More millions of Russians would have to be mobilized, the Austrian and Prussian marches would have a breathing spell. Russia would not go on to Berlin then, but must defend Warsaw, strive to save Poland from the invader.

Thus, far to the west and to the east, exactly the same desperate game was being played. Germany was staking everything upon success before Paris, success which could only come with the destruction of the enemy before her, not from an empty siege — useless, even if successful, if French and English

armies remained standing. Russia was putting the whole present prospect of the war in jeopardy to strike down the Austrian Army, which represented the full measure of Hapsburg strength and the sole sustaining bulwark for a nation of divided loyalties and many tongues.

So far as the Great War was a battle between the Slav and the Teuton it was now being fought about Lemberg. A victory for Russia might prove as decisive for the Slav as was Tannenberg five centuries ago, when the Poles checked the eastward advance of the Germans for centuries. More vital for Germany by far was the eastern than the western struggle, for neither France nor England threatened her existence, sought her provinces, save Alsace-Lorraine, but Slav ambition turned toward East Prussia, Silesia, toward Posen at the very gates of Berlin.

If Russia were victorious in the present eastern struggle — a quick change in the west was inevitable. To stem the Russian flood not one but many corps would have to be recalled. Anything but a decisive victory in France might prove but an empty triumph whose prize was lost as soon as won.

All this the Germans knew best of all. It explained all their gigantic efforts, their recklessness of life, of resources. The supreme hour had come, precisely as they planned it should come. They had almost reached Paris. Their war machine had fulfilled every task set for it so far, save only one — it had not yet destroyed Anglo-French armies. There

was yet time — but the first rumors from the Carpathians and the Vistula suggested that the time would not be long.

That retiring War Minister of France who declared before the severe struggle far to the north, "On this battle the fate of France depends," had found the exile he deserved, but in every European capital it was beginning to be said that on this Galician battle the fate of Austria depended.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ON TO RICHMOND IN 1864 AND ON TO BERLIN IN 1914

FOR Americans to whom the August days of desperate fighting in northern France must have seemed confusing and inexplicable there is an admirable parallel to be found in a Civil War campaign. The " On to Paris " movement in 1914 was executed with almost precisely the same strategy, spirit and determination which characterized the advance on Richmond of Grant in 1864.

When on May 4 in the earlier year General Grant stepped over the Rapidan into the Wilderness, with approximately twice the force of Lee, his controlling purpose was to use his superiority in numbers in such a manner as to defeat the enemy by frontal attack and at the same time by moving by his own left flank, get round Lee's right, cut him off from Richmond and if possible envelop him.

Repulsed in his frontal attack at the Wilderness he moved by the left flank to Spottsylvania, only to find Lee there in new intrenchments, from which after desperate fighting Grant was driven back. A second drive by the left brought him to the South Anna, only to find new intrenchments. Finally, at Cold

Harbor, on June 3, his last attempt by the left flank, that is, around Lee's right, failed.

Now, consider the German advance. At Charleroi and Mons on August 23 it delivered a savage frontal attack, which was partially successful, while the immense superiority of the Germans in numbers enabled them to strike for the allied left, that is, to endeavor to get round the end of the Anglo-French force and come down between it and Paris. To avoid the danger the Allies fell back, just as Lee did in the Wilderness, and stood again, the English, who held the left of the army, which was itself the left wing of the whole French Army, halting at Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies, the French at Avesnes-Chimay.

Against the English in position about Cambrai was hurled another terrific frontal attack, the severity of which was fully described in a subsequent British official report. The attack failed, but again a move to envelop the left flank compelled retirement, this time on the Péronne-St. Quentin front, while the French centre came back to the Guise-Vervins front, which was an extension of the English line.

From this point official information is less exact, but it is certain that once more there was a frontal attack upon the intrenched British, whose left flank was now partially covered by Fresh French troops brought up from Alsace by General Pau. At the same time a frontal attack was made on the French to the west. Again, after terrific fighting, German

numbers prevailed; repulsed in front they again got round the left. On the French front before Guise on the other hand, after a day of fighting the French took the offensive successfully, threw the Prussian Guard back into the Oise River, but had to come back as the English were still retiring.

Last of all, by September 1 we find the Anglo-French left established south of Montdidier, extending to Noyon on the Oise, just north of Compiègne. Here again they were intrenched, made a strong stand, repulsed frontal attacks with the same great losses to the Germans, but had finally to fall back again and the next position brought them not more than thirty miles from the forts of Paris.

In other words, with the Grant campaign in mind, it is easy to unravel the tangle. By the front and around the left the Germans came on for nearly two weeks. As Grant sought to get between Richmond and Lee, General von Kluck had striven to cut Pau and Sir John French off from Paris. Like Grant von Kluck failed. Grant's attack had been forward by the left flank, for von Kluck it was always forward by the right flank.

A great deal has been said about the German losses. At Cold Harbor Grant lost 15,000 men, Lee, 1,700. On that basis the British loss at Mons and Landrecies of 5,000 men would mean a casualty list to the Germans of 45,000. But machine guns, improved rifles and the German fondness for the

massed attack may have resulted in an even more disproportionate loss to them.

One more detail it is well to remember. After Cold Harbor Grant's army was temporarily demoralized. In four weeks he had lost 60,000 men, half his army. If the German force was 600,000 at the start, as has been said by some observers, this ratio would mean a loss of 300,000. Those who remember Civil War days will recall the wild outburst of denunciation in the country after Cold Harbor, when Grant was called a " butcher."

In 1864 Grant could afford to lose half his army and still be sure of a numerical superiority over Lee sufficient to prevent any counter stroke. In men, in money, in resources he was surely better off than his opponent. But his army was shaken and he had to take it south of the James and it was many months before a siege reduced Richmond.

In 1914, Germany had no such advantage over France and England. More soldiers she had than France and England combined, but she was compelled to send against Russia nearly all the number she had in excess of France and England. Again, as Russian mobilization became more and more effective, she was obliged to turn all her reserves, even some of her army in France, toward the East. For France and for England, on the contrary, the whole reserve and second line could be used against the German armies before Paris.

Indeed, there was now in many quarters to be detected the belief that when the German advance had worn itself out by its great exertion, and its first line troops had been greatly reduced by the casualties, the Allies, now already in equal numbers, would take the field and deliver a fatal counter-stroke.

Some notion of the Russian tactics against Napoleon in the Moscow campaign began to be clearly in the minds of many military observers, and for reasons that were obvious, yet such conjectures still seemed dangerous. Unlucky General Trochu, defender of Paris in 1871, always had "a plan," but Paris fell none the less.

But whether a brilliant counter-stroke were to be expected shortly, whether still further retirement, continued resistance behind intrenchments and slaughter of Germans advancing in mass formation were to come, the purpose of the Allies in the West was henceforth not mistakable. Consciously or unconsciously they had modelled their campaign on that of Lee, fifty years ago; unmistakably they expected the same result if at last German regiments should reach Fort Dumont, northernmost of the forts of Paris, and they could fight as Lee had at Cold Harbor. The Germans, moving by their right flank, as Grant had by his left, had swung sometimes, and sometimes thrust their right flank forward, piercing or assailing or encircling the Allied left.

CHAPTER XXIX

LEMBERG

AT the moment when the Germans were still sweeping all before them in Northwestern France, and Paris itself seemed within their grasp, the news of the Austrian disaster about Lemberg, concerning which vague rumors had been afloat for several days, suddenly filled the newspapers and compelled the attention of German commanders at the most inopportune of moments, when all their efforts and their resources were required in the west.

To understand this Russian campaign, which had culminated about September 1 in the great victory of Lemberg, the first considerable triumph of the Allied cause, it is necessary at the outset to grasp certain elementary facts, geographical, military, political, about the vast region, in which struggles waged by several millions of men, Russians, Germans and Austrians, were now taking place. These once grasped much of the complexity disappears.


To take the geographical first. If a line be drawn from Czernowitz, where the Russian, Rumanian and Austrian frontiers meet, to Berlin it will mark pretty accurately the point where the great Russian plain meets the first considerable mountain barrier west

of the Ural. From Czernowitz almost to Berlin on this line the Carpathian and Bohemian ranges form a solid wall. Again, draw a line from Memel, the Prussian town furthest north and east, to Berlin and, roughly speaking, all to the north of it will be the Baltic, to the south the mainland. Between Memel and Czernowitz is perhaps 700 miles, between the Baltic and the Saxon Mountains less than 250.

It is plain, then, that a Russian invasion which had its right on the Baltic, its left on the Carpathians and its centre half way between the two would move on Berlin, its flanks protected by natural obstacles, the sea and the mountains, its front slowly shortening and thus causing its battle line to contract.

Now as to the political. If a letter "U" is drawn with its two points on Memel and Czernowitz it will approximately mark the political frontiers — the semi-circle will be Russian Poland, while north and east German Prussia and south and east Austrian Galicia will half surround the Russian Polish territory. At the nearest point to Berlin, that is, at the westernmost point in the semicircle just east of Posen, the Russian frontier is not more than 200 miles from the German capital.

The natural expectation, then, might have been, in fact was, that Russia would at once send a huge army to Posen and on to Berlin. But for military reasons this was wholly impracticable. As long as the Germans held East Prussia, the Austrians Galicia, their armies advancing south and north respectively



THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ABOUT SEPTEMBER 1ST

could cut such Russian advance off from Russian territory, envelop and surround it.

Because of this fact Russian mobilization began, not in Russian territory nearest Posen, that is nearest to Berlin, but far back, almost exactly on the line between Memel and Czernowitz, while it was left to Warsaw and a number of other fortresses west of this mobilization line to hold back any Austro-German attempt to occupy Russian Poland, which was defended only by covering troops.

Now consider what had happened. First of all there was a Russian offensive stepping over into East Prussia, at the moment when the German advance had reached Brussels, that is, on August 20. This advance penetrated far into East Prussia, invested Koenigsberg, inflicted a number of defeats upon the Germans, almost reached the Vistula barrier of fortresses and produced a real panic in East Prussia and grave apprehension in Berlin. All the fruits of this success were presently lost in the severe defeat suffered by the Russians at Tannenburg, where two army corps were destroyed. The real value of this operation, which ultimately proved to have been a temporary expedient, is to be found in the fact that it compelled the withdrawal of army corps from the west before the decisive moment in the advance to Paris.

Turning to the south now, it will be noted that a great Russian Army coming west on a line between Czernowitz and Lemberg met and defeated the main

Austrian Army, driving it west and north back on its second line of intrenchments along the San and Vistula rivers. Thus it will be seen that one army had moved toward Berlin from the northeast with the Baltic on its right flank, through East Prussia, the other toward Berlin with the Carpathians on its left.

There remained the centre. But this had to conform to the wings, consequently the Russian centre was not yet much west of Warsaw — and the Russian territory between Warsaw and the German frontier was practically empty of troops. Taking advantage of this, German and Austrian forces pushed into Poland and penetrated to Lodz and toward Lublin. Had they continued east they must presently have met the Russian centre, but Russian success on their flanks compelled them to fall back to avoid disaster.

In a large way, then, it was possible now to think of this enormous Russian army marching straight west toward Berlin, one flank on the mountains, the other on the sea, both flanks in the enemies' territory but the centre still in Russia and confronted by an invading force of Austrians and Germans.

Having invested Koenigsberg and taken Lemberg, the Russian flanks had now to face two very serious obstacles. Moving west in Eastern Prussia they would presently come to the Vistula, which is defended by very strong fortresses from Danzig to Thorn through Graudenz, east of which they were finally defeated on Sedan Day. Moving west

through Galicia they would encounter the beaten Austrian army drawn up behind the Vistula and the San rivers, their right resting on the Carpathians, their left on the Vistula, their centre on the strong fortress of Przemysl. Meantime their centre would encounter the Austro-Russian invaders about Lodz west of Warsaw.

If they were victorious in Galicia, where their main forces were, and where the bulk of all Austrian military forces opposed them, then all Galicia would be lost to Austria, the centre of the Austro-German defence would have to retire, being outflanked, and the German line on the Vistula would also be worthless once Russia were west of the Vistula with her centre and left.

Presuming this success, it would then be possible for Russian forces to advance, the main army in Galicia down the valley of the Oder through Silesia, its flank on the Bohemian mountains, its centre facing Posen, its right resting on the Baltic by Dantzig, and the whole battle line would be within German territory except for such troops as were detached to protect the passes of the mountains to the west through which detachments of the defeated Austrians might retreat.

But if the Austrians about Przemysl were able to resist the advance of the victorious Russians, then the whole offensive would have to come to a standstill and wait until enough Russian troops could be brought up to carry this line, which was one of very

great military strength. A second Austrian defeat might well destroy the whole army, a Russian reverse or even temporary repulse would probably mean delay of Russian advance until the first crisis in France had long passed.

The problem of the following days was necessarily whether the Austrian reverse had shaken the morale of the Dual Kingdom's army. If it had the course of the war in the East, so far as Austria was concerned, might be decided in the next great battle, or indeed, without another major engagement, if the retreat passed the San.

Again it is necessary to examine the situation in the whole field of the conflict to estimate the full value of the Austrian defeat to the Allies. While the Germans were still sixty miles from Paris and a decisive battle had not yet been fought, the main Austrian field army was in distress, had met with disaster about Lemberg; five corps had been crushed, half the Austrian force in that region. Unsupported, the Austrian army might be annihilated. Now it was necessary to send east, not alone the two Austrian corps, hitherto aiding in the attack upon France, but five German corps. To make the matter worse, here was a Servian army, having routed four more Austrian corps at the Jedar, driving north for Hungary.

Having sent seven corps east, two to East Prussia, four to Galicia, the advantage of numbers was no longer with the Germans in France. Five corps

were withdrawn from Alsace and this relieved an equal number of French corps, which moving on interior lines might soon be expected in Ile-de-France or Champagne. Once more it was Waterloo repeated, with the Russians playing the Prussian rôle and more and more insistently demanding the attention of the very troops relied upon to give the fatal blow to the Allies, hard-pressed now, having narrowly escaped disaster, but still unbroken.

CHAPTER XXX

GENERAL JOFFRE'S STRATEGY

JUST as the whole world had for ten days been almost completely hoaxed by the Brussels reports of Belgian resistance and victory in the first days of August until it became fashionable to speak of German military efficiency as inferior to its reputation, contemptuousness shortly thereafter dearly paid for by all three of the Western Allies, it became, in the first days of September, common and natural to describe the German offensive as irresistible, to forecast the speedy fall of Paris and the utter defeat of French and British field armies.

Superficially the success of the Germans had been tremendous. Their victories won in struggles against entrenched foes, the mobility of their troops, the efficiency of their organization, the regularity with which they had taken fortresses, these things had captured the imagination of the readers of each edition of the daily press, who saw there hourly new reports of the Allies retreating, the Germans advancing through new cities and provinces toward Paris, from which the French Government had already fled to Bordeaux.

Yet at this precise time it had now become neces-

sary to examine this success in the light of certain mathematical considerations and strategic necessities. Thus, to go back to the beginning of things, it was patent that given time England, France and Russia could put more troops in the field than Germany. It was equally clear that several weeks must elapse between the time Germany and France were fully mobilized and the time when Russia and England could come up. The simple problem for the German General Staff was to crush France with their own superior army, leaving it to a minor German force and to Austria to hold back Russia until France was disposed of.

Now consider the mathematical side of the problem. Germany had in her first line twenty-five army corps, Austria sixteen, or forty-one for the Austro-German alliance. On the other side France had twenty-one, Russia thirty, Servia four, Great Britain four and Belgium one, or sixty corps for the five Allies. As to second line troops, their value is behind the battle line, and General von Bernhardi is authority for the view that for purposes of reckoning war strength, at least in the first weeks of conflict, they should be disregarded. In any event the second line of the French, English and Russians could be assumed to be numerically equal if not superior to the Austro-Germans.

The strength of the Anglo-French-Russian-Belgian-Servian, the Grand Alliance, a term we shall preserve for convenience, was then sixty army corps

against forty-one for the Dual Alliance. But for the first shock Germany could assign three of her corps to face Russia, while Austria turned ten of hers, sending four to Servia and two to France. For French operations the Germans then counted twenty-four corps, the French twenty-one of their own, two English and one Belgian, which was disposed of temporarily in the August fighting. It was with an equal number of corps, then, that the two forces began their struggle in the west, but Germany, being on the offensive, was able to concentrate her men and thus overpower the scattered French corps.

Yet at the precise moment when the German advance touched Brussels the German General Staff learned that contrary to expectations, Russian mobilization had already become effective and was driving through East Prussia at a dangerous rate, while the Servians had administered a terrific drubbing to four Austrian corps on the Jedar. Even before the Battle of Mons-Charleroi, therefore, it became necessary to divert two German and one Austrian corps to the east. The German armies now stood twenty-one to twenty-three corps in the west, but their superior concentration gave them the advantage of numbers at the decisive point.

Accordingly the German advance continued with invariable success but with huge losses until, after ten days of battle, September 3, it was almost within sight of Paris. But at this point the German General Staff was informed of the Austrian rout at Lem-

berg, the first actual disaster of the war. Patently Russian advance must again be beaten down as it had been in Eastern Prussia and now five German and the remaining Austrian corps were hurried eastward. But this reduced the German strength in the west to fifteen corps, while the Anglo-French stood at twenty-three and the Belgian corps around Antwerp was once more beginning to give trouble.

Turning to the east this situation existed. At the start three German and ten Austrian corps were assigned to the task of holding thirty Russian corps, whose mobilization might be expected to take many weeks. But it did not, and by August 20 it was necessary to send three corps, two German and one Austrian, east. This brought the total up to sixteen Austro-German corps against thirty Russian still coming up. But this was not enough, for a week later the Austrians were overwhelmed at Lemberg, five corps routed, 60,000 prisoners captured and vast supplies and munitions taken. Now five more corps had to be sent from the west, making twenty-one Austro-German corps against thirty Russian. But two of the Russian and five of the Austrian corps had been temporarily disposed of, leaving sixteen Austro-German corps against twenty-eight Russian.

Roughly speaking, then, as it now stood in the first week of September, fifteen German Army corps were opposed to twenty-three French and English in France, sixteen Austro-German corps to twenty-eight Russian in East Prussia, Galicia and Russian Poland,

while four defeated Austrian corps facing four victorious Servian along the Save and the Drina rivers.

If General Joffre had ventured to risk a decisive battle before August 20, he would have had but twenty-four corps against an equal number of Germans; if before August 27, he would have had twenty-three corps against twenty-one German far more advantageously concentrated. Now he disposed of twenty-three against fifteen. If the Russian triumph in Galicia continued, and the remaining Austrian field army were destroyed before German troops came, then still more German withdrawals from France were inevitable. Enormous German losses now becoming known, losses mainly of first line troops, must also be reckoned with as having further modified the relative strength of the two armies.

As for the territory now occupied by the Germans in France and Belgium it was a burden at this stage. The garrisoning of Belgium alone required many thousands of soldiers, second line to be sure, but second line troops were already needed on the Vistula and before Paris. In addition Germany was compelled to keep further troops in this region against the possible landing at Ostend and Dunkirk of expeditionary forces from England, Russia or British colonies. The wide extension of her lines in France called for more thousands of second and third line troops, who were also needed in the east.

Recall once more that the German plan was to

destroy France before Russia came up, leave second line troops to hold France until her first line, sent east, had crushed Russia, and then complete the conquest of France. At the outset she was able to put into France numbers equal to her foes. But in the sixth week of the war she was now outnumbered alike in France and on the Russian frontier, the Austrian army had been terribly punished, if not destroyed, and the French Army, superior in number, steadily reënforced from England, was recovering from the consequences of the first reckless dispersal incident to the counter-offensive.

It was still possible in the first week of September that a great German victory might restore the balance in France, it was equally possible that French strategy might contemplate still further retreat, a stand behind the Loire, until the Russian army had completed its concentration. But what was absolutely plain now was that before the first great battle of the war had been fought, the Allies had established a positive superiority of numbers at the decisive point, while battle losses, extension of lines, exhaustion following tremendous efforts had weakened the Germans.

To accomplish this result the French had sacrificed provinces and surrendered cities. All northern France had been abandoned to the Germans. Such a strategy presupposed a strong man as commander and a confident nation, utterly willing to abide by the consequences of its military chief's plans. In a

similar position Napoleon III had sent McMahon to Sedan because he feared that anything but a victory would cost him his throne. After the Mons-Charleroi disaster, Joffre had to face the same problem. To the desperate venture of halting the invader at once, he might have risked the whole issue of the war.

But Joffre's necessities were not those of Napoleon III. While the French Government removed to Bordeaux, while Paris talked of a siege, the world, of a second capture of the French capital, French public opinion, theoretically so easily excited, remained calm. Joffre was permitted to work out his problem undisturbed by any political consideration. The answer of French to German strategy was now apparent, a retreat on a selected position — a battle with every chance in favor of the Allies, after three weeks which brought the Russians up and compelled the Germans to weaken their line in France to save the eastern frontier. It was the calculation of a strong man, who trusted his nation and his government, but neither the nation nor the general had been unworthy of such confidence and both were now to be abundantly rewarded.

FROM THE MARNE TO THE AISNE

CHAPTER XXXI

THE END OF THE GREAT RETREAT

THE fifth week of the Great War saw all the French Armies, supported by the British Expeditionary Army, now reënforced to full strength, fighting the larger part of the field army of Germany on a line stretching east of Paris and south of the Marne to Vitry-le-François, thence north to Verdun, thence south along the Heights of the Meuse and the Woëvre Plateau to the Vosges, which it followed to Switzerland, on its eastern or right flank resting on the barrier forts of Toul, Epinal, Verdun and Belfort close to the frontier.

In Berlin, Paris and London no attempt was made to disguise the fact that the battle now beginning, and already named the Battle of the Marne, would have tremendous consequences, might indeed prove decisive so far as the struggle in the west was concerned. Indeed, German official statements of this time, paying frank tribute to the skill and success of previous Allied operations in avoiding battle under unfavorable conditions, now boldly asserted that the enemy had been at last compelled to accept battle and

the end of the great German offensive thrust was in sight, was to come within the six weeks, that the German General Staff schedule had allowed for French operations.

What then was the reason that the French and British had, after two weeks of steady retreat decided to risk a decisive battle? Why were they standing at the Marne?

Simply and obviously because further retreat would permit German armies to intervene between Paris on the west and the great bulwark of fortresses toward the Argonne, the Vosges and the Meurthe and Moselle rivers. Up to this moment the French retreat had been steadily south, the eastern flank protected by the frontier fortresses from Verdun to Belfort, the western, after long being in peril because of German flanking operations, had now come home squarely on Paris.

If the French left should retreat further it would have to swing west, not south, surrender its connection with the barrier fortresses and the French right. The army still fighting about Nancy, defending the gap between the barrier fortresses of Toul and Epinal, the eastern gate of Paris, against German attacks now directed by the Kaiser in person, and the French centre, facing north and northwest from Vitry-le-François to Verdun, would have to be left to do the best they could, assailed on the east from Lorraine by General von Heeringen's army, from the north by the Crown Prince's troops, and on the

west and presently on the south by Duke Albrecht's army.

The left, made up of French and English armies and the garrison of Paris, would in turn be open to attack north, east and presently south by the German armies which had come south from Belgium, and would be thrown back on Paris and enveloped, or would have to go south of the Loire, leave Paris to defend herself and lose all opportunity to come to the aid of the right and centre in the east.

In this situation the French elected to fight, and upon the portion of this line which constituted in some fashion the very life line connecting Paris and the eastern frontier, on a front of some fifty miles between Montmirail and Vitry-le-François, the terrific force of German attack now fell in a final attempt to separate the two strongholds of French resistance — Paris and the eastern forts and the armies in and about them.

Such was the situation. It remains to consider why the French had permitted themselves to be driven back to a position in which they must make a fight of this sort. Here the answer is twofold. First, since Germany has a far larger population than France she was able to maintain a much greater army. Since Russian mobilization was slower than hers she was able to turn against France an army more considerable than the French, even when reenforced by the British, and having the offensive she was able to attack all the points she selected, thus

enabling her to have an overwhelming advantage at the decisive point.

The problem for the French was to avoid destruction or the division of their forces until such time as the deflection of German troops to the Russian frontier should deprive Germany of the numerical advantage. They were then, in the nature of things, compelled to retreat, always endeavoring to inflict as great punishment as possible on the Germans and yet escape a dangerous decisive action.

To delay as long as possible German advance to the line where the French always knew they must stand; to await the progress of Russian advance until such time as the Kaiser's General Staff would have to send army corps east and then to turn upon the German Army, diminished in numbers by drafts to the east, wearied by tremendous exertions and weakened by the enormous losses incident to their method of making attacks by mass, separated by many miles from their railway bases, in a hostile country, compelled to detach many thousands of men to guard their communications, this had been French strategy, and the French answer to the imperious necessity of German strategy, namely to crush France before Russia came up.

Now Russia had come up. Her victories in the East have compelled the withdrawal of many thousands of first line troops from France. Meantime German losses had been enormous and as yet no real German strategical success had rewarded the mag-

nificent courage and the remarkable efficiency of their soldiers and General Staff. But on the other hand Germany had reached the point where France must fight, the point from which French retreat might imperil the existence of French military strength, as it would certainly cut her battle line in half.

Under these circumstances and chiefly between Montmirail and Vitry-le-François the mass of the French and German armies about September 6 began the desperate and tremendous Battle of the Marne. If the French line held, if German advance failed to break through French resistance made on a field long ago selected, prepared, failed to crush French armies now certainly equal and with the Army of Paris superior in numbers, possessing the incalculable advantage of fighting near its own base of supplies and with a network of railways behind it to enable speedy reënforcement of threatened points, then the whole German offensive must inevitably come to a halt, must presently recoil.

For it was not sufficient to hold the French on their present lines. Immediately the necessity of sending more troops eastward would become pressing, and if the German forces in France could not win with the numbers they now possessed, what chance would they have when reduced? In addition the question of their communications would shortly become serious, was in fact now the gravest problem of German commanders.

As for the Allies, defeat would certainly mean a

severe loss of present advantages, possibly disaster if the defeat were a rout, or if the German victors were in condition to turn and speedily destroy the French centre and right in the Argonne and the Vosges. But even disaster now would not mean what it would have three weeks ago, when Russia had not yet come up and crushed Austrian forces in Galicia.

But the outstanding fact in the first week of September was that the German advance in France had now reached a crisis. French strategy had succeeded in delaying the decisive encounter until the invader was already weakened by drafts sent to Russia, by tremendous losses, and by exertions hitherto unparalleled in war. Regard being had for the situation in the East, it was not difficult to see why Germany must now win a tremendous and crushing victory, or abandon her offensive and retire to defend herself against attack on the two fronts, from the Russian as well as the French frontier and perhaps to-morrow on the Austrian also.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

BY September 3, at the very latest, the Germans realized that their great enveloping movement had failed. Steadily retreating the Allied left had come almost squarely back under the guns of Paris, indeed, the battered English army on the left flank had already passed through Paris and was taking up its post along the Marne, leaving to the great Army of Paris, raised to defend the city, the task of holding back the German right south of Compiègne and between Senlis and Meaux. From Paris to the barrier fortresses of the East, that is with both flanks wholly protected, like a dam resting on the ledges that bounded a river valley, the Allied armies stood in battle line.

To use a homely figure, the Allied left from Mons to the gates of Paris had been in the position of a closing door; it hung on the barrier fortresses to the east, swinging closed on Paris. General von Kluck had endeavored to put a foot between the door and the casing before it closed. By September 3 the crack was far too narrow, in fact the door had swung closed and the great enveloping movement, by the

narrowest of margins, it appeared, had completely failed.

As von Kluck advanced, the armies of von Buelow, von Hausen, the Grand Duke Albrecht, and the Crown Prince had kept pace, while the Allied armies facing them had given way, not because of the pressure of the armies in front of them, but because the withdrawal of the Anglo-French on their left exposed their flank. Now the left stood on Paris, the right on the barrier fortresses, the centre south of the Marne River on a slightly curving line passing through Montmirail, Sézanne, La Fère Champenoise, Camp de Mailly, Vitry-le-François, to Revigny on the Ornain, just north of Bar-le-Duc. North of this point Verdun and the barrier fortresses above Toul were now half surrounded by the Crown Prince's army coming west by Stenay, and had been left to their own resources.

Between Vitry and Paris the railway distance is 127 miles; the front of the Allies was rather shorter. On this line they had concentrated an army subsequently estimated at 1,100,000. In addition the garrison at Paris counted 500,000. Against this the Germans did not have above 900,000. To succeed it was necessary to throw their full weight upon one point. They selected the centre and in the next few days the whole drive was between Sézanne and Vitry, centring at Camp de Mailly, happily for the French the field on which for years their artillery had been tested and their artillerists practised. Nowhere else

in all France could their shooting be expected to be half so good.

For the Germans there had been several possibilities. To besiege Paris was impossible because this would take time; moreover, the Allied armies were still unbroken, the Russians were coming up in the East and carrying all before them, and it was necessary to destroy the French and English armies promptly and turn east. To storm Paris was conceivably possible, but promised to be too costly in lives to warrant the risk while the Allied armies still stood. There remained the possibility of breaking the Allied centre between Paris and the barrier forts, cutting the Allied line in half and rolling up both fractions, one on Paris, the other against the armies of the Crown Prince and General von Heeringen in Lorraine.


The last was the plan chosen by the German General Staff. The German left, under General von Hausen and Grand Duke Albrecht, was sent against the French right standing between Vitry-le-François and Revigny near Bar-le-Duc and behind the Ornain River. The centre struck at the French centre between Montmirail and Sézanne. General von Buelow commanded here. On the German right General von Kluck, abandoning his flanking operation, turned southeast and marched his whole army across the front of and to the south of Paris. The Crown Prince, coming south, east of the Argonne, undertook to isolate Verdun by cutting the railroad going west

toward Paris, invest it and, with the assistance of siege guns brought up from Metz, reduce it and open a short way from Germany to northern France from Metz to Rheims, which should relieve the Germans of the intolerable burden of garrisoning Belgium to protect the long lines of communications across a hostile country on which they still depended for supplies and reënforcements.

To the American this change in plan is best described by recalling the course of Lee at Gettysburg. On the second day the whole weight of his attack was on Meade's left, his necessity to get Round Top, roll up the left, and dispose of the Union army. By a narrow margin he failed and on the third day his effort was to break the center against which he launched Pickett in his famous charge.

General von Kluck's manœuvre before Paris was the decisive movement. If the French and British who had fought him from Mons to the Marne had been crushed, if the garrison of Paris were too insignificant to need more than a few flank guards to hold it back, then the arrival of von Kluck on the left of the French centre and between it and Paris might insure a tremendous advantage — the centre might be expected to sag, break and let the German flood go swirling between Paris and the eastern forts irresistibly.

But if the Anglo-French left were not shaken, if the Paris garrison were strong enough to take the offensive, if, above all, the French high command



THE "SCISSORS" MOVE FROM PARIS WHICH WON THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

had not been disturbed by the long train of retreats and approximate disasters, then, if the centre held even temporarily, von Kluck's army would be in deadly peril. For the garrison of Paris sweeping out to the East toward Meaux and the Ourcq Valley would be at its rear and on its right flank, while the Anglo-French left would be on its front. If both took the offensive at the same moment von Kluck's army would be caught between the two blades of closing scissors.

Precisely this is what happened. Suddenly, on September 7, the garrison of Paris struck east. The Anglo-French force north toward Montmirail and the Marne and for forty-eight hours the fate of von Kluck was in doubt. Fighting desperately he managed to slip between and escape the blades, leaving artillery, supplies and wounded behind him. But in the struggle he lost his ammunition train and his communications were severely compromised.

By tremendous efforts von Kluck won free about September 10 and started north at terrific speed. Meantime to the east the desperate efforts of von Buelow had failed. The French centre was not to be broken. Pushed back beyond Sézanne and Camp-de-Mailly it stood inexpugnable; as for the right, it was equally adamant. Not only had the attack failed, but the rapid retreat of von Kluck opened the flank of the German centre. Accordingly it had to get up and go back, and after it the left, still fighting east of Vitry-le-François.

By September 12 the whole German Army was going north. But it was the retreat of von Kluck that remained the critical phase of the withdrawal. On his flank lay the garrison of Paris, toward his right rear French cavalry struck, toward his left rear British cavalry directed by Field Marshal French, perhaps the greatest living cavalry leader. After it followed the British and the French who for weeks had retreated and now at last knew the joy of pursuit and the pleasure of revenge.

For von Kluck the problem was precisely that of Lee in 1865, when at last he left Richmond. Exactly as Lee struck for Lynchburg, for a new base of supplies, von Kluck headed for the north along the Oise and on the railroads leading back to Belgium by the route he had come. To get his exhausted army ahead of his pursuers, to obtain food, to get ammunition, this was the whole purpose of the next few days of retreat in which he displayed skill and resource which commanded the reluctant admiration of London and Paris. In this operation, too, it is worth noting that in every respect the German general was now repeating the operations of the British Army from Mons to Paris, with the same peril and the same problem ever before him.

Such, briefly, was the Battle of the Marne. We are told that not less than 2,500,000 fought in it and that in the final phase 1,600,000 Allies faced 900,000 Germans. So far as one can now judge it represented the deliberate and magnificent planning of

General Joffre, who calmly permitted the Germans to inundate provinces and ravage cities until by the very greatness of their labors, the privations and the losses in the series of battles they fought, they came upon the final battle-field weary and spent, their food supply reduced, their ammunition trains outdistanced.

In this situation, after a month of retreat, General Joffre suddenly struck back with the full force of superior numbers, in far better physical condition, fighting near their bases of supplies, still unbroken in spirit and burning to avenge not merely old wrongs, but the immediate injuries of recent defeats.

The German strategy was comprehended in the single determination to strike one terrific, crippling, crushing blow without delay. The French, to parry that blow until its first force should be lost, its weight weakened by depletions necessitated by Russian advance, the human element in the magnificent machine exhausted. It was the French strategy which prevailed; it prevailed, because the French, with their English comrades, were able to retreat for three weeks and strike back in the fourth.

The Battle of the Marne could not end the war, but on the fields where Napoleon won his last great battles and a century before showed himself a supreme master of war, the long course of Prussian victories was at last interrupted by the sons of the soldiers who surrendered at Sedan and Metz, aided by the same British doggedness which a century before had won Waterloo.

CHAPTER XXXIII

GERMAN DISASTER

IF on the night of June 18, 1815, Napoleon, having put the Old Guard in and failed, had been able to extricate his army, take it back on the Sambre, call in Grouchy's force from Wavre and stand near the French frontier, the whole world, in the second week of September, 1914, would have discovered the remarkable parallel between the conditions of 1914 and 1815.

For the more one examines the campaign from the Sambre to the Marne, the more completely the Waterloo struggle comes to mind. To begin with, the problem of Napoleon in June, 1815, was precisely the problem of the Kaiser in August, 1914. In his immediate path in Belgium one considerable army, Belgian, Prussian, Dutch and English, was on foot, ready for battle. Far off in the East, Austrian, Russian, Swedish armies were gathering. In June he could hurl against the Allied army in Belgium a force almost equal in numbers, and superior in all that goes to make up a successful army. But in July or August, when the Russian and Austrian armies came up, he would be outnumbered, forced back upon France to fight one more such defensive

campaign as in 1814 had after a magnificent struggle led to complete disaster.

Napoleon tackled his problem in precisely the fashion the Kaiser's General Staff subsequently adopted. He launched his whole military force at the Allied armies in Belgium as the Germans did subsequently at France. The supreme test for Napoleon was at Waterloo; for the Germans, at the Battle of the Marne. In both cases the desperate game, the staking of all on a single throw, failed. In Napoleon's case the failure was a rout, the utter destruction of his army. In the German case it was a repulse, followed by a rapid retreat of nearly a hundred miles.

Yet, if the Germans had saved their army, as soon became unmistakable, this could not blind the observer to the extent of their disaster. The very importance they attached to their terrific, desperate drive at France demonstrated this. To get at France promptly they violated the neutrality of Belgium. Not even the certainty that this step would bring the British in against them could counterbalance the imperious necessity of crushing France before Russia got up.

Six weeks from the declaration of war was the extreme time German military authorities had believed they would have in which to crush France before the onrush of the Russians in the East would demand the recall of German troops from France, the depletion of the invading army to a point where, if France

were not crushed, the weight of Anglo-French numbers would throw it back upon the defensive.

And so for six weeks nearly the whole German Army had been driven forward with a speed and a carelessness of life unparalleled in the history of Western warfare. In two weeks the masses of von Kluck were pushed from Brussels to the Seine south and east of Paris, more than one hundred and fifty miles. Battles which in other wars would seem great were fought on many fields. In that mass formation which at the cost of thousands of lives, by the sheer weight of numbers broke down all opposition, the German hosts rushed on.

But now the six weeks of grace that were allotted to the Germans had passed. Forty-five days after the declaration of war in 1870 Napoleon III surrendered at Sedan, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 had been won in six weeks. Six weeks after the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, not, perhaps demoralized, but unmistakably exhausted, leaving behind them their wounded, the litter of all that armies abandon only in precipitate retreat, all the German armies were in retreat, and Paris, from which one week ago the troops were only seventeen miles distant at Lagny — less than five from the outer ring of forts — was sixty miles behind Germans, still retreating.

Meantime, Russia had come up. In this six weeks she had crushed the military power of Austria-Hungary. Her victorious armies were now beating

down the last desperate resistance of the Austrians in Galicia, might to-morrow be on the road toward Berlin with only German troops to reckon with in their pathway. From the west, then, from the armies which had already proved inadequate to the task of crushing the Anglo-French power, more troops must soon be taken, if Russia were to be held.

As for the French, after fifty years they had known the intoxication of victory. They had beaten and were pursuing the Germans. The nightmare of Sedan, which had hung over them for forty-four years, had been banished. As the legendary glory of the army of Frederick the Great perished at Jena, that of von Moltke's was dimmed at the Marne. One was a rout, the other a defeat, but mere defeat was destructive of the reputation the Prussian soldier had possessed for half a century.

Now a million and a half victorious French soldiers, supported by the British expeditionary force, were undertaking to clear France of Germans. Behind them the whole colonial armies of Britain were coming up. Even the Belgian army was in the field once more. On the west the Germans were hopelessly outnumbered. This disadvantage could only be accentuated when Russian pressure on the Vistula and the Oder claimed new attention.

Nor was the German disaster to be measured by mere losses of numbers. The flower of her military power had gone down in the desperate battles

in Picardy and Champagne. The courage, the desperation, which marked the French at Waterloo, the devotion which had made that struggle the admiration of the succeeding century, had been displayed by the Kaiser's troops; but as Waterloo marked the extermination of the Napoleonic army, so the struggle in Northern France meant grave weakening of that marvellous machine of commissioned and non-commissioned officers on which the whole German system rested.

German armies were certain to continue to fight as they had fought before. The comparison after the great battle, for actual military considerations, was with Gettysburg, not Waterloo. But was it unreasonable that to the world Lagny near the Marne the high water mark of German advance, should have seemed comparable with the extreme point of Pickett's charge at Gettysburg? After Gettysburg the South had many victories still to win, more than a year of splendid resistance to offer, but after Gettysburg the issue of the Civil War was no longer in real doubt.

Beyond this, however, the thing that stood out boldly was the overthrow of the tradition of German military invincibility. As gallantly as Napoleon's veterans at Waterloo the German conscripts had upheld their reputation by their fight. But as the Old Guard failed they have failed, and with their failure the whole splendid fabric of German military domination in Europe was shaken.

Like Napoleon, the Kaiser had gambled desperately, splendidly, put all his fortunes on a single throw, and the dice had gone against him.


"The issue of Germany's next war must be world power or downfall," wrote General von Bernhardi. Was it too soon to believe that the dream of world power had been blasted on the banks of the Marne?

CHAPTER XXXIV

VON KLUCK'S RETREAT TO THE AISNE

AT the Battle of the Marne the great German movement was at last brought to a standstill, its right flank was turned, its change from the offensive to the defensive determined. The effort to envelop the Allied armies, to envelop them and cut them off from Paris had failed, the decisive check as it now appears had been at Cambrai on August 26. At the Marne and beginning with the operations of September 7, the effort to pierce the centre, isolate Paris, surround the eastern barrier forts failed also. There was to be no Sedan, no Waterloo for the Allies in the opening weeks of the war. Allied defeat was to be accomplished if at all, not by a sudden thrust but by a long campaign.

When the Germans started back and the whole Allied line, like the soldiers who obeyed the famous command, "Up, Guards, and at them," at Waterloo, flung themselves into the pursuit, the situation of the two armies was strangely reversed. From Cambrai to Paris, von Kluck had been upon the Allied flank struggling to get behind it and crumple it up and after it the centre and left. Now the gar-



THE BATTLE LINE OF THE MARNE AND THE RETREAT TO THE AISNE, SEPTEMBER 6-12

rison of Paris, done with garrison work for a time, was on his flank reaching for his lines of communication, snapping up his ammunition trains in the first hours of the advance. Now he was racing for his life to get ahead of the flank thrust and precisely as the Anglo-French left in retreat dragged the whole force with it, von Kluck was dragging the whole German force in France.

But if German hopes had been shattered at the Marne, it was soon apparent that French and British newspapers and military authorities had also far overestimated the extent of their triumph. The Marne had not been a German rout. It had been a Gettysburg, a Gettysburg followed by a prompt, sweeping, energetic pursuit. The thing Meade failed to do, and suffered always for his failure, Pau and Sir John French undertook without hesitation. But from the Marne to the Aisne the Germans, General von Kluck, showed themselves quite as great in retreat as their enemies had been.

Von Kluck's withdrawal from the Marne began on September 7, five days later he was near Soissons and behind the Aisne a little south of the position which was for weeks to be the scene of the most desperate conflict the world had ever known. During these five days the problem of the Allied commanders was plain. For them it was essential to prevent the Germans from taking root in France and preparing a position behind which they could reorganize, refit, supply their shaken forces, make

a new concentration, replenish ammunition stores now exhausted and presently undertake a new offensive movement toward Paris. Could they do this, much of the profit of the Battle of the Marne would be lost.

On the other hand, if the pursuit were pressed with complete success the Germans might be driven north to the very frontier of France, to the line of the Meuse and the foot hills of the Ardennes with their right stretching from the Sambre to the Scheldt, that is to the position on which the first battle of the campaign had been fought and the German invasion of France made possible. It was even conceivable, believed likely in Paris and London in the second week in September that the German retreat might be turned into a rout, that the destruction which overtook the Grand Army after Waterloo might be the fate of the Kaiser's vast force.

This hope, it was little more, was wholly shattered when on September 12 von Kluck successfully passed the Aisne. The reasons for this are to be found in the examination of the topographical circumstances of the position which he now took up, a position which it was soon to be discovered had been prepared by the German General Staff against just such a reverse as they had now suffered.

Coming south or west toward Paris, that is from Belgium or Germany, some eighty miles distant from the French capital there rise out of the plains a

long range of hills stretching from La Fère to Rheims, running straight across the front of the city and in the pathway of the invader. These hills are highest just back of Rheims, where they reach an elevation of nearly 1,000 feet. Just south of La Fère, at the other end near Noyon, so frequently mentioned in battle reports, the elevation is 600 feet. These hills are known indifferently as the Hills of Champagne and of the Ile-de-France. They are highest on the north and east where they rise abruptly from the plain, and fall down gradually in the direction of Paris.

Where the hills rise from the plains the French had erected a chain of forts stretching from La Fère to Rheims. This city was surrounded by a circle of forts, those to the west on the main range of hills, those on the east upon isolated foothills. In military volumes they are described as the Laon-La Fère-Rheims barrier, and they were intended to serve as a second line of defence in advance of Paris, to check the invader who had successfully forced the first line of fortresses at the frontier.

In August they failed to serve this purpose because the Germans turned them. Between La Fère and the English Channel, that is west of the Champagne Hills, there is a level plain, but from the highlands to the Channel the Somme River runs through a valley which is marshy and serves as a military obstacle. Unfortunately for the French the Germans, having succeeded in concentrating an

overwhelming force against the left, that is in the face of the British during the early battles, were able to drive the Allies beyond the Somme before they could be reënforced. Had the Allies then remained behind the Laon-La Fère-Rheims barrier they would have been cut off from Paris and enveloped. To avoid this they dismantled the forts and retired.

It was of vital importance to the Allies, then, if they were to drive the Germans out of France after defeating them at the Marne to prevent them from halting before they passed this line of the Champagne Hills, the sole naturally strong defensive position between the Marne and the Belgian frontier. Had they been able to do this they would have regained all that had been lost by their previous retreat. But they did not quite succeed. In retaking Rheims they did drive the Germans from the eastern end of the Champagne highlands, but the Germans retained the hills just beyond Rheims, on which had stood the detached forts dismantled by the Allies in their retreat. It was from these hills that the Germans later bombarded Rheims cathedral. To the north the Allies did drive their opponents beyond the Aisne, and after desperate fighting won a foothold on the Craonne plateau south of the Lette. But the Germans were able to hang on at La Fère and Laon, that is, to the northern and highest edge of the Champagne Hills, where the French forts had stood.

West of the Oise, by retaining possession of the Noyon Hills north of Ribécourt, the Germans were even more fortunate than to the east, because these hills are south of the Somme, which flowing west from them through a marshy valley, now flooded by recent rains, temporarily protected their imperilled right flank. To get round it the French would be compelled to go west of Péronne, solidly held by German troops, which had been drawn in from all the northwestern corner of France, beyond Amiens and this meant delay.

On the Noyon Hills and north of the Aisne above Soissons along the whole ridge, the Craonne plateau the Germans had hastily mounted heavy artillery, plainly guns intended to reduce the forts of Paris. While the outcome of the Battle of the Marne was still in doubt they had also erected entrenchments far east along the Aisne, toward Rheims to the southeast beyond that river. Behind these works on September 12 and 13 the Germans at last came to a halt. For them the lines of the Aisne were to serve the purpose those of the Chatalja had for the Turks after their disasters in Thrace and their retreat from Lule Burgas. Before these fortifications the Allied pursuit was decisively halted by September 13 and the great Battle of the Aisne had begun.

If the position of the Champagne Hills was naturally strong, it had the further advantage of admirable railroad communications in the rear. From

Germany, through Luxemburg one trunk railroad descended into France by Mézières and Rethel, a second followed the Meuse Valley from Namur and reached Laon, a third came south from Maubeuge, that is from the main Liège-Paris line to the same town, a fourth, the main line from Paris to Brussels, came south through Mons to St. Quentin, Tergnier, to Noyon. Finally in the rear the trunk line from Calais to Switzerland crossed these four railways and made it simple, not merely to direct reenforcements from one flank to another, but to move troops by Metz and Thionville, from Alsace-Lorraine.

Such then was the position to which the Germans had come back on September 13. If they were driven beyond it there remained no satisfactory position south of the frontier. To lose this foothold they now retained on the second line of the defenses of the French capital was to concede the failure of their whole gigantic offensive. The defeat at the Marne had been officially described at Berlin as a mere change of position for "strategic reasons." The advance had outrun the supplies, but there had been no reverse, so the German General Staff insisted. But if the Champagne Hills were retaken by the French no such claim could be made. They would become a barrier to all future invasion and the siege of Paris would have to be begun, if at all, almost a hundred miles from the capital.

The Germans had passed this line three weeks

before because they were able to outflank it, to concentrate superior forces on the Allied Left, in addition the south bank of the Somme had not at that time been fortified. It could only be attacked by an invader coming south from Belgium and against this attack the French had before the war made no proper provision. But such a concentration as had succeeded before was not likely to be achieved again. Now the two armies were face to face and the Allies, able by using their aeroplanes to follow every move made by the Germans, could meet concentration with concentration. To surrender the Aisne position, then, was for the Germans to relinquish practically all their great offensive drive had won for them at such a tremendous cost in life.

On the other hand, could the Germans hold their new position, presently regain the offensive and strike out for Paris once more, they would still have to fight all the way to the Marne, repeat, in the face of a foe now fully concentrated and able to entrench on the hills on the south of the Aisne, the highest hills of the whole range, with the Vesle and Ourcq rivers in their front. German success at the Aisne, as it appeared in the early days of September, aside from possible disaster, meant the beginning of a long series of open sieges, of trench work to regain lost positions over sixty miles.

There remained the possibility of a draw. But for the Germans a draw was only less disastrous than a defeat. If they were compelled to sit down

in their present position they would have not merely to guard their front, which stretched over one hundred miles from Noyon to Metz, but their communications. From La Fère to Liège is more than one hundred and fifty miles by the main railroad, which passes through Maubeuge, Namur and Charleroi. All this distance was through hostile territory and every foot must be guarded. In addition it was necessary to keep an army before Antwerp to prevent the Belgian Army from cutting this line, and Ostend must be watched for possible British expeditions. Finally the peril from a French flanking thrust coming from Amiens and Cambrai was patent.

In order to stay in their present position the Germans had then to waste over 150,000 in flank and rear guards. Now it was fair to say that henceforth the advantage of numbers in the western field would be with the Allies, and increasingly so. Thus for the Germans to weaken their battle line by detaching 150,000 for necessary duty elsewhere was to insure a decisive advantage to the enemy, who must be dislodged as he stood in intrenchments by frontal attack. Presently then it was clear the Germans must advance, must win decisively and without much delay or retreat. Nothing short of victory, of a repetition of their sweep to Paris and the Marne, could permanently assure their position in France. Such were the conditions of the Battle of the Aisne.

CHAPTER XXXV

HOW THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE BEGAN

THE first shots in the Battle of the Aisne were fired on September 12, when the British Army moving swiftly after von Kluck's retreating Army reached the Aisne south of Soissons. On the following day British and French troops, under severe fire and with heavy losses passed the river at and about Soissons, successfully constructed pontoon bridges and effected a lodgment on the first ridges of the Craonne Plateau north of the city. Further efforts to advance were promptly beaten down by German heavy artillery, now discovered solidly placed on cement platforms and protected by a maze of trenches and earthworks.

For the American the next operations in this field must recall the Petersburg campaign. Fifty years before, Grant, striking at Lee's lines south of Richmond endeavored to take Petersburg by storm. He failed and in the months that followed there grew up south of the Appomattox those marvellous lines of entrenchments in parallel lines stretching from Petersburg to Five Forks. Always the controlling purpose of Grant was to move west and north, to

get on the flank and the rear of Lee, to cut the railroad line which connected the Confederate capital with the South, which was in fact the life line of the Army of Northern Virginia. For Lee there was the absolute necessity to hold this line. In addition his effort was by striking by the other flank, that is toward Washington, to compel Grant to relax his deathlike grip. For this purpose Early was presently sent on that spectacular raid to the very forts of Washington. Similar efforts were presently to be made both by the Allied and German commanders on the Aisne.

Yet it is necessary to note that, as it developed, the Battle of the Aisne, so far as it resembled any previous military operation, suggested the Mukden campaign of the Russo-Japanese War. In numbers, in extent of territory it surpassed this greatly, yet nowhere else in history was there anything comparable. Again, up to this time the battles fought were not greatly different from those of other wars. As has been pointed out, from Mons to the forts of Paris, General von Kluck had repeated the campaign of Grant from the Rapidan to Cold Harbor. The great German enveloping movement had been but the vastly expanded conception of von Moltke in 1870. But now, as was recognized on all sides, comparisons with 1864 or 1870 had become misleading. The size of the armies engaged, the extent of the territory covered by the operations, the time required to traverse the vast distances between

the various portions of the two armies seemed to remove most of the possibilities which had been grasped by all the successful generals of modern history. At the start of the Battle of the Aisne, however, this change was hardly realized by a world, still waiting for Sedans or Waterloos.

The first problem for the Allies was to determine whether the Germans were making a stand merely to cover a further withdrawal, when their trains and heavy artillery, mired in the muddy roads, a week of frightful weather had made almost impassable, could be moved or whether they were, as Berlin insisted, rallying to resume the offensive, when they had been reënforced and rested, after their tremendous exertions. It was at this period that the conflict centred between Rheims and Soissons, when it still deserved the title of the Battle of the Aisne. By the end of the first week it was plain that the German position about Soissons could not be forced, not only had the Germans repulsed all assaults by the French and British on this front, but they were now beginning to strike out again, themselves, to make desperate efforts to resume the offensive.

Meantime the battle line had developed far to the east, where the armies of von Buelow, von Hausen, now succeeded by von Einem, of the Grand Duke Albrecht had been obliged to take new positions conforming to that of von Kluck. It is, then, necessary to indicate the position of the several German

armies along the extended battle line as they stood in the first week of the Battle of the Aisne. Starting on the east there was the army of the Crown Prince about the Meuse. In the original plan of the German campaign the army of the Crown Prince was to cross the Meuse at Stenay, turn south as the main German invasion advanced, cut Verdun off from Paris, besiege it, aided by German troops moving west from Metz, take it and thus open a short road from Germany to Northern France, permitting the evacuation of Western Belgium and the reduction of the army of occupation whose regiments were needed on the battle line.

This operation failed, because the retreat of von Kluck far to the west compelled the general withdrawal of the German forces all through France. With some difficulty the Crown Prince extricated his army, fell back beyond Verdun to Montfaucon, thus protecting his line of retreat across the Meuse at Stenay toward Luxemburg. Meantime the Germans coming west from Metz had made repeated attacks south of Verdun. These continued, but were as yet apparently little more than attempts to prevent the French from withdrawing troops to the western field. In the field east of the Argonne and on both sides of the Meuse the operations had momentarily become unimportant.

Operating west of the Argonne were the German army corps forming the left wing of the main German Army in the western field. They had been de-

feated at the Battle of the Marne after desperate attempts to break the French line between Vitry-le-François and Camp de Mailly. Since then they had been slowly but steadily driven back. Their latest retreat had been from Souain, which is midway between Rheims and the Argonne. In general they occupied entrenched positions along the Plain of Chalons, to which they had been driven slowly. Here, too, the fighting did not seem at this time to be of first importance.


North and west of Rheims to the Oise the situation was wholly different. Here the armies of von Buelow and von Kluck were now engaged in a desperate attempt to break the French centre and left centre. From east to west the French position here, starting from the city of Rheims, went north across the Aisne near Berry-au-Bac, then west to the Oise along the edge of the Craonne Plateau. This narrow ridge between the Aisne and the Lette was for ten days the scene of fighting of the most desperate character.

At Rheims and along the Craonne Plateau, the whole strength of the German Army was now being exerted to break through, drive the Allies south of the Aisne at Soissons, seize Rheims, with its vitally important network of highways and railroads. The Allies on their part were endeavoring to force this point and push slowly north toward Laon, the key of the communications of the Germans, and in general push the Germans off the rim of the Cham-

pagne Hills which they still held. After several Allied gains at the outset, the situation here, as a result of intrenching on both sides, was now fast approaching a deadlock.

Ten days of fast and furious fighting from the Oise to the Argonne were needed to convince the Allies that the German retreat was at an end, that they had defeated, not routed an enemy, who, now reënforced was inexpugnable in his present position. In the same period the Germans also learned that the road to Paris over which they had recently retreated was now closed to them. All the efforts they made in these days, all the frontal attacks, again costing lives without number, since they persisted in their massed formation, were of no avail. On either side positions were taken and lost, but by neither the Allies nor the Germans was any real progress made.

It was clear then that some new plan must be adopted, if the existing deadlock were to be broken, either by the Allies or by the Germans. It was the French who made the first venture. Meantime the opening phase of the Battle of the Aisne had ended in a deadlock, both armies stood rooted in their positions, the Germans unable to resume the offensive toward Paris; the Allies similarly unsuccessful in their attempts to drive the invaders down the slopes of the Champagne Hills and to the Belgian frontier.



THE START OF THE ALLIED FLANKING ATTACK, SEPTEMBER 21ST

CHAPTER XXXVI

ON VON KLUCK'S RIGHT FLANK


BY September 18 the Allied attack upon the German lines from the Oise to the Meuse had come to a dead halt. Further progress on this front was plainly impossible. There remained the chance that by a wide swing to the left around Noyon and to the north of the Somme, a flanking army might come in on von Kluck's right and rear, cut his lines of communication, compel his withdrawal from the Champagne Hills. As Grant struck by Five Forks at the Confederate right and beyond it at the Richmond and Danville Railroad, using Sheridan as a hammer, the Allies might reach the German railway lines at and beyond St. Quentin. Such was the purpose of the next move.

Von Kluck's battle-line touched the Noyon Hills, west of the Oise and there in strong entrenchments were planted many heavy cannon. Terrific assaults made by the Allies had failed to carry this point. From Noyon the German line turned north, in a direction perpendicular to the Soissons-Verdun front and ran north along the Somme. Behind this stream and in front of St. Quentin, their front pro-

tected by the marshy valley of the river and by Péronne, once a fortress and still easily defensible, stretched vaguely north, west of Cambrai to the Belgian frontier, held by various detachments échelonned from Péronne north.

Moving north and west of Noyon, the Allied flanking force passed through Amiens, crossed the Somme, turned east and struck squarely at von Kluck's flank and rear. By August 18 they had captured Péronne and penetrated to the suburbs of St. Quentin. Their cavalry had crossed the westernmost of the railroads on which the German right depended for its supplies. Victory seemed in sight and Paris and London proclaimed the speedy withdrawal of von Kluck. Indeed one wild despatch from Paris announced that the German commander had offered to surrender, but all these hopes were dashed.

While the Allies had been collecting reserves, creating a new Western Army for this flanking thrust, commanded by General d'Amade, the conqueror of Fez, the Germans had been equally busy. No sooner had the Allies reached St. Quentin and Le Catelet than the Germans launched a counterstroke, which drove the French back, out of St. Quentin, west of Péronne, back almost to Amiens. On September 18 they had been on the Liège-Brussels-St. Quentin railroad, by September 21 they were twenty miles west at Albert, beyond Bapaume. Meantime to the south, near Noyon the



ALLIED OPERATIONS ON VON KLUCK'S RIGHT TO OCTOBER 4TH, SHOWING GERMAN LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Germans had also been reënforced, had taken the offensive and driven the Allies south to Ribécourt, dislodged them from the heights of Lassigny, which they had recently captured.

More than this, there was now beginning along the Aisne front a new and terrific battle. The whole front of the Allied line was being bombarded, the cathedral of Rheims was in flames and the Germans were here making a terrific attempt to regain the offensive, at the least to exercise such pressure upon the Allied centre as would compel them to abandon the menacing move on the right flank. After sharp fighting this newest German offensive was beaten down. Once more it was demonstrated that neither army could make any considerable progress by the centre.

In the meantime the Allied move by the left flank, that is, against the German right, was resumed. New armies, come from Southern France, from India, from the four corners of the globe were reported to have been sent north. German attempts to push the Allies back of Ribécourt, Roye, Albert failed, but now the flanking operation was carried further to the north. This time the drive east was from Arras toward Cambrai not St. Quentin, the battle line was extending from the Aisne to Belgium, von Kluck's army was now facing not south but west, the Allied left had its back, not to Paris but to London, to Boulogne and Calais, from the two French ports, too, it was reported new regiments

were coming from British colonies to swell the great army of the West.

At Petersburg Grant had finally succeeded because his superiority of numbers enabled him to extend his line far to the west and Lee, with inferior numbers, compelled to extend his line correspondingly, stretched it too far, extended it until it was so thin, Sheridan was able to penetrate it at Five Forks. Such was plainly the effort of the Allies. Yet ten days later, in the first days of October, the move by the left flank was not yet successful. In fact at this time Paris official reports were compelled to confess a repulse and withdrawal north and east of Arras. So far the Germans had met reënforcements by reënforcements. The deadlock along the Aisne had been continued along the Somme, even now the lines were approaching the Scheldt with the German communications always intact.

While all this was happening in the west of the French battleground, the Germans on the east were now breaking out with a counter-thrust of their own, quite as sustained and, if successful, bound to have an important effect upon the whole campaign in Northern France.

CHAPTER XXXVII

ON THE ALLIED RIGHT

AT the moment when the attention of the world was directed toward French and British efforts to turn the German right flank the Berlin official statement suddenly announced the capture of the French works at Beaumont, with some thousands of prisoners. This was the first indication to the world of the German drive at the Allied right, which was henceforth to claim equal notice with the operations about the Somme. Beaumont is on the road from Pont-a-Mousson on the Moselle to Commercy on the Meuse and the road between the two towns passes over the Woëvre Plateau through the line of the Verdun-Toul barrier fortresses. Here then was another attempt to break through the iron wall of the French eastern frontier.

Such an operation might have a twofold purpose.

In the first place successful action against these barrier forts, since it would isolate Verdun and permit its reduction, as Maubeuge had already been reduced, would necessarily compel the French General Staff to hurry reënforcements to the Meuse. Such reënforcements would diminish the mass of troops held in the West for participation in the

great flanking movement about and beyond St. Quentin, where the Germans, confessedly outnumbered, were still holding on, but with apparent difficulty.

Yet there was a far wider significance to this attack made by the army of the Crown Prince, and, from the outset, pressed home with preliminary success and in the first week of October not yet decisively checked. In sum, it was an effort to open a short road from Germany into France, which would permit the Germans to evacuate Belgium temporarily and recall many thousands of troops now employed in guarding the long and vital line of communications from Liège by Brussels and also by Namur to the armies of von Kluck and von Boehm.

This was the second time the Crown Prince had made a desperate drive at the Verdun barrier, and his first attack had been preceded by the costly and long continued effort to break through in front of Nancy, which in its final stage was made under the eyes of the Kaiser himself.

To explain the value of the gateways into France covered by the Verdun-Toul barrier it is necessary to recall again the original purpose of German strategy. The invasion of Belgium was not directed against Belgium. Were France to be destroyed as a military power Belgium would be at the mercy of her German neighbor, but until that time Germany had no desire to detach army corps to garrison Belgium and contain Belgian forces in Antwerp. Hence her request for permission to

cross, accompanied by promises to respect Belgian integrity.

Had Belgium permitted the crossing, the patent plan of the German General Staff was to sweep through Northern France — as they did — toward Paris. While this advance was going on and after the Allied armies, falling back, had retired south of the Marne, it was the mission of the army of the Crown Prince, moving his troops west from Metz on one side of the barrier forts and south from Stenay on the other, to surround Verdun, besiege it and take it.

Meantime the army of General von Heeringen, coming west from Strassburg, was to force its way by Nancy through the gap between the Toul-Verdun and Epinal-Belfort barriers and joining hands with the Crown Prince's army to complete the investment of the whole Verdun-Toul barrier. Thus surrounded and subjected to bombardment by the guns which had reduced Liège and Maubeuge, the fall of these forts might be expected speedily.

With their fall the Germans would instantly obtain possession of the main railways leading from Northeast France to Paris, one coming from Metz through Verdun to Rheims, the other through Toul to Chalons. From German territory to Rheims and Chalons by these routes is not more than a quarter of the distance from Aix-la-Chapelle to St. Quentin and Rheims through Belgium.

Now, had Belgians permitted German troops to

cross to France without resistance, the German expectation was to force the Verdun-Toul barrier, withdraw all German troops from Belgium and employ the French lines, shorter and more satisfactory for German purposes, to transport supplies and reenforcements to the forces operating south of the Marne and before Paris.

Belgian resistance did not change the plan; in fact, it rather increased the urgency of the need for carrying the Verdun-Toul barrier. For until it was carried all Northern, Eastern and Central Belgium had to be garrisoned in order to keep open the railways from Liège to Northwestern France, on which the armies of von Boehm, von Kluck and von Buelow depended for all their supplies and reënforcements.

Despite desperate efforts the first attack upon Verdun failed and the Crown Prince's army was involved in the general retirement after the Battle of the Marne. At the same time the attempt of von Heeringen, despite the presence of the Kaiser, was halted in sight of Nancy. For the moment the plan had to be abandoned. But, just as soon as the Germans had rallied on the Aisne line and reorganized, the operation was resumed, since for obvious reasons the need of forcing the barriers and releasing army corps in Belgium to meet the reënforced Allied troops along the Aisne was daily increasing.

This time a less ambitious scheme was adopted. While the Crown Prince again came south between

Verdun and the Argonne, aiming to cut the railroad leading back to Paris and to isolate Verdun, the forces of von Heeringen, reduced by two corps sent west to St. Quentin, were sent against the barrier forts north of Toul. This new drive was to cut Verdun off and open, not the Verdun-Paris and the Nancy-Paris railways, but merely the former road.

By October the Crown Prince had reached or was almost on the Verdun-Paris railway line, having taken Varennes and continued south. Between the circle of forts surrounding Verdun and the similar circle about Toul there were a number of detached forts, some on the east, some on the west bank of the Meuse, along which run the road and railroad from Verdun to Toul. At the point where the Woëvre Plateau, dividing the Meuse from the Moselle Valley, is narrowest and the hills lowest, following the highroad from Pont-à-Mousson through Beaumont to Commercy, the Germans had come in, captured Beaumont, taken the fort of Camp des Romains, one of the most considerable of the detached forts, and at this point crossed the Meuse near St. Mihiel.

Paris reported that the crossing party was subsequently repulsed. Berlin insisted that it was not. Paris asserted that fresh troops coming north from Nancy by Toul were already on the flank of this army and had driven it out of Beaumont. Berlin denied this. On October 1, the truth was still undiscoverable, or in other words the issue of the

fight still undecided. If the French version were correct and the advance is pressed, the Germans east of the Woëvre must soon retreat to escape an enveloping movement, but the retreat had not yet come.

What is vital to note in the Verdun operation is that the Germans were making a second terrific effort to open a short road from German territory to French and free themselves from the intolerable burden of garrisoning Belgium, when every available man was needed in France and on the eastern frontiers. If they succeeded they could retire the three army corps in Belgium, leaving containing forces between the fortresses of Maubeuge, Namur and Liège now in their hands, stationed behind the Meuse and the Sambre to protect their flank. If they failed, then a general retirement from the Aisne would again free Verdun from danger and the Germans would still have to rely upon Belgian railways until another invasion of France permitted a third attempt on the Verdun-Toul barrier.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE FALL OF JAROSLAV

AT the Battle of Lemberg — about September 1, the Austrian centre facing east and standing in the midst of the Austrian Province of Galicia was routed. Two days later the right, holding the line from the Carpathians to the upper reaches of the Dniester River, was driven in and the strong fortress of Halicz taken. Meantime the Austrian left, striking north toward Lublin and attempting to postpone a Russian advance into Germany, had won preliminary successes. But the defeat of the right and centre left it in a precarious position. Attempting to escape, the Austrians were soundly beaten at Rawaruska and at Tomaszov. These battles completed the defeat of the main Austrian field army; in a general way they may be described as parts of the great Battle of Lemberg, since they are portions of a single general operation.

Having been defeated on all wings, it became a vital necessity for the Austrians not merely to retreat, but in retreating to concentrate. Precisely as the Germans after the Battle of the Marne went north until they stood solidly on the line of the Aisne, the Austrians had to seek a defensive battle ground.

This was discoverable some seventy miles west of Lemberg behind the San River. Flowing north from the Carpathians to the Vistula, straight across the whole province of Galicia, this large stream supplies a splendid barrier. In addition, both flanks of an army standing behind the San are protected, on the south by the Carpathians, on the north by the Vistula flowing east from Cracow.

Not only was this position of the San strong naturally, but in the centre two great fortresses surrounded by detached forts had been prepared at Jaroslav and Przemysl. Retreating from Rawaruska, Lemberg, Halicz, the Austrians could hope, finding reënforcements here, to make a second and more successful fight, if the morale of their armies had not been shaken by their defeats. But the fall of Jaroslav on September 23 plainly demonstrated that the Russian description of the Austrian reverses as routs was not exaggerated. In surrendering Jaroslav the Austrians gave up not merely the line of the San River, but the railroad from Cracow to Przemysl. Moreover, since the Russians were able to cross the San further north on the heels of the fleeing Austrians, saving the bridge, they now held positions west of the San enabling their own right and centre to cross, while their left wing along the Carpathians was across the San south of Przemysl.

For the Austrians the next promising defensive position was Tarnow, fifty miles east of Cracow and eighty miles west of Jaroslav. Here the Donajec

River, flowing north like the San to the Vistula from the Carpathians, barred the Russian road, while the Vistula protected the flank. The Vistula here, too, is much nearer to the Carpathians and the Austrians would have a far shorter line to defend. But Tarnow was not comparable with Przemysl or even Jaroslav as a fortified place.

Falling back from Jaroslav the Austrians had always to guard against the possibility of being enveloped by Cossack cavalry and cut off from Tarnow. If the retreat were a rout they might be captured or destroyed along the miry roads they were following. In any event, an army so shaken as to be unable to defend the San barrier could hardly reach Tarnow in an improved state after a long, difficult, harassing retreat.

In the larger way the Austrian disaster at Jaroslav was even more impressive than at Lemberg. It proved that a month after the earlier defeat the Austrian army had not recovered, had not pulled itself together sufficiently to defend a position ten times as strong naturally as that which the German Army was able to hold six days after it had been defeated and compelled to withdraw from the Marne to the Aisne.

By October 1, then, there was plain prospect that the Austrian field army in its present retreat might be wholly disorganized, practically destroyed as a fighting force, before it came home at Tarnow or Cracow. Outnumbered, demoralized by succes-

sive disasters, undermined by Slav sympathies, attacked by the diseases which always afflict badly trained and improperly equipped troops, the plight of this Austrian field force was plainly becoming more and more desperate.

The consequences of these defeats were clearly seen in the changed political situation in Rome and in all Balkan States. Just before Lemberg, Turkey and Bulgaria seemed on the point of joining the Dual Alliance. German officers were at Constantinople. Rumania and Italy were neutral and seemed determined to remain neutral. But after Lemberg, which gave Russia control not only of Eastern Galicia but of Bukovina, half of whose population is Rumanian, the Bucharest demand to take the field with the Allies of Russia became insistent, Italy began to ferment. Bulgaria grew cold to German intrigue. Even the Turk pushed his sword back and with characteristic fatalism resigned himself to inglorious peace.

After Jaroslav all this agitation was bound to grow. Promptly there was heard the circumstantial report that the Balkan League had been revived, that Russia had restored the Bulgarian-Greek-Servian Alliance and brought Rumania into it. If these Allies should join Russia, Bukovina and Transylvania would go to Rumania. Greece and Bulgaria would have compensation from Turkey, the former in the Ægean, the latter at Adrianople. As for

Italy — Trieste and the Trentino were always waiting for her.

So much for the neighbors of Austria, but what of her Slavs, what of her Czechs, her Serbs, her Croats, her Slovaks, her Slovenes; what of her Rumanians and her Italians? Even more insistently than after Lemberg the familiar question was posed. Would they not also yield to the centrifugal influences of race? Victory might have welded this heterogeneous force which is the Austrian Army, but defeat, disaster, rout, at the hands of the Slav? What, too, of still more defeats from the little Slav, the Serb south of the Save, who had to be disciplined — destroyed — and had repulsed the Austrian menace by the rout of the Jedar, was now coming on toward Serajevo, the city in which the torch had laid to the whole European magazine?

So far as the military aspect of the situation was concerned the Russian sweep still moved on slowly but steadily. Cracow reached, it would be in fact at the frontier of Germany, for Cracow was rather the sentinel of Silesia than Hungary and Cracow was now in sight. Even if Przemysl held out a little while, its fate seemed as certain as was that of Maubeuge. Once it fell the Russian left flank was solidly planted on the Carpathians and the march to Berlin could begin.

It was still possible on October 1 that Austrian reënforcements, strengthened by German army

corps, might stop the Russians at Tarnow. It was more likely that they would stand about Cracow, since the Germans might be needed in Silesia presently. But it was now apparent that Austria alone could not hold the Russian masses, could not keep the field against them. What Lemberg began Jaroslav had continued with a vengeance. Looked at with eyes most favorable to the Germans, it was becoming difficult to see how they could hope to postpone for many weeks more the arrival of the main Russian Army on their boundaries. It might come sooner too, if the Italian, the Rumanian, the Bulgarian saw in Jaroslav the promise of complete Russian triumph with individual profit to themselves if they assisted.

Meanwhile, the effect of the Russian victory at Jaroslav on the western operations was watched with interest. Once more, as before the invasion of Paris, as just preceding the Battle of the Marne, when Germany was engaged in a crucial and perhaps decisive operation, Austrian disaster claimed her attention. Was it small wonder that already Germans were beginning to whisper that the Austrian Alliance was, in fact, a millstone about their necks, a burden steadily growing to a positive peril? So Napoleon in his later days had won great victories, only to see their fruits lost by the consequences of the disasters which had overtaken his marshals.

CHAPTER XXXIX

A GERMAN ATTACK UPON ANTWERP

IN the closing days of September, while the Battle of the Aisne continued without cessation and with no promise of solution, the Germans suddenly began a considerable attack upon Antwerp. So extensive were the preparations that they seemed explicable only as the evidence of a grim determination to rid themselves of the intolerable burden, the present hindrance and the future peril, if at last they should be compelled to retire from France, which had long been discoverable in the brave and energetic operations of the Belgian Army, commanded by its intrepid sovereign and operating about the Antwerp fortress.

The determination of the Germans to press siege operations against Antwerp revealed in the closing days of September was simply explicable as the desire to rid themselves of an intolerable burden, a present hindrance, and in case of defeat in France a possible peril in the future. What Spain was to Napoleon in the latter days of the First Empire, Belgium had plainly become for the Kaiser, and the very atrocities, sufferings, brutalities of the Belgian campaign were but incomplete repetitions of the ter-

rible Peninsular War, in which Spanish women vied with the men in their ferocity, their courage and their determination to kill invaders at any cost.

In the opening days of the present war, when the little Belgian Army was fighting from Liège to Brussels, facing the screen of cavalry which the Germans stretched before their main advance, a credulous world attached far too much importance to Belgian battles, saw far too great results flowing from mere skirmishes like that at Haelen. A stray war correspondent in Brussels when the Germans arrived reported that one German officer, seizing a Brussels newspaper filled with reports of Belgian "victories," burst into a loud laugh and threw the sheet away.

A different situation existed, however, when the main German Army wheeled left at Brussels and started for Paris. Instantly it became necessary to detach three army corps to watch Antwerp, to which the Belgian Army had withdrawn; to mask Ostend, where British marines had been landed; to cover the railways, which were the life lines of German Armies now turned south to France. Behind the forts of Antwerp the Belgians stood like Wellington's veterans behind the lines of Torres Vedras in the Peninsular War, ready to strike whenever the forces before them were weakened.

Three army corps, then, were removed from the first line of German invasion at the crucial moment. Looking back upon the desperate days of the great

Allied retreat, recalling how near Sir John French's Army was to destruction at Cambrai, at St. Quentin, is it too much to say that the Belgian contribution to the Allied cause was here vital — decisive? Like Wellington's army, holding French masses in Spain and Portugal, when Napoleon was in fact fighting for his life in Eastern Germany, the Belgians were reducing German strength before Paris at the crucial hour in the great invasion.

More than this, it should be recalled that when von Kluck began his rapid retreat from the Marne the German General Staff attempted to despatch two army corps from Belgium to his aid. Instantly the Belgians sallied forth from Antwerp, came down almost to the gates of Brussels, compelled the recall of the two corps and delayed the reënforcement of von Kluck for days, necessitating an ultimate weakening of the Alsace-Lorraine armies.

To the disastrous effect of this resistance it is natural and doubtless correct to trace much of the bad conduct of Germans in Belgium. France was an expected opponent. Toward French cities and towns captured the Germans had displayed no such ferocity as the Belgian incidents revealed. All through the campaign there was unmistakably a growing rage at the presumption of the little State, not merely in making a resistance, but in crippling German armies at the moment when a tremendous triumph was almost in their hands.

What Napoleon attempted to do in Spain it now

seemed that the Germans were about to undertake in Belgium. As the British under Sir John Moore were driven back to Corunna and there compelled to take ship, the Belgians were now to be captured or driven out of Antwerp, or west to Ostend, to Ghent, to France. Antwerp itself could be of little present value to Germany, since an attempt to use it as a naval base, even if possible, would involve a violation of neutrality which might bring Holland into the enemy's camp. But Antwerp taken, the Belgian army captured or driven out of Northern Belgium, three army corps, vitally needed to the south, would be released. Belgium, save for the district about Ostend, would be completely conquered and the last Belgian army disposed of. So long as there was a Belgian army in being, the whole country was likely to continue its irregular warfare, but it seemed not improbable that the capture of King Albert's army would break the spirit of a gallant little people, utterly crushed at last by the might of German arms.

On the other hand if German retreat from Northern France should follow the Battle of the Aisne, the Belgian army would presently be released by the Allied advance, could operate on the left flank of the Anglo-French army and compel the evacuation of Brussels and all of Northern and Western Belgium, might be as useful to the general Allied cause as was that of Wellington, which flowed

over the Pyrenees in 1814, to the enemies of Napoleon.

Belgium, like Servia then, had rendered real service to the cause of her greater Allies. At the decisive moment in the Austro-Russian campaign in Galicia, when Austria needed every battalion at Lemberg, Servia was not merely holding, but defeating four of the sixteen first line corps on her own frontier at the Jedar. Since Brussels fell Belgium had similarly occupied the attention of three German corps. Until Antwerp fell she seemed likely to continue to render this service, of incalculable advantage now, when Germany needed all her soldiers to meet Russia, France and England.

The capture of Antwerp would have been held impossible two months earlier. But German howitzers had now shattered all preconceived notions of the impregnability of fortresses. Its position, partially surrounded by meadows, which could be inundated, together with its proximity to the Dutch frontier, prevented its complete investment. Its seagate would remain open and supplies could flow in and out steadily, unless Germany ventured to invade Dutch territory — a risk too great to take now, it appeared.

On the other hand, until Antwerp were taken German security in the West was unattainable. Its two circles of forts, now strengthened during eight weeks of waiting, had been reckoned so strong that

the town was held the rival of Paris as a fortified city. On the outer line, its whole field army was placed, and the army was trained in battle. It was also nerved to desperate resistance by the realization that the fall of Antwerp would mark the close of Belgian resistance and not improbably of Belgian independence if Germany should win the great war.

German defeat at the Aisne might automatically terminate the siege of Antwerp. German victory would certainly permit the siege to be pressed. Similarly a continuation of that battle on its present lines would give the Germans the necessary time for their siege operations. Thus on October 1 it seemed not impossible that in the next few days the world might see the Belgians making their last stand. But even if they were now defeated, their contribution to the Allied cause could not be exaggerated and would not be forgotten on the day of reckoning if Germany's foes ultimately prevailed. Nor was it likely to be overlooked by Germany if she finally defeated a world in arms.

CHAPTER XL

EXTINGUISHING GERMANY'S PLACE IN THE SUN

GERMAN colonial activity is in the main a Post-Bismarckian development. For the Iron Chancellor remote and insanitary African holdings were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. To the close of his public career Bismarck concentrated his attention, his interest upon Europe. It was only after he was sent into retirement that Germany tardily entered the race for possessions beyond the seas.

The new policy brought with it new perils and new rivalries. It was natural that Modern Germany, breaking her flag out on every sea, year after year distancing ancient rivals and pressing close upon English heels, should view with resentment a condition in which her ships were at the mercy of the English, the French, even the Portuguese and the Dutch colonial ports. Nowhere about the Seven Seas was Germany in possession of naval or commercial bases such as some of the most insignificant of nations possessed.

To repair the situation the successors of Bismarck hastily endeavored to plant the German flag upon such territories as had not yet been taken by other

nations. Thus Togoland, Kamerun, German Southwest Africa and German East Africa were acquired; Samoa, Kaiser Wilhelmsland and Spanish islands in the Pacific were annexed or purchased. Ten years ago the world map began to show considerable areas bearing the German color.

Yet while Germany was doing this France acquired Madagascar, made good her empire from the Mediterranean to the Niger and the Congo, extended her frontier in Indo-China, began the absorption of Morocco. Great Britain conquered the Boer Republics, the United States the Philippines and Porto Rico; even little Belgium came into possession of the vast Congo Free State, incomparably superior to all the colonial acquisitions of the mighty German Empire. Italy, ally but still a rival, took Tripoli, the last waste place on the North African coast.

Thus, looking back over German official and unofficial comment during the past decade there is noticeable the ever-growing bitterness and dissatisfaction disclosed over the failure of modern Germany to acquire its "place in the sun," over the manifest injustice that was patent in a distribution of overseas land which had allotted to France, with a stationary population, to Great Britain, also inferior in European population to Germany, splendid colonial territories capable of receiving European immigrants, while Germans, without colonies, members of an ever-growing population, were compelled to



GERMANY'S AFRICAN COLONIES (SHOWN IN BLACK)

lose nationality when they emigrated, and German industrial prosperity was threatened by the ever-increasing number of lands in which hostile tariffs handicapped German exports.

The Moroccan incident, aside from the merely political aspects, appealed to the whole German public because it represented to them an effort to prevent the annexation by France of the last considerable African territory in which German manufacturers might find a market, German colonists and merchants a foothold. Year by year Germany was consciously growing stronger, yet year by year she was being outdistanced by feebler rivals in that partition of the surface of the earth which carried with it the commercial prosperity of the future.

In developing the German attitude toward England, toward France, toward Russia, an attitude which made for war and is wholly demonstrable by reference to Bernhardi, the resentment at the unfairness of the colonial division played no inconsiderable part. It was, too, mainly directed against England, because it was recognized that but for British support French colonies would have followed the fate of Alsace-Lorraine. The British conquest of the Boer Republics, too, closed to Germany the last attractive home for her surplus population desiring to remain German in tongue and sympathy.

Such was the colonial emotion of Germany prior to war. Now what has been the immediate effect of the great struggle upon her insignificant "place

in the sun," so inadequate in German eyes yet precious in the promise of the future? First of all, on the morning of the declaration of war France and England from Dahomey and the Gold Coast stepped over into Togoland, seized the ports, overran the shore, and after a mere formal resistance upon the part of a helpless colonial governor extinguished German authority there.

Hard on this came the Japanese attack upon Kiao Chau, long persisting but certain to end in the capture by Japan of Germany's only foothold in Asia, on which she has lavished millions and for which she had planned a great future, conceiving it to be the base from which she was to challenge British influence at Hong Kong and French in Indo-China.

Then, in the Pacific, Australian and New Zealand expeditions took Germany's Samoan port and island, occupied Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and an eventual seizure of the islands purchased from Spain was to be expected. Taken by Australia and New Zealand, they would patently be hereafter included in the Anglo-Saxon Empire of the South Pacific, will be lost permanently as Kiao Chau must be.

In Africa there promptly began British operations against German Southwest Africa. This colony had always been a menace in British eyes. Held by Germany it was a base for hostile intrigue on the flank of her South African colonies, it included a part of the gold and diamond fields. To acquire it, Germany on her part had paid dearly in blood and treas-

ure in the Herero War. Now armies from the Union of South Africa, officered, such is the irony of fate, by the Boer Generals on whom Germany relied to promote revolt in the Transvaal, were being directed against this colony, indefensible with the resources possessed by its Governor. Its fall and inclusion in the South African Union already by October 1, seemed almost inevitable.

On the East Coast there was that prosperous colony, through which Germany has just completed a railway to Lake Tanganyika from Dar-es-Salaam. With the Kamerun and the Belgian Congo to be acquired by forcible annexation later, this was to be Germany's most considerable "place in the sun." But the British early bombarded Dar-es-Salaam, and began an invasion from the south. Once this colony were taken the sole obstacle to Cecil Rhodes's Cape-to-Cairo "all red" dream was extinguished — for could any one, recalling British history, suppose that, conquered, it would be relinquished?

Finally from Kamerun, on the West Coast, only recently extended by French "compensation" toward the Congo and the Ubanghi, came reports of French and British activities at Duala, at Coco Beach, of the surrender of German officials helpless in the presence of warships and French and English colonial forces from Nigeria and French Congo. Plainly France was striving here to retake her surrendered territory and restore her interrupted grasp from the Mediterranean to the Congo.

While the attention of the world was fixed upon the battlefields of Western Europe it was now clear German colonial possessions on two continents were rapidly becoming the prey of her opponents. So Louis XV and Napoleon saw their overseas territories vanish. So France lost Quebec and India. Thus, once more, sea power was proving its tremendous value in a world war.

CHAPTER XLI

GERMAN SURPRISES. HOWITZER, SUBMARINE AND ZEPPELIN

AT the very outset of the war the world was warned that Germany had "surprises" in store for her opponents. Not "surprises" in the sense that the general staffs of the Allies were uninformed, in some measure at least, as to the innovations which their great opponent had planned to introduce, but "surprises" which would astound and terrify the people of France, of England and of Russia, who were naturally uninformed on technical military matters.

The first of these surprises was the great siege gun. Of its achievement at Liège the world knew little, because after the first days of confused reports a veil settled over this city, a veil which was not lifted until long after the last fort fell and the first war correspondents were permitted to inspect the ruins of the steel turreted concrete forts which had been destroyed by the opening salvos of the howitzer.

It was, in fact, the fall of Namur which first warned the general public that the reliance in fortresses had been vain. From the first operation against Liège on August 4 until August 20 the Bel-

gians, aided at least by the advice of their British and French Allies, had been at work preparing Namur for resistance. The whole battle plan of the Allies about Charleroi, Mons and the northern line was predicated upon a determined resistance by Namur. But in a few hours Namur fell, the forts destroyed, the garrisons terror-stricken, and the French at Charleroi, the British at Mons, narrowly escaped disaster.

More than any other circumstances the German howitzer contributed to the opening defeats of the Allies. Following the fall of Namur there was what one British newspaper described as a whole *dégringolade* of fortresses. Lille was dismantled, La Fère and Rheims were abandoned in turn. Laon fell, Mézières capitulated, the entire northern barrier of French fortresses gave up the struggle, with a celerity which astounded the world.

It is idle, of course, to believe that French military men were ignorant of the weakness of their forts. Indeed, as we now know, they had tested one with their own cannon and reduced it to dust in a few minutes. The prompt fall of Jaroslav, after a short bombardment by Russian big guns, similarly suggests that the heavy artillery of all the big armies has hopelessly distanced the defensive art of engineers and that what Germany has already done may be repeated by France at Metz and Strassburg, by Russia at Posen and Breslau, if the chance comes.

Yet the German howitzer, a mountain of metal, mobile on its caterpillar wheels, certainly insured German superiority in the field of heavy artillery, and as the German armies approached Paris it seemed to the whole world that with this tremendous weapon the Kaiser might accomplish his design and get into Paris in six weeks. The defeat at the Marne prevented this. But in the last week of September there came word from the east of France that Verdun and Toul, the great barrier forts guarding the Alsace-Lorraine frontiers, were crumbling under the fire of these same howitzers that levelled Namur and Liège and that the Germans expected shortly to destroy the great wall that through the years and at tremendous expense France has erected on this frontier.

Armed with the howitzer on land, Germany was equally equipped on the water — or perhaps better under it. The apprehension, the actual fear, which the great guns inspired in the hearts of the British and French publics in the early days of the war was equalled, if not exceeded by the anxiety caused by the first attack of the German submarines. A single raid, made, German official statements asserted, by one submarine, resulted in the destruction of three large battle cruisers — the *Cressy,* the *Aboukir,* the *La Hogue* — and the loss of most of their crews. Indeed, one must go far back in British naval history to find a parallel to the disaster of September 22 in the North Sea.

If there was general ignorance as to German howitzers, it is no exaggeration to say there was actual lack of information in naval quarters as to the German submarines. The secret of their plans, their possibilities, had been guarded with success; while technical journals published authoritative discussions of each new device in British submarine building, no whisper of German submarine construction has been permitted to reach the world.

There was, then, about the German submarine exploit something of the mysterious, which added to terror a feeling not unlike that of the man who suddenly treads upon a deadly serpent in the grass. Something snakelike there was in the whole affair. After it there could be no mistaking British apprehension. The ships lost were not of the first line, but how soon was there to be a second raid which might destroy superdreadnoughts? How great thereafter would be the strain upon the captains and admirals who commanded the British high seas fleet watching outside the German naval base!

Last of all in the final week of September, following a raid on Ostend there came reports of a general Zeppelin raid. At Antwerp weeks ago there was a Zeppelin attack, apparently by a single airship. But now, it appeared that there was preparing, not an experimental trip by one Zeppelin, but an operation of a fleet. From Ostend to London was not an hour's sail for these dreadnoughts of the air. The incident in Antwerp was enough to warrant graver ap-

prehension than London knew in Napoleon's time.

From the outbreak of the present war, before it, Germans had threatened great and terrible things with their Zeppelins. It was true that they had met with many accidents in peace time. It was a fact that technical men in France and England had asserted that the Zeppelin was too dependent upon air conditions to be an efficient weapon. Yet year after year Germany, by no means reckless with her money, had sunk millions in Zeppelins. To this very hour, too, the general public at least was ignorant of what these monsters might accomplish either in an attack upon British ships in the German Ocean or upon London and Paris.

On land, under the water and now in the air, Germany had provided terrible weapons. Should the Zeppelins, despite all its critics, even approximate the success of the howitzer and the submarine, it was plain that the civilized world would soon see in actual life a realization of the most terrible and tremendous things which the imagination of novelists had described in recent years. Certainly the fancied approach of the Zeppelin gave London a keener realization of the meaning of war than it had yet known.

It is appropriate, too, to point out once more how thoroughly Germany had so far distanced her opponents on the technical side of war making.

CHAPTER XLII

THE END OF THE FIRST PHASE

UNDER the walls of the eastern forts of Liège the first shots of the Belgian campaign were fired on August 4. October 4 then, marking the close of the second month of the Great War, supplied an appropriate calendar division at which to measure the progress of the several campaigns.

The honors of the first month undoubtedly rested with the Germans. Thirty days after the artillery of the Kaiser awakened echoes not merely of the hills above the Vesdre and Ourthe Valleys, but throughout the civilized world, his grey uniformed masses were on the Marne and the Seine, the roar of his cannon at Meaux and Lagny was plainly audible on the boulevards and along the quays of the French capital. Five weeks after Germany had despatched her first declaration of war, that to Petrograd, her massive military machine had overrun Belgium and reached the gates of Paris.

Looking eastward, if the success was less complete, there was still little cause for German pessimism. It was true that about Lemberg the main Austrian Army had been beaten, was falling back in a retreat which, as it turned out, was to become a

rout, but north and east in Poland and before Lubline and in Lodz Austrian and German soldiers were still advancing. In East Prussia, too, on Sedan Day, General von Hindenberg had won the sweeping victory of Tannenberg — "the Sedan of the East," German journals named it. The destruction of General Rennenkampf's force, the right wing of the Russian battle line from the Carpathians to the Baltic, seemed quite as probable as the rout of the Austrian army corps on the San and the Vistula.

Plainly, indisputably, Germany had won the first round. On September 4 — and to get a just appreciation of the situation on October 4, in its proper relation to that of a month before, it is necessary to recall what the world expected on the earlier date — the press of London and Berlin alike talked frankly of the possibility that in a few days Paris might fall, the French Government had fled to Bordeaux, all the parallels and precedents of 1870 were on the lips and in the minds of men. For two weeks defeated French and English Armies had retreated over the fields of Flanders, Picardy, Artois and Champagne — these provinces were lost and there existed the grave possibility that the morale of the Allied Armies had been shaken — possibly destroyed.

But on October 4, who could mistake the change? The Battle of the Marne had been fought. The southernmost foothold of the Germans, that on the Noyon Hills, was nearly seventy miles from Paris

and eighty from Lagny, the high water mark of the advance of von Kluck. Eastward the German line now ran straight across the plain of Chalons north of Verdun, no longer surrounded. The army of the Crown Prince was retiring from Varennes and the vicious thrust through the barrier forts at St. Mihiel seemed to be frustrated.

More than this, after a week of retreat and three more weeks of desperate, tremendous, heroic efforts the German masses had been unable to get on foot again, to step out once more toward Paris. To Noyon and the Craonne Plateau north of Soissons von Kluck had come back on September 12. Von Buelow had been driven north of Rheims in the same general movement, and on October 4 neither the German right nor the centre had regained a single mile of territory on this front.

Three weeks of the most confused and bloodiest fighting the Western world had known found the Germans and the Allies facing each other, deadlocked on lines swept by the heaviest artillery of three nations, cut and seamed with the trenches and intrenchments which were daily growing and more and more taking on the character of those lines below Richmond where Grant and Lee did battle from July, 1864, to April, 1865.

Meantime, to the west and north, new Allied Armies gathered from every quarter of the globe, regiments of Sikhs and Gurkhas touching elbows with Moroccan *goums* and battalions of black sol-

diers from the Senegal and the Niger, British regulars recalled from Hindustan and Egypt, strengthened or about to be strengthened by Colonial troops from Canada and Australia, were moving upon the flank and rear of the German armies; Asia, Africa, America and Australia were beginning to contribute the first levies from resources which should henceforth be inexhaustible.

As a result of this thrust all northwest France had been recovered. Amiens, Lille, Arras, cities and regions which had been occupied by Germans in early September, had paid ransom to their conquerors, were now redeemed. All the main railways from Paris to the Channel were in Allied hands once more and, having been reconstructed, were conveying fresh troops far northward as the campaign developed toward the Belgian line.

In all this time the main effort of the Germans had been defensive. The hope of a new thrust at Paris, made promptly, when the armies defeated at the Marne had been refitted, rested, had vanished. Save for a desperate flank push toward the Verdun-Toul barrier the whole concern of the German General Staff was to protect its imperilled right — to guard the railroad from Laon and St. Quentin to Brussels and Liège, the life line of the great armies in France. Even the vigorous drive at Antwerp was one more defensive move, to relieve pressure upon necessary communications.

Up to October 4 the Germans had succeeded in

these efforts. French and British advances to Péronne and the suburbs of St. Quentin had been pushed back. Cavalry raids to Le Catelet and Roisel, towns actually on the westernmost of the German supply lines, had been checked and flung back. Even to the south, beyond Noyon, impertinent drives at Lassigny and the Noyon Hills had been crushed down and ground lost had been retaken.

But to do this troops had been collected from the whole extent of the battle line, from the interior garrisons of Germany — attack in Alsace, in Lorraine had been abandoned. The efforts to break the Allied centre had failed. Army corps in Belgium had been drawn down and the garrisoning of this captured kingdom left to the Landsturm, to middle-aged men.

Yet all this had not served to relieve the pressure. Repulsed at one point, the Allied flanking thrust moved always to the north. It had failed at Péronne and St. Quentin. It was renewed at Albert and Bapaume. Halted here, it was felt again east of Arras and was now mounting up to Douai. The Battle of the Aisne had become the Battle of the Seven Rivers. The German right flank, once resting in the Noyon Hills, was extending hourly towards Belgium. Allied armies were already stretching out a hand to Belgian forces west of the Scheldt. Behind them was the chain of Channel ports, Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, equally

available for sending supplies and reënforcements since the Allies held the seas.

In fact, the German offensive in the second month had fallen to the level of a siege, and it was the invaders who were being besieged. Again and again they were striking out, with unfaltering courage and determination endeavoring to break the circle of steel always closing about them. But, despite small gains, they had made no substantial progress. The ground they had occupied they held, their lines of communication remained intact. But this was the limit of their advantage after three weeks of effort, after losses which far exceeded those from Liège to the Battle of the Marne.

Meantime the situation in the East had gravely changed. Austrian defeat at Lemberg had been followed by rout at Tomazov, at Rawaruska. Jaroslav had fallen. Przemysl was isolated and invested. Cossacks had crowned the Carpathians and flowed over into the Hungarian Plain. A considerable offensive toward the Niemen from East Prussia was being beaten down. From the Baltic to the Carpathians the Russian battle line was at last in motion, its left flank on the Carpathians near Cracow, its right once more moving into East Prussia, its centre drawing toward Posen and Breslau, still on Russian soil, but no longer far from the Silesian and Posen frontier posts. Two months, too, the Czar had been allowed to bring up his millions; in

bringing them up he seemed unmistakably to have crushed Austrian military strength, and there was left only Germany to meet Allied might in the long feared "war of the two fronts."

If the first month, the "first round" had been to the Germans; was it less unmistakable on October 4 that the second had been to the Allies? But German statesmen, themselves, in justifying their violation of Belgian neutrality, had, in effect, confessed that to win at all Germany must triumph in the first weeks, win, not tactically but decisively, crush, annihilate the military strength of France; hold Paris and the Republic to ransom, as a hostage, while victorious western armies flowed back to the Niemen to deal with the armies of the Czar.

Yet on October 4 it was Allied, not German, armies that were advancing in France. As on September 4 the world was talking of the fall of Paris, so on October 4 it was the probable approach of German retreat from France which occupied the attention not alone of Allies but of neutral observers. The expectations of the earlier month had proved false, those of October might be equally unwarranted. Yet, not even in German official and unofficial utterances was there longer the promise of victory that should terminate the western war. What had opened as a daring, magnificent, unrivalled effort to end a war in the first weeks of conflict with a brief and irresistible drive, had fallen now to the level of a mere campaign, in size, in ex-

tent of territory, in numbers engaged, unequalled in history, but still a campaign, like other campaigns, before Waterloo, Sedan and Sadowa had nourished the belief that nations could be crushed in weeks, even in days.

So in a larger sense October 4 might be accepted as the date which saw the close of the first phase of the Great War, the interruption, perhaps temporary, perhaps final of German expectations, but at least the termination of the period in which she had hoped to win quickly; the extinction of the dream which had dominated her military operations from Liège to the time when the Battle of the Aisne became the Battle of the Seven Rivers, of the Three Nations, for the immediate battle ground now stretched through Germany, France and Belgium, from the Swiss to the Dutch frontiers. Two months had seen the beginning of a war not the end of France, of Servia, not even of little Belgium, crushed but defiant; had seen Russia take the field and England send her advance guard to the continent.

POSTSCRIPT

THE FALL OF ANTWERP

IT was the moral rather than the military aspect of the fall of Antwerp which on October 10 necessarily appealed to the whole civilized world. For if the military consequences were bound to be immediate, possibly considerable, conceivably felt along the whole tremendous battle lines which were the present frontiers of European nations, the moral value was permanent, destined to take its place among the few imperishable failures of the weak to resist the strong, which from Thermopylæ to Lexington and Saragossa have captured the admiration and the imagination of mankind.

Indeed, from the moment the first cannon of the Kaiser was heard in the Valley of the Vesdre and Liège, openly challenged the German millions, it was Belgium which had contributed the real moral note in a war that on all other sides had seemed, continued to seem, the battle of rival races, nations, cultures, ambitions for "places in the sun." France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Great Britain, each was fighting for something which if acquired meant greater power, influence, prosperity, grandeur.

But Belgium, for her no profit had ever been in the question. The ruin that now covered her fields from the Meuse to the Scheldt was unavoidable, inevitable, the moment that the first shots about the Walloon citadel proclaimed that another little people was prepared to die for its independence. So Holland challenged Spain, and so in brief weeks ruin mounted and extended until the Dutch in their despair opened the dikes and invited the sea to complete what the Duke of Alva had begun. So the Swiss of the Forest Cantons challenged the Hapsburg power and gave William Tell to German literature and legend.

Each day, too, since the first, the wave of destruction had rolled steadily on. Louvain, Dinant, Aerschot, Malines, a score more of cities, filled with the splendors and glories of centuries, adorned with the supreme artistic expression of generations and centuries now long vanished, had succumbed to the shells of Krupp and the torch and bomb of German military power. To these was now added Antwerp, in flames, devastated, how terribly was still unknown.

Even more instantly appalling was the continuing history of human misery which for two months had been reported in every daily despatch. The cortège of the innocent, the unfortunate, the women and children, of the aged and the helpless, had flowed north, south, west, vainly seeking to escape from the ruin of their homes, the wreck of all that life held dear to them. Mothers carrying the mutilated bodies

of their children, children trudging wearily down the long roads leading from one misery to another, their wondering eyes still blinded by the horrors of a tragedy they could not understand.

Yet in all ages this has been the price of liberty. In our own time and generation it has become natural, as it was easy, to think of the blessings which are our inheritance — peace, independence, the right to speak the language of our fathers and follow the traditions of our race — as things assured by mere right of existence, guaranteed by laws and powers divine and superhuman and beyond the challenge of living men or nations. Thus as we have wondered and admired the courage of those who from Marathon to Haarlem lived heroically and died fearlessly, we have come to look at the necessity for defending liberty as legendary, as having become obsolete as ancient forts now transformed into places of pilgrimage and pleasure.

Thanks to Belgium, the world is now able to see two things clearly. First, that the necessity to defend the things which all men hold dearest is as modern as the latest invention of the current year. Second, that while all the conditions of war have changed, while the armored automobile with its rapid fire gun has replaced the scythed chariot of the Persian, the gray clad German infantryman the hoplite of the Hellenes, the 42-centimetre howitzer of the Krupps the artillery of Cretan bowmen, while commanders now examine the report of their aeroplane

scouts instead of the omens before giving battle, the spirit of man himself remains unchanged, still unconquerable, still willing to dare all that those things he holds dear may survive even though he must perish.

Thus it was that even as the world mourned the destruction of the glorious monuments of Belgium, saw in the ruin of Louvain and half a score of Flemish cities known to all who love beautiful things a hopeless subtraction from its capital of architecture and of art, it had in the same moment to recognize the gain, the increase in the spiritual glories of mankind. In our own times, as contemporary as the latest edition of the morning paper, there was revealed once more amidst the crumbling walls of Antwerp, in the blackened, shell-torn fields of Flanders, the spirit without which architecture was impossible, art could not have flourished, the spirit that gave Greece existence, without which the Parthenon would not have been, the inspiration that was before and beneath all that the Hellenic genius gave the world.

In a larger sense, then, the siege of Antwerp, as it symbolized the resistance of the gallant little Belgian people, was an event which instantly took its place in the enduring history of the world. It came to us in a newspaper still damp from the press, but so long as written history endures men will grope through scanty records as we search the imperfect resources of ancient times to discover, if we may, one

more circumstance in the story of Marathon, in the legend of Thermopylæ.

More than all else poor, crushed and beaten Belgium, her last bulwark of resistance in ashes now, had lived and in a sense almost died that mankind might perceive that years of peace, progress, of advance in all that makes life easy and pleasant, had neither impaired the spirit of man himself nor abolished the necessity that from time to time men should die, nations suffer, that what men hold best might live.

In all history the resistance of Greece to Xerxes, of Holland to Philip have remained unchallenged as the most heroic incidents in the records of our planet. By right of courage, devotion, supreme agony, Belgium had now earned her right to a place beside these two. This could not be a solace to her in present suffering, it would not heal the ravages nor bind the wounds of war, but in the long time hereafter it will make Belgium a place of pilgrimage and give to the history of this nation a spiritual value compensating for the ashes of Louvain, the ruins of Antwerp, for the terrible months of agony now touching the apex.

DATES IN THE GREAT WAR

June 28. Assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

July 23. Austria sends an ultimatum to Servia.

25. Servia answers and Austria declares the reply unsatisfactory.

28. Austria declares war on Servia.
Russia orders partial mobilization against Austria.

29. Austria bombards Belgrade.

31. Germany in an ultimatum demands that Russia demobilize.
Belgian mobilization ordered.
German mobilization ordered.

August 1. Germany declares war on Russia.
German mobilization begun.

2. German troops enter Luxemburg.
Germany asks Belgian government to permit German troops to cross Belgium.
Belgium declines to permit this.

3. German troops enter Belgium.
French mobilization ordered.
King Albert of Belgium appeals to Great Britain.
Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons foreshadows British action.

4. Great Britain sends an ultimatum to Ger-

many demanding Belgian neutrality be respected.

Germany declares war on France and Belgium. Great Britain, just after midnight, declares a state of war has existed with Germany beginning on Aug. 4.

German troops before Liège.

August 5. Germans attack Liège forts and are repulsed.

Lord Kitchener enters the British Cabinet as War Minister.

Austrian troops bombard Belgrade.

German warships shell Libau and Bona.

6 British fleet takes position in the North Sea.

Italy informs the British Government of her intention to remain neutral.

Austria declares war on Russia.

7. Germans enter Liège but some of the forts hold out for several days.

French enter Alsace.

8. First British troops land in France.

9. *Goeben* and *Breslau* take refuge in the Dardanelles.

10. France declares war on Austria.

11. German advance through Belgium begins, skirmish at Landen.

12. Great Britain declares a state of war exists with Austria.

Montenegro declares war on Austria.

Battle of Haelen, first considerable "Belgian Battle."

13. Turkey buys the *Goeben* and *Breslau* from Germany.

French troops in Alsace, fight about Muelhausen.

August 14. Germans and Belgians fight at Diest.
French troops enter Belgium near Charleroi marching to Gembloux.

15. Czar promises restoration of Poland.
French counter-offensive in Lorraine begins.
Japan sends ultimatum to Germany.
Belgians and Germans fight at Tirlemont.

17. Belgian capital moved to Brussels.
Battle of Jedar in Servia begins.
Battle of Saarburg-Lunéville opens.

18. Main Germany Army approaches Brussels.
Russian advance toward East Prussia starts, reaching Gumbinnen.

19. Belgians decisively defeated before Brussels at Louvain.

20. Germans enter Brussels.
Belgian army retires to Antwerp.

21. French troops defeated in Battle of Saarburg-Lunéville.
French counter-offensive in Alsace-Lorraine fails.
Servians rout the Austrians in the Battle of the Jedar.
Germans attack Namur and march on Mons and Charleroi.
British troops reach Mons.
French evacuate Muelhausen in Alsace.
German Crown Prince defeats French at Neufchâteau in Belgian Ardennes, repulsing French counter-offensive on the Meuse.

August 22. Germans take Namur.
Battle of Mons-Charleroi begins.
23. Japan declares war on Germany and prepares to attack Kiau-Chau.
French are defeated at Charleroi and Givet.
Lille surrenders.
Russian troops victorious in East Prussia approach Koenigsberg.
French and British begin their "great retreat."
Austrians driven out of Servia.
24. A Zeppelin drops bombs in Antwerp.
25. Austria declares war on Japan.
26. A New French Ministry formed.
British Army defeated at Cambrai retreats to escape annihilation.
Russians victorious in East Prussia occupy Allenstein.
The Battle of Lemberg in Galicia begins.
Louvain destroyed.
27. Germans capture Longwy.
Kiau-Chau blockaded.
28. British defeated at St. Quentin and compelled to retire.
French repulse Germans at Guise but have to retreat.
Germans and French fight indecisive battle at Launois.
Austrian Army invading Russian Poland wins Battle of Krasnik.
British fleet wins first naval battle of the war near Heligoland.

Germany sends troops from the west to check the Russians.

August 29. Germans take La Fère and pass the second line of French defense.

An expedition from New Zealand siezes German Samoa.

30. Germans occupy Amiens.

German aeroplanes drop bombs in Paris.

31. Austrians routed by Russians before Lemberg, first Allied victory.

St. Petersburg becomes Petrograd again.

September 1. Von Kluck's army reaches Senlis, 25 miles from Paris.

Russians occupy Lemberg.

Russians routed at Tannenberg in East Prussia.

2. Japanese expedition against Kiau-Chau lands in China.

3. French Government removes to Bordeaux which becomes the capital.

Von Kluck begins his turning movement toward the Marne.

4. Germans cross the Marne.

Rheims abandoned by the French and occupied by the Germans.

Belgian troops take the field along the Scheldt from Antwerp.

5. Great Britain, France and Russia sign an agreement binding all three to make no peace save together.

6. The Battle of the Marne begins with the attack of the garrison of Paris and the

British upon von Kluck east of Lagny, five miles from the eastern forts of Paris.

German center attacks French position at La Fère Champenoise, the left at Vitry-le-François.

September 7. Von Kluck begins German retreat from the Marne.

Maubeuge captured by the Germans.

Austrians routed at Ravaruska in Galicia.

8. Von Buelow's army, the German center, repulsed at Montmirail begins retreat across the Marne.

Von Kluck defeated at the Ourcq retreats toward the Aisne.

10. Whole Germany Army from Paris to Vitry in retreat.

Beginning of a week of rain-storms.

Servians capture Semlin.

11. Von Kluck draws his forces out of Amiens and Compiègne and approaches Soissons.

12. German Army before Nancy decisively repulsed in the presence of the Kaiser.

French and British begin the Battle of the Aisne attacking Von Kluck at Soissons.

13. French and British force the passage of the Aisne at Soissons and gain a foothold on the Craonne Plateau.

14. Allies recapture Rheims.

Belgians driven back into Antwerp.

Allied pursuit of Von Kluck checked just north of Soissons.

15. The battle line of the Aisne develops toward

the Argonne and Allied pursuit is brought to a standstill.

September 16. Russians reach Przemysl.

18. Rheims Cathedral bombarded.
Russian Army driven out of East Prussia.
Germans retreat from French Lorraine near Nancy.
Along the Aisne Germans attempt to take the offensive unsuccessfully.

19. Germans take Beaumont between Toul and Verdun.

21. Allies begin attack on German left flank at Lassigny.
Russians take Jaroslav.
German submarine *U-9* in the North Sea sinks three British cruisers, *Cressy, La Hogue* and *Aboukir.*
On Germans' left Allies capture Péronne, reach St. Quentin and are driven out.

23. German attack on French right reaches barrier forts south of Verdun.

24. Zeppelin airship drops bombs in Ostend.

25. German invasion of Russia from East Prussia reaches the Niemen River.
Allies are driven out of Péronne.
Germans reach the Meuse on the Allied right near St. Mihiel.

26. Russian cavalry crosses Carpathians into Hungary.

27. British troops from India land in Marseilles.
Servians approach Serajevo.

28. Germans retake Lassigny on their right.

Allied flanking movement reaches Albert.
Siege of Antwerp begins.

September 29. Belgian sortie from Antwerp repulsed.

30. Allied movement against German right reaches vicinity of Arras.

October 1. Germans defeated at Augustovo.
German attack on French right repulsed across the Meuse at St. Mihiel.

3. Crown Prince defeated in the Argonne north of Varennes.
German attack on Verdun-Toul barrier forts abandoned, despite the capture of Fort Camp des Romains.
German attack on Antwerp makes material progress.

4. Allied flanking movement reaches Arras and is driven back from Douai.
German retreat from Niemen River reaches East Prussian frontier.
Przemysl invested by Russians whose advance in Galicia reaches Tarnow.
Russian cavalry invades Hungary.

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